Concordia Seminary - Saint Louis

Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary
Master of Sacred Theology Thesis

Concordia Seminary Scholarship

5-1-1966

An Examination of the Logic of Religious Discourse with a View to
Ascertaining the Impact of Linguistic Analysis Upon
Contemporary Philosophy of Religion
John Groh

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.csl.edu/stm
Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Groh, John, "An Examination of the Logic of Religious Discourse with a View to Ascertaining the Impact of
Linguistic Analysis Upon Contemporary Philosophy of Religion" (1966). Master of Sacred Theology
Thesis. 315.
https://scholar.csl.edu/stm/315

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Concordia Seminary Scholarship at Scholarly
Resources from Concordia Seminary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master of Sacred Theology Thesis by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary. For more information, please contact
seitzw@csl.edu.

AN l~XAMINAT ION OF l'HE LOGIC Ol"' nt:LIGIOUS U.ISCOUH!ii:: tHTH A Va~
TO A~Ci;i(fAINING 'l'H.i:: IMPACT OF LINGUI;.i'.L'IC ANALY:SI!i UPON
<;OUTI<;M'PORARY PHILO~OPHY OF lij,;LIGION

A Theois Presented to the Faculty
of Concordia Seminary, St. Louis,
Department of Systematic Theology
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of .":iacred Theology

,

by
John Edward ~oh

May 1966

BV

tfl)t 0
C..(c;,9

M3
1t:t~ LP
V\~.7

SHORT Tl'l1!.E:

C. , 7-

·l'HB LOGIC OF i~LIGIOU.a DD>COU!iSE

CONCOfWl/1 Sl:J.11NA RY LIBRAlft.
St LOUIS, MISSOURl

TABLE OF CONT!NTS
Chapter

Page

I. THE LOGIC OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE. • • • • • • • • • • •

The Problem • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Delimiting the Scope • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Purpose and Importance of the Study • • • • • • • • •
History and Previous Treatments of Problem •• • • • •
Methodology and Sources • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

l

1
l

4
7
9

II. LOGICAL POSITIVISM, THE IMMEDIATE PRECURSOR OF
LINGUIST!~ ANALYSIS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
'I'lle Stage • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

12
12

Developments in England: the New Logic and Logical
Atomisrn • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

14

Developments on the Continent: Der \·/iener Kreis •••
Kantian Heritage and Comtian Corrections • • • • • • •
The Verification Principle and tha .9urden of Preci-

20

sion. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • •

2?

23

Monism without Metaphysics: Metaphysical and Theological Statements and Systems under Logical Positivism. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Logical Positivism in the Larger Context • • • • • • •

III.

THE LURE OF 'l'HE PART: LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS • • • • • • •
Linguistic Analysis as Related to Logical Positivism.

Descriptive Definitions of Linguistic Analysis • • • •
Cambridge Philosophical Analysis: Metap~sical
Therapy • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Oxf~rd: the Logics of Language • • • • • • • • • • • •
Challenges to the \-Jorld of Theology • • • • • • • • •

IV.

VERIFIABILITY-FALSIFIABILITY IN THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS
LANGUAGE: ANSWERING THE FIRST A.'lALYTIC CHALLENGE • • • •
Introducticn• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Verifiability and Religious Experience • • • • • • • •
John B. Wilson • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
David Cox • • • • • • • • • • • •. • • • • • • • •
Verifiability and Religious Propositions• • • • • • •
Ben F. Kimpel • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Richard B. Braithwaite• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Paul van Buren. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Paul F. Schmidt • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Falsifiability and Religious Propositions •• • • ••
William A. Christian. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
William T. Blackstone • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Proleptic Verification and Religious Propositions ••
John Hick • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Interweaving the Strands • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

55
55
59
67
72

84

105
105

1o8
1o8

116
117
118
119

124

134

135
135
145
148
148
152

v.

THE "LCGICS" OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE •• • • • • • • • • •
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Logic of Authority • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Al.asdair MacIntyre • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Ian HacHattie Crombie • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Eric Lionel Mascall • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Logic of Situation • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Ninian Smart • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Peter Munz. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Logic of Particularity in Religious Language • • • • •
Ian T. Ramsey • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Frank Harold Cleobury • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
William Hordern • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Donald D. Evans • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Expressive Logic of Life-Direction • • • • • • • • • •
Thomas Richard Miles • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Frederick Ferre • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
John A. Hutchinson • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••
Willem F. Zuurdeeg. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Unity in Diversity • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

VI.

155
155
157

158

160
16Lt168
169
176
179
179
188
189
195
202

203
212
218

224
2'Zl

AN BXAMINATION OF THE LOGIC OF RELIGIOUS DI SCOURSE
\'/ITH A VIEW TO ASCERTAINING THE I MPACT OF LINGUISTIC
ANALYSIS UPON CON'l'Er!PORARY PHILO~OPHY OF RELI GION • • •
Chapter I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Chapter II. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Chapter III • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Chapter IV. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

232
232
232

233
235

Chapter V • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

236

APPENDIX • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

237

BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

243

11

,

·rhe Problem

This paper proposea to exan1ina how linguistic a.nalyaia, togethor
with ita precursor logical positivism, has provoked a rea3aeao~ent of
tho nnturo of religious discourse.
two quostiona:

The problem is nccuratel7 stated iu

(1) ~·hat are the challenges which analysis directs to the

philoaopher of religion in the area of religious language?

(2) In what

ways do tho replies of the philosophers o! religion relate to and illu•
mine the6o challenges?
Delillliting the Scope

A number of £actors limit the aaope of the study.

Chronological~

the investigation ia reatrioted to ideational activity ot the twentieth
century.

.Jreat 3ritian, aome of the commonwealth natiou (I,ew ~aland,

Ju.1stralia, Ca.Dada), and the United States provide the geographical boundaries.1 'rhe author'd doci31on not to include curreuta o! contomporary phil•
oaophy which are involved in linguistic problems, but are not immediate~
related to linguistic nnalysia or directly relevant to tho queation ot

religious die~ourse, is also a limiting tactor.

On

this account the con-

tinental discuaaion ot the interrelation betweon l a ~ and phenoaenolo11

l..nie pographical boundaries are roughly those ot analyaia' aphere
of influence. The ScandilM'vian countries also, in part, enter thia categoey. Austria is included by reason ot the Vienna Circle.
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has not been an object ot research. 2 For the eam.e reason the work ot
Paul 'J :Ulich has not been examined. although it touches on religious
discourse at maey points. Finally. the recent investigation of axiological and ethical language, although it mq bo extrapolated from its own
sphere into the realJn of religious discourse, does not lie within the
scope ot the st~.
In addition, the paper is circumscribed in that it otters critiques

neither or the philosophical aovement known as linguistic ~ s i s , nor

or

the numerous theories which describe the nature ot religious dia-

course.3 On the other hand, the paper seeks to record particular criticisms of individual statements or concepts when the criticisms ot other
men are illuminative.
It is the writer's persuasion that presuppositions restrict the
2rus discussion includes, among Dl&D¥ others, Georg J&oaka•s ~
spracbl1chen G ~ e n def Philosophie (Graz: Akadeaische Druck- und
Verl.agaanstalt, l 2, and articles by Johannes Bapt. Lotz, 11 Sprache
und Denken. Zur .Pblncaenologie und Metapbyaik der Sprache, 11 Scholuti..k,
rn (19.56), 496-.514, and "Philo:sophie und Spraohe," Scholaatik, XL
(October 196.5), 481-.511. The two articles deal in part with Heidegger's
phUoao~ of language. In this regard it is interesting to note that
the editors ot Die ReJ1e19la in Geeghjchte und Gegemrart (tubingen: J. c• .B.
Mohr, c.1962), telt constrained to invite Ian Ru.aey, an English theologian, to write the article titled 11 Theologie und Philoaophie IV. Ia
lngeldchsischen BeNich, 11 VI, 830-838. Evidently the continental theologians did not teel at home discwssing the iap&ct ot 11ngu1atic ~ • 1 •
on theology 1n Great .&ritian.
)A we~reuoned critique at lingu18tic anaqeia is the work CJ•rttr
ip Crit.icip or Lingu:1stic~b~19!9PAY, edited by
ll. D. LewisLandon: George Allen and Omd.n. c.i ) . It. otters a varieq
ot penetrating evaluations, aca• by an&:qata. On the other hand, the work
ot Ernest Gellner, Woz:sl! pi Ib3ns•: A
Account gt Lipgp;\at1o

is Not Enougt: Epf&.YS

Pb1J,fophv,

CJUctCfl

introduced by Bertl'and Russell London: Victor Gollancs,
19S9 , provides 80118 protound criticia in popular evle, but auttera

fraa being the work ot a single author.
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extent or arq 1nvest.igat1on. It is impossible to "sneak frca one's
skin."

The better part

or wisdom

is to expose the presuppositions. and

to utilize them 1n bounding the l:1m1ts of the. study. Here are tour
as5\lmptions which have influenced both research and composition decidedly.

First, the writer

assU111es

that the question ot aeani!lg 1n language

offers a profitable juncture at which to address oneself to the question
of meaning in lire.

Second, it 1& assumed that theology and philoaopq

of religion are distinguishable• but not separable. A theology at least

1.lllplies a philosophy of religion, and it there is a philosop}v' of
religion, there is also a correlative theology. On this basis

t.he

author has included both theologians and philosophers of religion
among those whose works are examined particularzy in Chapters IV and V.
Third, the writer shares with JIUllO" others the conviction that contemporary philosophy and philosopb.y of religion are ensnared by the
"Cartesian blight." M.nt•s Copernican revolution had its roots 1n the
interiorizatio.u or Descartes. The modern extension of that revolut.1.on,
including the spec1al.1zed a ~ or man•a language both in philoaophy
and religion, find.a

restrictive

its ultimate !'rule at reference in Descartes•

cog1to ergo sum. The

splintered world of spec1alisation

1a Jlirrored in l.1ngu1atic ana:cy,sis and 1n the philosopt\y or relig1on

when both disciplines llait their inwstigationa sole~ to the l.&IJguage

ot an. In view ot tbia third unmption the author

baa tried to aTOid

over-abridging the e.vaa1nat1on ot linguistic analysis, and the dialogue

between religioua philoaopey anc:l an&JJ'sia aa well. F1nAll7, the author
has written

an ideational account ot l.iJ2guiatic an&l38ia as it relatu

to religious language under the uBlDlption tbat. God the Creator ie

4

active no less in the world of' hUlll&n thought than in the world ot
nature.

tJ1th this faith-commitment he takes up a diacuaaion of' l.i.ngu1a-

tic a..nazysis 1n the assurance that God reigns and mould.a all things for
l:iis Churoh.
A word is needed regarding recurrent tel'Dls.

"Logical positivism"

or "logical empiricism" or "poeitiviam" is gene~ understood as a
philosophical movement of the l&te 1920 1 & which attempted to anchor the
ueaning ot propositions in their verifiability.

11.nguiatic a~aia"

11

is understood as a contemporary philosophical movement which vi.ewe the

purposa of philosophy as the descriptive (as opposed to prescriptive)
ana.1¥sis of language.

Philosophical ~sis," "logical ~ a i e , 11

11

and "~sis" are used aynon.yaoualy with"l.iniuiatic analyaia. 11

A

third tem is "logic." It occurs especially in reference to stateaents,
utterances, or discourse, and is to be contrasted with the "logic" ot
rational thought. The term mq be defined as the threads of inter-

relation, often contextually covert, which bind a statement, utterance,
or discourse into a 11.11&a111ngt'ul" unit. A tourth tel"ll is 11religious
discourse." lt uy be defined as a group ot linguistic utterances o~
stato11ent& ultimate]¥ Nferring to God. Sy"noJvaoua pbraaea are
11

thoological discourse, 11 "religioue stateaenta, 11 and "religious

utterances."
Purpose and Illlportance or the Stud;y
the concern which led the writer to this stuey was more than acad.._
ic.

The 1.mportance and the purpose of the research were tor hi.a indi:ri.a-

ible. The purpose ot the•~ ia to answer the tvo queationa which

.5
compose the problem. If the first question (vlhat a.re the ch&l.lenges
which anazysis directs to the philosopher of religion in the area of
religious language?) is answered, the significance of the stucy may be
said to lie in its contribution to dialogue between the Church (and its
philosophers) and the world. lt is possible that the questions of linguistic analysis are not unrelated to the challenge of Dietrich

.oonhoeffer on the one hand, and of Rudolf Bultmann on the other. If
the first question is answered, i t ~ be possible to approach with
new freshness the problem of "old belief's losing their meaning" in the
contemporary world.

li'or while classical theology bas generally 'been

argumentative and controversial when dealing with objections that
Christian doctrine is either false or unproved (together with argwaenta

that it is impracticable, harsh, and trivial),

11

theologians have seldom

encountered the charge •This is not an assertion at

all,• 'There is

nothing here that one can either believe or disbelieve.1 114 Then too,
if the challenges of linguistic f1!1LcySis are adequa.tely apprehended,
11

God-1s-dea.d11 talk

may

seek its proper level of flotation.

1'he dis-

placenent of the tel'lll 11God11 as the head of a certain famil3" of words 1n
favor of the term "religion" as the head of the same linguistic f ~
is not a to"ta].4 unrelated problem. finally, the Church's somewhat appre-

hensive attitude toward dialogue with the world~ be exposed in all it.a

4G.

c.

Stead, "liow Theologians Reason," Faith ~d Logic, edited by
and Unwin, 195:;; P• 116 •

Basil Mitchell (London: George Allen

Pffl,popb.v
f. R1Ugion (Englewood Cliffs, l•ew Jereey:
J, p.8.

.5John Hick,
Prentice-liall, c.l

6

nakedness if the challenges of analysis are carefull7 examined.

Speci-

fically, the time-gap between the world's question (in thia case the
question of linguistic analysis) and the Church's answer will be seen
for what it io:

a time-gap too long for proper nurture of healthy

dialogue.
If the second question (In what · way do the replies of the philosophers of religion relate to and illumine the challenges of analysis?)
is answered, the importance of the study may be aaid to consist in its
contribution to dialogue within the Church.
been labeled the century of ecumenism.

converaation is meaningful dialogue.

Th~ twentieth century has

An essential element of ecumenical
But purposeful dialogue is im-

possible when Coleridge's paraphrased line applies:
everywhere, and not a thought to think."

''Words, words,

It is to be hoped that con-

temporary study of the logic of religious discourse will bear fruit in
these conversations.

To the degree that the study summarizeo the con-

cerns of religious philosophers who deal with the nature ot religious
language it will contribute in a small way to meaningful dialogue within
the Church.
Dialogue in the Church also involves intercontessional conversation
in the area of biblical hermeneu tics.

Contemporary biblical studies

must necessarily take cognizance ot current philosophy ot religion, for
when the latter addresses itself to the question of religious language
it inevitlibly touches the sphere of biblical hermeneutics.

This study

sets out to demonstrate current activity in the philosophy of religion
with the conviction that biblical hermeneutics may profit iro~ a dialogic
encounter •

?

Dialogue in the Church also involves dialogue among her philosophers.
If the second question of the problem is properly asked and answered,
·the s tuuy will be valuable beoa4se it investigates the apologetics of
current religious philosophers as they relate to linguistic acaly;sia.
A comparison of their widely differing methods and conclusion3 will be
both instructive and ~timulating.

In fact, a rather new definition

of the task of the philos ophy of religion emerges from the encountor
with analyai::;, one ,1hich should riot go unchallenged and unobserved
among the nona.nalytic philosophers of the Church.

In order to contri-

bute to dialogue among the man7 philosophers of the Church, abundant
bibliocrraphioal references have bean included.
Finally, the importance of the study lies in part in its exposition
of tho problem of cognition in religious discourse.

If the study merely

alerts the reader to the necessity of measuring both the assets and the
liabilitio~ involved in attributing cognition to religious language, it
has accomplii:h:etl :~nimportant objective.

If religious language is seen

to have, in any sense, a cognitivo element, the question ot the "meaning"
of and the criteria of cognition immediately arises.

lf on the other

hand cognition ia not construed as an essential element of religious
language, the relation of religious faith to the "nude facts" of empirical
recl it~ comes to the fore at once.

The emphasis on worship in the litur-

gical revival is a healthy phenomenon.

But the question ot cognition in

religious discourse invades also the Church's worahip life.
History and Previous Treatments of Problem
The question o! "meaning" in religious language is as old as the

8
discourse itself.

Saint Paul refera to some of the difficulties in writ-

ing to the ~orinthiane:
'f here ure r.loubtlesa many different languagea in the world, and
none ia without meaning; but if I do not know the meaning of
the language, I shall be a roreigner to the speaker and tho
sp~aker a foreigner to me. 6
The Christological controversies of the early Church were extensively
concerned with the ~eaning of words.

From one perspective the whole of

church history may be viewed as the Church's attempt to delineate and
clarify the meaning ot' key terms.

In centuries since the Reformation

it has been especially the language of natural theology that bas been
ecrutinized.

But especially in the twentieth century the problem bas

assumed overwhelming significance.

It is precisely b1:cauae the question

of meaning in religious discourse is so intimately connected with the
philosophy of analyaie that this study proposes to address itself to both
aspects of the giant problem.
Previous investigationu of the problem have often lacked both objectivity and depth.

Those philosophers of religion who have taken cogni-

zance of the phenomenon of logical positivism. the precursor of linguistic
analysis, have all

t.00

frequently attacked it with a war cry.

Others

have all t·oo readily dismissed linguistic analysis itself in fav·o r of the
second viable philosophical option of current times, existentiali3m.

On

the other hand, the philosophers of religion who have earnestly endeavored
to seek out the core and challenge of linguistic anal1sia fre quently rush
through an inveatigation of analysis in order to arrive ~ore quickly at
an appropriate apologetics.

61 Corinthians 14:10-11.

In sum, the men who have dealt ~1th the

9

problQm at l:w.nd have frequently tonded to divide themselves into two
~roups: if chey are pbiloaophera concernoJ 111.ith linguiatic analysis, they

are quick to di3misa tho question of religious language; if they are
philosophers of religion, they often ruah through a discusaion of philosophical analyeis, or tako li~tlo cognizance ot the concluaions of other
philoaophers vi religion.

~hilo there have been 11an1 booka, articles, and

s1mposia which have addressed the ~uestion, to this writer's kno~ledge
none .has taken really adequate notice either o! ~he impact of logical
positivism on linguistic analyois as it affects anal1sis'challengea to
r~ligious discourse, or o! the preci$8 natU1·e ot the analytic challenges
to theoloi~, or ot the diver::.ity

or

ai;c;wera given by philosophers of

religion. 7
Methodology and $ourcoe
The methodology ot tho study baa been conatructed to deal with the
two buaic queationo of t ho problem.

~hapter II u:s kn ideational-biatorical

aurvey of logical po~itivism aa thd pre.cursor 0£ l inguistic analysis.
~hupter III seta out to characterize linguistic analysis a~ it encounters
theology and reli~ious laD~uage.

~wo ba3iC cha:langes el:ktrge.

In the

firat, analysis damoustrates its positiviotic parentage by d~llltlnding the
verifiaoility-tal~ifi.A&bility ot religious discourse as a sine qua non for

7·r u1a state111ent do~s not aill to depreciate tiew ~S&Ja iu Philosophical 'l 'heology, edited by Antoey o. N. }..le.., and Alasdair Maolntyre (New York:
:-1ac111illa11 ~pan1, c.1955), or work!J ot Basil Mitchell, Ian Ramsey,
~onald Hepburn, and many others. It does indicate the need !or a !u.llblown lilalmination of t he probl.t11 a:s it aatands ~ 1966, an exalllination
both ol the analytic challenges (to~ether vith their pbiloaopili.cal history)
afid of ropraaentatiYe replies ~o tha~e challenge~.

10

a:iud.t.t"'i:.ce to the rao.lm of r;ioaning!ul laur,u.a~~.
ca;;;ok~ fo1· thw ''logic'' uf .1·eligioua di.:lcourmt.

In the attcond, aualyai,s

In thia ro-1ueat analyois

admits the !ormal validity of religious diacourse a.s a uaet·ui ''la11guagegct111e, 11 or field of l an~age, because it ia found among people.

Chaptar

IV aumn.ial'iZ.'18 nine repreaontative theoriea of ~he naturo of rl)ligious
lan~uago offered in ar.swer to the first analytic challenge.

Chaptar V

aummnrizea thirteen thoorioa of relisioua langua~e which represent typical
aumters to the second ancll ytic challt:nge.

:;nnpter VI s:11:1:;;arizes the

eut.ir·o study and offers some tentative conclusiona.
J.lajor sources US.¢d in tho atucly include ~ritiugs of logical positiv-

i:;ts , lin3ui3tic Etr.alyota, and hiatoriana of philoaophy, aa .tell as worka

ot philooophers of religion.

Only philosophers oi roligion who offered

ttn explicit theory of roligious language wore consulted in detail. 8

In the
mented.

OlHJe

of thei:M writers, i~bo works are carefully sulllll8rized and docu-

~ho author haa takon the liberty to rearrange some sections of

these \'forks, but every precaution :.,a.a tukeu to avoid diotort.ion.

,-iome

parti:i not specifically s orruane to the particular theor; of roligioua

language, -.,er& uot included in the sum,:iaries.
is provided for i he

r>l8D

oior;raphical inforoation

discusaad in Chapters IV and V.

tha n one .,ork ot an author was consulted.

At

tiaaos aore

All of the stuu:,•s 118.jor sou:ces

are li~ted in the primary bibliograpb.J.

8An excellent work by id.chard Luacke, New M4tanings tor Now I3eing~
(Philadelphia: Fortresa Preas, 1964), deserves mention at this point. It
is not summarized in this utudy becauae Luecke'3 theory o! religious
language is ao well hidden in the book'3 aubstance that it would uudoubtecil1 suffer distortion if the present writer were to attempt to
.

extract it.

11

The author has sought to choose his words with care.

The apirit

of ~zra vound'3 plea tor the care of ~he language hns beou an important
methodological principlo both in rosoarch and ·, riting:

Language is uot u mere cabinet curio or ~u3ewn exhibit. It doed
definitely !unction in all human lite from tribal sta te onward.
You caonot govern vlithout it, you cannot w.ake laws without it.
Thnt 1a you make lnws and thuy becom~ aero r.1are'3 nests !or graft
ana discus sion. , • • • Printed word or drum telegraph are neither
without bauring on ::be a gisret1ate life ot t:he folk. As language
become a the ~ost po.rer .CUl instru:nent of perfid7, so bngua~e alone
can rid'11.a a nd cut t hrough the meshes. Used to conceal ;nganin~,
usad to blur r::ealling, to produce the complete and utter ir~ferno of
the !)clSt c@ntury • • • ugninst vhich ~O~LY a care for langua~e,
for e.ccurate regi s tra tion 'by language avail$.

i;nd if raen too

10113 neglect it, th~ir cn~ldren will find thall13elvoa t>egging and
thair offsprin~ betrayed.

9s zra Pound, Literary :~sso s of ~zra Pound, edited by T. 3. i;liot
(~orfolk, Connecticut : 1:ew Oiroctioao, 195 , , PP• 76, 77.

~liAPl'ER II
LOGICAL FOSITIV'ISM, 'l'HE IMMEDIA't ~ PlmCURSOR

OF LlNGU~TIC ANALYSIS
The Stage
For some historians of pbil.osophy, logical poaitiviwra wa~ an interruption in the devel~pnient o! philosophical analysis.

The line that ruua

from Moore through Wittgenstein to Ryle and the other contemporary analysts,
they contend, snappod with tbe iconoclasm o! logical empiriciam.

On

the

o~ber hand, it will be profitable to exallline logi cal positivisa as a precuraor ot linguist ic analysis.

Cont emporary linguistic analyai~ will ciake

as much sense as its history, and the histo17 of lingui3tic analysis involves the development and flowering of logical poaitiYism, its precursor.

Although it is ditticult to aucertain the period of greatest influence,
the years 1927-1937 might well be co11sidered the 11Golde11 Age'' ot logical
positivism.

Birth pang~ were prolonged, and an interplay of complex factors

give growth and maturit:, to the moveilient.
In the late nineteenth century, Neo-Idealiats vere active in Zngl.alld

and op ..- the cont.inent.
an idealistic backdrop.

Logical poaitiviaa aaaerted its identit7 against
?he moTemeut questioned the logic ot a etatement

such as "Tiu is unreal."

It atsked tor the sense of "Absolute .Realit7. ''

It confronted the hostility ot F. H. Bradle7, vith his overwhel.aing con-

tempt of the empiricist tradition.

G. J. Warnock cbaracterisea the Abso-

lute Idealisaa of Bernard Bosanquet and F. H. Bradle1 aa hiahl7 &lld aabitiouly •taphlucal, burdened vith impreasin rhetoric, and little concerned

l}

with ordinary ways ot thinking. 1
existed.

~ven as late as 1939 a strained situation

In that year C. D. Broad, an idealist, published an article baaing

the cosmological argwaent for God's exiatance oc the asoertion that some
exiatontial propositions are intrinsically neceauary.

In the face of nu.mer-

oua argumonts to the contrary, Broad publi~hed the exact salilO article tou.rt~en years later. 2
It was in antithea13 to dogtaatic idealiotic philosphy that logical
positiYism asaumed ita character.

Thia antithesis, coupled with redoubled

etforta in inductive scientific re$oarcb and phenomenal advances in
theoreticul science, produced a nutritive environment for rapid developmont.

H.J. P~ton characterizes the impact of science upon the develop-

ment of logical positivism with this statement:
It I were aaked to state in one word the r:wain impulse to all this
new thinking, and particularly to the whole lo5l cal and liugldetic
mov~ment o! this contury, l should take the question lijerally and
SllY aimply that it was science (including mathematics).

1 a. J. vlaro.ock, :"'.:up;liab Phi103opby $ince

1900 (London: Oxford University Preas, c.1958), pp. 3, 5, 6, 9. Warnock warna tbat this rather colorful movement should not bo viewed as traditional on the English scene,
!or it waa an ''exotic" alien import. ·
2 Eric Lionel Mascall, tlords and Images (l~ew York: Roi.ald Press
CoBpany, c.1957), P• 30. Rovolution in Philoso}hy, editod by Al!red
J. Ayer (J..Ondon: MacDUL.llan and Co111p&D7, .. c.19.56 , givea an accurate description of the philoeophical climate preceding logical po~iti~aa,
including the philosop~ ot Bradley and logical atomism.
}H. J. Paton, "Fifty Years ot Philosop~, '' Cont.eaporarz Bn.tillh
Philosophy, edited by H. D. Lewis (London: George Allen and Unwin,
c.1956), P• 352. Frederick Fer~ not•a in Langua,se 1 Logic and God (First
edition1 Nev York: Harper and Brotbero, c.1961), that the rise of inductive science de1110nstrated a concern more for methodology than empirical resulta. Pbilosop~, too, ceased to concern itself vith synthesis of
natural scientific matters, and turned its attention to a methodology
vbich would cSim\lltaneousl.y d@~ondtrate its distinction from tho sciences
while still contributing to them. See PP• 4-6.
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The baoio theaoa of the complex philosophical revolution popularly called "logical positivism'' or 11J;ogical empiricism, 11 dogmutic 111

their style and iconocla.;tic in thoir contact, are al1bjects for conaideration in the next PQges:
a.
b.

c.
d.

e.
f.

'tho function of philosophy is logical l:inalJoia. • • • philosophy ha~ becorae tho logical analysis of science through the
s,ntactical analysis of scientific language.
All cognitively significant (meaningful) discourse is divisible
· without reQainder into analytic or 01nthetic propositions.
Any proposition that purports to be factual or empirical bas
meaning oul;y if it is pos:Jible in principle to ·!escribe a method
!or its verification.
All metaphysical a suertiona, being neither analytic nor synthetic
propoaitions, aro meaningleaa .
There is a eingle l anguage for all scionce; it is aimilar in fora
to the language of physics, and all synthetic propoaitious are
reducible to olementary exp~riancea expressible in this lauguage.
All normative assertions, whether positing coral, aesthetic, or
religious valueo, are ecientificall;y unverifiable, and are ,;h.ere4
for& to be classified aa torma ot non-cognitive discourse.

1Jevulopra1tnta in i.i;1,gland: the Nev Logic a.nd l'..ogical Atolli.81l

Iu philosophical u.istorJ Sngland generally resta in the empirical
camp.

But

&5

an "exotic" import, the idealists ot the late nin.iteenth

and early twentieth conturiea affirmed the validity o! reason and logic.
Conliequent to their interest, it was first in Ensland that the "new logic"
assumed precise form and achieved influential status.

Thu dev~Wiltion of

traciitional Aristotelian logic, and the definite formulation of the "new
logic," "ere fundamental contributions of ;;";nglish philoaoph,y to the
gradual developmsnt of logical ·poa1tiv1sm.

4Albert William Levi, PhilosopbY and the Hodwrll \Jorld (.iiloomingtOD,
Indiana: Indiana Universit7 Pross, c.1959), PP• j44-j45.
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Since tb.e days of Aristotle, men imparted to traditional logic an
ontological character at least of sorts.

t he ! a ct that the relation

between t h.ought and word was coU1mor,ly interpreted aa s. coding-decoding

~rocess, or image-mirror picture, evidencea an unconocioum vindication
of logic'a ontologi~al utatus.

John Findlay clair:la that past philosophical

interpret~tiona o! language have genarally asswnod that word.a wsre expressions of thoughts on t he ona band, and t hat they 1:ieant thine a on
the other.

Thoughts tte.re construed as iuvi.9ible ghostly acts .ihich ..

could, in cert uin caaea, diapeuse ~ith spoecb.5 Even tho~ghta were to
be "tho1.oght" in accordance with ,\ristotelian logic.

Thero ia no need to describe how, during the nineteenth century, the
fifth axioru of Euclidean ,:Seometry was weighed in the balance and found
wanting as an integral element o! man•u perception and reasolling.

Nor

is there the need to cons ider the implications of this cha llenge !or
Aristotle's logic.

Our concern i s the devaluat ion of t raditional logic

within logical pouitiviBm.

'.l'b.~ continental positiviata -,ere attempting

to tra.nalate relational acrntences into lo~ic.
not a~enablo to the eff ort.

AritJtotolian logic was

~a a consequence, tho poaitiviata quedtioned

the validity o! traditiorial logic in the ~phere o! relatiooal s~ntences.
Hans Reichenbach gave a n exa1'!!ple of t heir challengo yaara later:

It is tr1.1e that the sentence "Bitter iii tall" haa the 3ubjoot "Peter"
and the predicate "tall"• But· the aentouce "Petor is taller th&A
Paul" has two subjects, narael;y "Peter" and "Pau.1 11 , ai11oe the predicate "taller than" ia a relation. '?he miaunderstanding of linguistic

5John Niemayer Fiudlay, "!iome Heactiou to .Heoeut C&11bridai- Philo- .

aophy (1940-1)," Language. Hind and Vo.l11e (New York: liuaaanities Preaa,
c.1963), PP• 16-17. Thia article or1gima1ly appeared in Allatr alasiaD Journal of Psyeboloq and Philoaoplg (Deceaber 19401 April 1941).
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structu.rea, originating from adherence to Aristotelian logic, has
seriously impaired the science ot linguiatics.6
Carnap isolated the inadequacy of truditional logic in 1930, explicitly
linking it ~.,ith the Ariatotelian-3chola·s t ic ayatem:
The desire to replace metaphysical concopt-poetry by a rigorous,
scientific method of philosophizing would have remained a pious
hope if the ~ystem ot traditional logic had been the only logical
instrument available. Traditional logic was totally incapable of
satisfying the requiromont of richness o! contont, tormal rigor
and technica l utility which ita new role demanded or it. Formal
logic rested on the Aristotelian-scholastic syutom which in the
course of its f urther development had been only slightly improved
and extended.7
The new logic was an attempt to demonstrate the ioadequaoy of Aristotelian logic, simultaneously constructing other logical Gystums with basic
axioms freely posited and developed.

Following Leibniz's ideas, Frege,

Peano, and Schr6der tr.ade the first attempts at a reconstruction of logic.
On tho basis of thctir work, Hhitehead and Russell created tho t oundational work o! the new logic, Principia Mathematica (1910-1}).

Furth~r attempts

depended wholly on their accomplishment. a Russell and whitehead'a work
"demonstrated how the concept of natural numbers, the theoey of manifolds,
and notions like continuity and derivation can be strictl1 deduced. from a
handful ot primitive notions and about the same number of logical axioms,"

6Batia Reichonbach, The Rise ot Scienti!ic PhlloaoPhY (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, c.1951), PP• 220-221.

?Rudolf Carnap, "The Old and the Nev Logic," Logical Positivism,
edited by A. J. A1er (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Presa, 0.1959), PP• 133-134.
The article originally appeared aa "Die alte und die neue Logik," Erkenntnia,
I (1930-31).
8 Ibid., PP• 134-135• Frege•a contribution to the development of new
logic 'Isaccurately au,rm!B.rized by 'fl . C. Kneale, "Gottlob Frege and Mathematical Logic," The Revolution in Philoao
, edited by A. J. Ayer (Londont
Macmillan and Compa~, 0.19
, PP• 2
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while its apecific s i e nificance f or positivism lay in the logic ut propositions:

"the theory or logical types, • • •

the logical divisions or all

statements into true, false, and meaningless, and the diatinction between
atomic and molecular propositiona. 119
Immediately the rela tionship of the new logic to human langQag~ caffle
in for question.

Although the Copleaton-Ayer broadcast occurred in 1949,

the question put by Copleston wus a question commonly raised in ·tho earlier
days

of the now logic:
Coplea ton:
Ayer:
Copleaton:
Ayer:

My question is thia. Within a three-val11ed system of
lo 0ic is there any rula of cons ietoncy at all? (They
have been diacuaeing such a for:r.al logicl
Yes . Otherwise it wouldn't be a aiste~ of logic.
Then does it not seem tbat there is at least one proto1:,ropoaition ~hich governs all possible systems of logic?
LRe is re£erring to the principle ot non-contradiction.l
No, that doesn't !ollow.10

Huaaell 3tepped confidently and related the ne. logic to language.
It was aussell'a opiuion, according to J. 0. Urmson, that
a logic from which the whole uf mathecaatics with all itu complexities can be derived must be an adequate skeleton (minus the extralogical vocab11lary which the variables r eplace) of a languas~
11
capable of expre3sing all that can b@ adequately said at all.

9Levi, P• 34<).

10A. J. Ayer and F. c. Copleston, "Logica.l Positivism--A Debate,"
Modern Introduction to Philoso
, edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap
Glencoe, Illinois; Free Presa, .c.1957), P• 600. This debate occl.ll"red in
1949 over th~ British .Broadcasting Corporation. In re!erence to ~he principle o! non-contradiction, Ernest Nagel in "Logic Jithout Ontology, 11 !~eadings
in Philosophical Aa:ialysis, edited by a. Feigl and \l • .:ie.1.lars (l~ew York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, c.1949), PP• 191-210, contends that &fl3 attempt to
Justify logical principles (such aa ~ho principle of non-contradiction) in
terms ot their suppoaed conformity to a structure or facts overlooks the
function of those logical principles aa f or mulative a nd regulative of huaian
pursu.ita.
11J. o. Uri:13011, ?hilosopbical Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Presa, 19.56),
P• 7. Guido KUng ot Notre Dauie University, in Ontologie und logitiache
Acalyse der ~prache (~ien: Springer-Vorlag, o.1963), examines .i.lussell'a
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Russell was convinced that his notations in the Principia embodied the
essence of language.

Where common language appeared to diverge, the

skeleton bad been in eome way concealed.

12

Ludwig W1ttger.3tein noted that

F. P. Ra msey of Cambridge cast the new logic in a oim1lar role, although
Wittgenstein did not approve in his later !nveatigations:
F. P. Hamsey bat ein1118l im Gesprttch 1nit mir betont, die Logik sei
eine "normative ~i sdenachaft 11 • Genau welche ldee ihm dabei vorschwebte, weias ich nicht; aie war aber zweifellos eng verwandt rait
der, die mir erat sp8ter autgegangen i at: daas wir IUlmlich in der
Philosophie den Gebrauch der wUrter oft mit 5pielen, KalkUlen nach
!esten Regeln, verglaichen, aber nicht sagen. k6nnen, wer die tiprache
gebraucht, ~ ein solcbea Spiel spielen.13
The now logic provided n focus for poaitivistic thought.

I! Ari3to-

talian l o~ic d~alt inade quately· with curtain relatioiw.l sentences, and

if other systems were no l~as "logical ly" exhaus tive , t he n Aristoeelian

role (among others) in the i mpact of logic upon linguist ic analysis. He
3tatea the purpoae of his atudy (p. 13): ''Auf6abe der ers"tan 'L'eila iat es,
eine 3infUhrung in die gcrade i m deuts chen 5pra.chgebiet allzu wenig
bekannten Denkgawohnheiten der zeitgen6ssiachen logischen ~praohanalyse
zu geben, und inabes ondere den \Jog zur zweiatelligen 3emantik der Abbildung
zu achildern, ~Uhrend der ~weite Teil der apeziallen Frago der Abbildungsbeziehung der PrlJdikatzeichen, d.h. der zoitgen6ssisohen formulierung der
Univer~lieafrage, nachgahen wird."
12warnock, P• }3. Inaofar as the a pplication of computer-acience to
nat ural language indicates an a pproach soraewhat paral leling Russell's,
Natural Lan ua2e and the Com uter, edited by Paul L. Garvin (New York:
McGraw Hill Book Co., e.19o3 , ia an int'or,native inveat.:i.gation. liarvin
di.scusaea the co,aputer' a role in lingui3tic analysis. H. .C:. Maron givea
a logician's view of t he endeavor. ?here are alao discussions of the
progress made in trans lating natural language through the comput~r.
l}Ludwig WittiJGnstein, Philoso hiache Unt6rauchun

Philoso~hical

Investigations, tranalated by G. E:. H. Anacombe Oxford: ,: 3asil_Black.,ell,
19.5.3), P• 38. 'l'b.e provided ~nglish translat ion reads: "11'. P. Ram...ey onee
emphasized in conversation with me that logic was a 'normative science•.
I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but it was doubtless closely

related to wha t only dawned on me later: namely, that in philosophy we
otten compare the u.ee of words with games and calculi which have fixed
rules, but cannot say tbflt . aomeone who is uaing language~ be playing
such a game" (p. 38e).
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logic served as a questionable oasis for linguistic construction.
the principle o! non-contra.diet.ion

\tas

~'Ten

no H,ore tiuAn a postulate 1 The

dissection ot language waa an inevitable consequence of the development
of new logic.
'l 'he

ne•« logic assu med philosophical dres1.J in the "logical atomisaa"

of Bertrand ~ussell and othera.
consis ta

Logical atomists contended that. the world

or

au ind<:,finitely large number of "atomic !acts" to 'irlhich truo
·
14
atomic propositions oorraspond.
It was asuwuod that if propoaitions

were of a logical character, tho atomic facts which corresponded to them
were apprehended only through logical propositions.

In logical atomi.sm

ware to be round the building blocka of logical positivism, for tha latter

irait3.ted the form~r•s exhaustive di.vi:3ion of all "meaningf ul'' propositions
into analytic and 11tmpirical.

,iarnock clarifies t he situation:

According to t he pures t doctrines of Logical Atoflli.Slll 1 a proposition
ca n be sta ted s i gnificantly either it there is, or could be, an
atomic fact to which it corrosponds, or if it ia a truth-function,
however complex, of propoiiiitione of t'iia't sort.l.5
Ludwig \·iittgenatoin of Ca1Goricige was the liaison between developments in England nnd stirrings on the continent.
hia famed ·r ractatua .Logico-r'hiloaophicua.

In 1922 he published

This work wa.s at one and the

aaiue time an i,apetua to the development or logical poait ivism on :.he

continent, a nd a au:.,mary ot developments in ~..:ngland.

14urmson, P•

It ass umed that

16. Urmoon olaims that it is not fanciful to

see a
Clustav 136rgmann, in ''Revolt
Against Logical Atoruiam," Moaning and ~stance (Madiaozu University ot
Wisconsin Press, c.1959), pp. 39-72, exumines critically Urmaon'3 Philosophical Analysis in its account ot tho logical atowia.m ot Huseell and
~/ittgen~tain; .9ertrand ~usaell doe a tho aame in "Philosophical Analysis,"
Hibbert Journal, LIV (May 1956), 319-329•
similarity to Leibniz.' s world o! monads here.

15Warnock, P• 41.
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new logic was in some way applicable to human language.
sitions as pictures.

It viewed propo-

It upheld the dichotomy of statecente into analytic

and empirical with an endorsement of logical atomism.

It urged continen-

tal positivism to delineate more precisely the "meaning" of empirical
statements.

Speaking of Wittgenstein's Tractatus at home and abroad, Gilbert

Ryle comments:
In Vienna some of its teachings were applied polemically, namely to
demolishing the pretensions of philosophy to be the science of transcendent realities. In England, on the whole, others of its teachings
were applied more cons tructively, namely to s t ating the positive
functions which philosophical propositions perform • • • • In England,
on the whole, interest was concentrated on Wittgenstein's description of philosophy as an activity of clarifying or elucidating the
meanings of the expressions used, e.g. by scientists; that is, on
the medicinal virtues of his account of the nonsensical. In Vienna,
on the whole, interest was concentrated on the l ethal potentialities
of Wittgenstein's account of nonsense.16
In its concentration upon the "lethal potentialities of Wittgenstein's
account of nonsense," the continental Wiener Kreis (Vienna Circle) paralleled and advanced beyond logical atomiem.
Developm.e nts on the Continent: Der Wiener Kreis
· The so-called "Vienna Circle" coagulated in the early 1920's around
Moritz Schlick, philosophy professor at the University of Vienna.

In-

cluded in the circle were Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl,
Friedrich Waiemann, Edgar Zilsel, Victor Kraft, Philipp Frank, Karl
Menger, Kurt GHdel, and Hans Hahn.17 Most of the men were scientists.

16Gilbert Ryle, "The Theor;y of Meaning," British Philosophy in the
Mid-Century, edited by c. A. Mace (New York: Macmillan Company, c.195?),
P• 262.
~?A. J. Ayer, Lo5ical Positivi811 (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Pr~ss,
c.1959), p. 3. Victor Kraft, Der Wiener Kreis: Der Ure
des Neo sitivismua (Wien: Springer-Verlag, c.1950, PP• 1-10, presents an excellent
historical survey of the Circle from the perspective of a participant.
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3chlick had written his cJ.octo.ra.l. did.;;ertation ir. phy3ics; Carnap anli
rank were theoretical physicists; Hahn, Ne~er, and GHdel ~ere :::athemnticia~s; t~eu.rath waa an economiat and sociologist; and flitt 0,.rnste1u, illhose

ideao were di~cu~sed in his absence, was au engineer. 18 ~ince the remainder of this chapter ~ill consider in detail the philosophical position

taken by the Viennese to 6ether with their ~nglish counterparts, our
prese~t concarn will be with the philo:sophical ancestry and the mental
te,!lperam<:nt of thiB "circle" of Vienneao intsllectu&la.
The Vienna ~ircle publicly recognized ito ideation.al indebtedne~s to

Hume, Comte, Nill, Hach, Helmholtz, iioiu:ann, PoincarC:, Mn:ttein, Leibni~,
Frege, Hus:Jell, \-Jhitohead, und ,litt.genstein in a manife15to titled. wi;5.:ienscb...'!.i'tliohe ,velto.u!!asaung 1 Der \1iener Kreis.

Excluding contea-poraries,

Hume and ,'lach moat clearly approximated .the Circle's porspective. 19 The

empirical accent of logical positivi31D originated with l!w:ie.

~ho roots

of :aanipulative lo3ic run back to .Leibniz, for he divided propoaitions
into truthe of reanori and truth~ of .raot.
.

analj·cis of tha ~ori.aer.

In addition, he attempted an

20

The fact that tha group gath~red around Noritz ;jchlick prct!igured
its later development.

In 1918 Jchlick published Allgeiaeino

lehro dcQling ,.;ith, the theory of knowledge.

a:;rkenntuis-

Hany of tho views later

18Branci lllanshat·d, ~~ea13on and Analyais (London: uecrge .Ulen and
Unwin, c.1962), P• 106.
l9Ayer, Logical Positivism, p. 4. ·rhe 1J1&nit'eato was published in.
Vienna, 1929.
20Julius R• .-,einberg, .-t.n ~minatiou of Loijical l'ositivism (Patoraon,

New Jersey: .Littlefield, ~dams and Company, 1960 ~riginally published
193§} ) , PP• 3-4.
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characteristic of logical poaitiviam U!>pearod thGre in seed. 21

The

rooetings with Schlick were ir1·egu1Ar until the group organized it::selt a~
the "Verei11 .8:-nst Mach" ic 1928. 22
The Moanipg of Henning, publiahed by c. K. Ogden and I. A. Richard:s

in 1923, wus a contemporunaous in!luonce on tho Circle, at leaat upon
Rudolf Carnap.

The authors attempted to differentiate between °ea.otive"

and "referential" uso :in.la.n.guago.

'l 'hey auggoated t hat the distinction

between the two uae3, coupled with a preference tor the !ormer, is the
ear:sl!nce of l:iolilllntic positivi:J1.o. 23 This dichoto1111 reaasert.acl itoelf in
the Circle's later diatinction botween meaningleos/mouning£ul.
Logicul positivism ma.de an intercational debut before a forum of
pbilosophic:al ~xpertu at the Seventh Intorrw.t1onal Congress ot Philosoph)'
in Oxford.• 19}0 .

Moritz Schlick diaou.:.sed "~he Futuro of Philosophy,''

and heralded a new era:
we are witneaaing the beginning ot a nuw era in philosop!q • • •
its future will be very ditterent trom its past, which has been
so full ot failures, vain struggles, and futile disputea.24

21Alfred J. k1er, "The Vienna Cir cle," 'l 'he Revolution in 1,lhiloso
,
edited by Alfred J. Ayer (London; Macmillan and Comp&J:17, c.19
, P• 71.
Georg Jinoaka, Dies rachlichen Grundla n der f'hil.oao hie (Graz, Auotria:
Akademioche Druck-u. Verlagoanatalt, l
, P• ll, q·u otes Schliok'a 1925
edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnialehre (whitre Schlick favorably citos
~instein} aa followaz "Ineofern aioh die Sitze der Hathematik aut die
Wirklichkeit beziohen, sind asie nicbt aicbor, und inso!ern sie sicher
sinci, beziehen aie aich nicbt au! Wirklichkeit."
22
w.anahard, P• 109.

23LeTi,

P•.

}76.

2 'tJoerpn Joergonsen, '£he iJovelopment o! Logie&l &lpin.ciu (Chicagoi
Universit7 ot Chic.go Preas, c.19;,l) • PP• 46-'•l. Thie work 1a Vol. II,

~o. 9 ot the Iuternatioaal i ncyclopedia o! UnifiQd J oieDce, a logical
poaitiviat work•
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The message was the aame on the continent.
twenties and in the thirtiea.

Congreaaea met in tho late

In 1929, the Circle displayed its varea

in l'rague1 in 1930, there was a meeting in K6rdgsberg.

Prague in 1934,

Paria in 1935, and Copenhagen in 1936, the last with causality as its
theme, provided a wide geographical exposure. 25
The movement sought out its blood brothers at an early date.

The

Circle formed an alliance with tho so-called "Berlin Johool" (Hana
Reichenbach and Kurt Grelling); with Scandinavian philosophers auch aa
ilno Kaila and Joergen Joergttneen; with the Uppaala school o! empiricists;
with the Dutch group gathered around Mannoury pursuing what they called
"Signitica''; with tho MUnster group of logicians; with Amorican sympathizers, including Nagel and -~uine; and with British amtlyats of Tarioua

shades, from Ryle and Braithwaite to Wisdom and r..yer. 26

The scientific. tomperaa:ent ot the Viennese indicated that the group'•
pbilosophical stance would be decidedly empirical.

The intellectual

world vas not disappointed, for the Circle took to task th~ modernizing

ot Comte, aimultaneoualy applying the new logic and au •mpirical criterion
to tbo language o! Everyman.
Kantian Heritage and Comtian Correotiona
I1D11&nuel Kant concerned hi.mselt with tbe dichotO#IJ ot tb~ analytic
and the a1nthet10.

He dealt exhaustively with the ephere ot kllowledge.

25 Ibid., PP• 44-45.
26Ayer, Logical Poaitinsa, PP• 5-6. That the .Scandiaanana were
actively involved in ear11 logical positiviam iD ~vident from the historical survey ot Georg Henrik von ~right, Dell logiak.a empiria.Hn (Belaiagtora:
ll•P•t 194}).
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Auguste Comte'a philosophizing led him to asuert that evolutioDA17 develop..

ment endowed roan with an all-enoompaasing acienti!ic method.

r.an had out-

grown tho religiously metaphyoicnl, and diamiaaed any yearning for treedora,
God, and immortalitJ ap&rt from tho ~orahip of science.
The logical positivists probed beneath both Kant and Comte, taking
from e~ch tho ~eeded tools of explora~ion.

Acknowlodging Kant•a work,

they adlllitted his ciiohotolll)' of ~nal1tic and synthetic knowledge; but they

advanoed beyond him with the iconoclaatic proposal that philosophy deals
with propositions rather than knowledge.
superseded Comte no les a than Kant.

With thia conaideration the1

They contendod that science not on~

exhausta kno~ledge; science !rMrnes the limits of meacingtul diacouroe as

well.

\:iitll the ra.d1.cal proposal to deal onl.J with propositiona of laDgUD.ge

the logical pooitiviata created a new age in philosophical hiat017. The1
stood on the shoulders of both Kant and Comte, but sprouted wi11gs ot their
o"'n•
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Thv basic asswnption of logical pbsitiviam vau that all Qeaniagtul
etatemonta are eithor analytic or synthetic.

The dichoto~ ia exhaustive,

out the validation of a propoaition differs in either case.

According to

Ayer, a proposition is analytic vben ita validit~ ia eolely contingent on
defisu.tion ot its ay~bolu.

A proposition ia 91nthetic when ito validit7

i• determined by facts of experienao.

28

?he anai,tic utatelll8nt i~ valid by definition.

The rules ot thG

27J,noalca, pp. 16-22, admirably deaoribes th• IC&DtiaA heritage
ot Viennea. logioal poc,itivism.

28a. J.

Paton~ The Modern Predicaments A Stud in the Philoao
aeligi.on (London; George Allen and Unwin, c.1955, P• 'J7•

ot
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"game" detorllline ita status \liitbin the game of logic.

An analytic atato-

ment i s oithor tautological or contradictory--a contradiction is ~orely
a tautology negated.

If a ~tato~ent ia contradictory, it is logically

"meaning!ul 1' though not neceai:sarily true ("The triangle iG tour-sided'').
Positivista oxpl~inad the lack oi novelty iu tautological, r.eoeaaary
statoQanta in at l~ast three w~ya ;

(l) they followed Kant in suggesting

that a otatement i G analytic when tho predicate-concept i a part of tho
~ubjeot content ("&diea aro 1:txtenciecl"); (2) the: oubmithd that a proposition ig analytic becau~ it~ truth !ollowa from the meaDiog of the ter.ta
alone ( 111'' ull brotuers o! tho SDJ11e man are full brothers ot each other'');
(}) they proposed that the cuntradictory of an analytic proposition iu
alwa7~ and inexorably sel!-contradictory. 29

In any case, the poaitivi ato

wore certain thure waa no µo ~e!bility o! aurpris e 1n tautological atat•-

menttt.

; ·or thio rva.~on they claimed that analytic propo:1itiona ai·e

barred from an: reference to "f'act."30
For the logical positiviata the concept ot "truth" was tautological.

Ayer conhndod th.at a reference to "truth" aclds nothing to tho logical
aenso of a statement.

To say that a statetaent is "true'' is to mal<e a

tautological atater.ieut:
Thia indicate8 that to ask \4hat is truth? i:> tant.at1ount to a :ikiua
\-Jhat is thtt anal.yoia of tho $0Utence "p is true"? where the valuea

29Blanahard, PP• 257-258.
30Blanahard argues tbat it ana.l ytio propositionl.S, according to the
positivists, say nothing about "fact," it is ditticult to evaluate the
positiviatio argument that analytic propo$1tions are in!ort:J&tivo in I"Qference to li~istic ,u,a.p. It 11.3lue i:.s a color" in.licat•~ that people
do not use the fir~t element in sitWltiona whore the1 rotuae to use tbe
second, thi& tautolog.Y aa.10 uowethill$ . ••tactual." }:eunwb.ile, thll) ~ poai.tiY•
ist& aasert that all auch arAlytic at~to~ents are tautologous. ~•• P• 260.

I
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of pare propositiona.

out it ia eviJ~nt ~bat in a sont~nco o!
the f'o1•r.1 "p io true'' or "It ia true that p 0 the reference to truth
never add:.J f:illJ thing to t ho 6enae. 1£ I aay that it ia true that
~1hakec.peare wrote Ha17tlet, or that tho proposition "J hakeupeare
,-1ro't e lla:iilet" is true, l a m Sb.yin~ no mora than that 3hak8apoure
wroto Hamlet. • • • this s how» that the words ''true" a.nd "false"

aro not uaed to atuud for anything, but function in th~ :Jentence
merel1 as assertion and negation signs. ~hat iu to say, truth aucl
tals~hood. are not gonuine conceptu. Consequently, t h e r e ~ no
logical problem conoarning the nature ot truth.31
Analytic statements are valid by definition. The othur elaau ot
state,11ents are ''meaningful" tactual propo~itiona "hich 1Are empirica.ll.)r
veritiable. 32 Synthetic statements ar~ tt1eaningful to the degree they are
"experientially" possible.

'f he so-called "verification principle" arose

to teut und validate the menning of synthetic atate!:'ie nta.

'rhe veri!ie&-

tion principle, in sum, atatod that the meaning of a proposition i a tho
P?aoibility of tho state of affairs which it represents.}} Moritz Uchlick
defined ~eaning in term3 of verification in l9.36i
·r hus, whenever we aek about a sentence, "What does it :!lean?", what

we expect ia inatruotion ad to tho circumstanceo in \fhich the
suntonce is to be used; we want a description ot thu condi.tioua
un~er which the sentence ~ill lorm a true proposition and of thoae
~hich will r:..ake it !alae• • • • Statiiii'"tne meaning ot a sentence
a~ounts to stating tiie°rl.llea according to which the sentence is to
bu used, and 1;hi:, ie the sat0e ns stating the way in which it can be
verified (or falsi!i~i;l). '.l:b~ u:eaniDIJ o! & proposition is the i:ctthod
or its varification.~
\ie shall diacuaa thia principle in greater detail below.

}lAllred J. ,\;fer, ''The Criterion of ·rruth," Philosop~ and Ana).yaict,
edited by !•largaret HacOonald (Oxfordc Be.ail Blackwell, 195), P• 238.
32Ayer, Logical Positivism, P• 10.

33~einberg, P• 178.
34t-torita uchlick, "Meatning and Verification," Philoaophical ~Tiev 1
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1936), J39•
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Logic~l positivism t,eldeJ toglither tha Y.,d1tian heritago and the

Co:utian spirit as it advuriced beyond both in an exa1.1inution of propositions
rathc,r than knowled3e. 35

In dividing all moanin0 ful propo$itiona into

analytic and aynthotic, it defined tho senae ur weaning 0£ a propoaitiun
in tt:11·11·,s of the mathocl of its vorificat.ion.

"Vori!ication'' of ~nalytic

ata tewent a occurred in de!inition; the sense-weanin6 of an analytic atatement is t&utologoua .

11

Veritication11 of aynthetic atatemeuts diaplayed

ituttlf in the 1>ciences, that ia, tbrou.~h empiricia:4; the sense-meaning
of a aynthetic atutement ia "empirically verifiable. '' The tlenning o! a
proposition eviaonoea itself either in definition or in verification.

It through the former, the m~aning is neoe~sary but tautological; i !
t hrough tbe latter, the meaning i a oontingont b\l·t wholl;y empirical.
?iaa ning thl'ough definition had been widely accepted in the philosophical
world, fo1.· thia waf.l the raethod cf ,ua thematio::i.

But on the other hand, it

logical poait.ivis ts cla i 1ued to liroit meaningful contingent statemonts to
the empirically verifiable , -chu burden o! delineating t he precise character of the veri!ica tion principle rested s~uarely on the shoulders of the

positivist a.
't'he Verification !)rinciple and th• Burden

ot Precision

the positivi~tic cl~rification ot thd varification principle, neoeas1-·
tated by the exhaustive synthetic-analytic diohotoffl1, was improcioe,

variable, and axiomaticall;y incorusiateut.

The fact that James' pragmatisa

35Logical positivism differed from Comte speciticall1 in vie~ing
metaphysics not ad false, but aa meaningless.
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contribute d to tho estnoliahi1ont of ~he principle:,6 suggeats that ou~-

ccptibility to multitudinous val'intion~ was a n inborn liability.

On the

other band, througliout tba complex development from atringent er.ipirical
11

verifiability 11 to principlod "confirr,iability," the poeitivis ta held to

two the sea un~averinglyi a factual proposition refers to empirical tact

alone; t hi.:J ! a ct i .s always whitt its asaertor would regu•d as t he bei,t
1\larra nt for the truth of his a so&i-tion. }7

It " ou.: d bo imprecis e to

mea6ure logical poaitiviam sole ly bJ the:: vel'ii'ica tion principle, but
an exa:uination o! the priuciplu'a ro&turation will loa d to an unde rstand-

ing of t he devolop1'Jont and eveu~uol disintegrat ion of tho rnove,:ient.

vie

will distinguish five atageo in the de velop~ent of t he vori!ica.tion principle, and then consider ho~ s o1oe of the principle's oonstituent ulo!!Mtnta
contributed to a relaxation 0£ t.htt original i."orr:iulatior..

The init ial formulation of t ho vorificution principla waa probably
the work of Ludwig ia ttgcnotein.

s~lthough he andoraed lcg1cal atoraiom

with Hus 6ell, he conce1·ll0d hi mself with the relation of atomic foct to
atolllic propoaition--later called the probleo oi' verification.

In hie

Tracta tus

\littger,otein interpreted the situation with the abandon ot

aolipiern.

He lir.iitod mea ning in a !actual proposition when it cd only

363ilbert !lylo, n Introduction, 11 Tne iievolutiou in Philoao
, ed.ited
by il . J. Ayer (Lo11cion: r4.acuaillan anJ Ooi:1pa117, c.19r: , P• 9. 'r. a. Kiles•
auirJtiarJ of positivis tic ''operational d$f1Ditions 11 in Heligion and -che
Scientific O~tlook (Londoni Allen and Un'din, c.1959), P• .20, d•moustrateo

a de!ir.ite pra~mat ic orientation in the movement. In the procedure ot
••opora.tioi.al d~finition. 11 the miHlnillg o! a term ia explained by tho operations involva.:1 iu deta:r!.!ling whether th;i, gta t:.ement containi ni;t i;be t81"1l 1a
true or tal~<-. Thus "l~'' ie de!ined in terma of a pttrson'a pertoraaa.ce
on an intelli~ence teat.
}?Blanahard., P• 20!).
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when, aa .Blanubard says, "it refers to what is given within the set of
sensible facts comprising 'one self. "'38

It is obvious that \:iittgenatein

waa heavily indebted to logical atomiam at thia time.

In fact, his formu-

lation is so imprecise that :-18.Xitell Charlesworth re!uaes to asaociate him
with the logical positivist.Eh

He contends that although Wittgendtein

subscribed to the verification principle, he held "vurification'' to a.ean
different things. 39 There ia room for discussion her~ but little profit
in pursuing the question.
The second developmental atage wRa Moritz Schlick's "consistent

empiricism" of 19.}2.

Schlick held that to pronounce a synthetic propo-

sition ''meaningful" was to guarautee ita verifiability in nrinciple to
one person.

40 A "meaningful" syuthetic statement ia not limited to the

realm of past empirical exp~rience, but it must be capable of empirical
verit'icat ion in principle.

:..;chlick argued that "verification in principle"

moant, in fact, ''conceivable."

Thua the proposition "There i:, a mountain

of a t111ight of 3()0() meters ou the othor side of the moon" made sense even
though in 1932 aoiance lacked the technical means of verifying the propo41
aition experientially. The verification remained couceivable.

38a1anshard, P• 200.
39Maxwell John Charlesworth, PbilosophY and Linguistic Analysi3 1 Vo. IX
of Duquesne Studies (Pittsburg: Duquesne University, c.1959), PP• 99-100.
R. B. Braithwaite, in "An Empirioiat•a View of the Nature of Religious
Belief," Existence of God, edited by John Hick (Nev York: Macmillan Compa~,
c.1964), P• 252, argues that the first explicit statement of t~e verification principle was Friedrich Waiamann's in ErkeDDtnis, I (1930), 229.
4oBlanshard, P• 209.

41Koritz Schlick, "Positivism und Realiaoi," Logical Positiri.sm,
edited by Alfred J. Ayer (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.~959), P• 88.
The article was originally published in Erkenntnis, Ill (1932-33).
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Schlick further limited meaningful propositions to such aa were verifiable in principle by a single person.

The synthetic proposition was

restricted to one rd.nd; in thio rebiard $chlick' a for1nulation was no
advance beyond Wittgenstein's.
The second stage gave way to a third becauae of 5everal deficiencies.

The verification principle aa formulated in stage two outlawed

sentences of univeroal form including statements (!tven of scienc!) expreasi ve of general laws.

42 Again, :3chlick' s ''verifiability in principle" vas

liruited to appearance in person or at first band ot such empirical evidence
as was necet:5aary or in principle possible.
Th~ third atage signo.led the acceptance of verifiabilit1 in prin-

ciple by aD.Yone.

Conver1>ely, stage three relegated only atate.:senta of

logical imposaibility and tautologies to the realm of the "meaningless"
stahment. 43

tJrinson characterizes the "strong" verification principle,

which appears to be stage three, with this statement:
Any

statement, to be digl'li.Cicant, n1ust be, in principle, capable

ot being conclusively verified or falsified; every propoaition
42earl G. Hempel, "~mpiriciat Criterion or Meaning,'' Logical .i?ositiv!2!, edited by Allred J. Ayer (Olencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.1959),
p. 112. The article originally appeared in Revue International• de
Philosophie, r.v (1950). Miles (p. 27) makes reference to the problem of
generalities a.a it appeared in sentences dealing with atoms and electrons.
The positivist found himself in a dile~ma: tellow-scientisto introduced
"atom," "electron," "proton" as descriptions o! effects; but these terms
stood for something permanently unknown, and properly should be jettisoned
aa "meaningless." The problem resolved itself in a reformulation of the
principle which allowed a sentence to be considered meaningful if translatable into other sentences which referred to what was (in principle)
observable.

43Blansbard, p. 221. J'oergensen notea (p. 4o) that it was approximately at thia time, after 1930, tbat logical positivists preferred to be
called "lugioal empiricists," thereby etro:ssinb tbat they did not consider
themselvea tied to a poeitivistic view in the more narrow and dogmatic

sense.
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is a truth-function of a set of simple statements all of which
could in principle be chocked nnd the truth or falsehood o! the
proposition thua conclusivel1 establiahed.44
Schlick also made the change from the second to tho third stage.

He

allowed for speculation about immortality, and argues that such apecu.lation was within tho confines of the vorification a3 defined (verification

Ria auggeation aroused the indignation of other
positivists, including Ayer. 45

in principle by anyone).

The fourth stage of development was in one aenae a reversal.
four dealt with "falsifiability'' rather than verifiability.

3tage

Karl Popper

augce3ted in Logik der Forshung (1935) that falsifiability was the only
proper mothod of deraaroating betw~en statements cf the empirical sciences
and all other otatements.

As early as 1919 ?opper was forced to examine

the traditionally empirical approach to the verificat iona of theories.
He recalls his thinking of the summer of 1919 in these words:
The most ch&raoteristic element in tho situation seemed to me
the incessant stream o! confirmations, o! observa.tioll8 which
"verified" the theories in ttuostion; and thia was the point
constantly emphasized by their adherents. A Marxist could not
open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence
for his interpretation ot history • • • • The Freudian analysts
emF,hasized that their theorie:J were daily, nay, hourly, verified
by their "clinical observations". And as to (~ltre<!J Adler, I
~a3 much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I
reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian,

44
. Urmson, p. 111.
45Blaushard, p. 223. For a comparison of Ayer and Jchliok's views
on the possibility ot meaningful statementd regarding immortality, see
Virgil c. Aldrieh "Meaera. Schlick and Ayer on Immortality," Readings
in Philoaophical ~nal.ysis, edited by H. Feigl and W. Sellars (Nev York:
Appleton-Century-Crotts, c.1949), PP• 171-174. The articl•/irst appeared in ?bilosophioal R~view (1938). AntoDY G. N. Flew, in Can a Man
witness Kia Own Funeral?" Hibbert JourDMl, J;IV (April 1956), 242-250,
challenges Schlick by suggesting the.t Gchlick'a imagi~tion ot his funeral
ia not equivalent to imagining or describing a world without a body.
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but which ho found no difficulty whatever in analysing in tarms ot
his theory ot inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen
the child. J lightly shocked, I asked him how he could 'bo ao su.r~
about all thi,~ "Because of my thousan<liold experience", he replied • • • •
As early as the winter of 1919 Popper claim3 to have settled on talaifialie determined that it was rttlat.ively easy to obtain contiraa-

bility.

tions, or varifications, for nearly every thaory.

He concluded that

confir1t1ations ahouil:cl count only if they were "risq," that is, if they
were unenlightened by the theory in quoiltion.

Every "good" scientific

theory is one which forbids certain things to happen; "the more a theory
forbids, the better it ia. 11
a virtu~.

Irrefutability is a theoretical vice, not

Popper's thinking of 1919 can be suuunarized in one atateraent:

"!a l~1£iability 1 or re!utability, is a criterion of the scientific stutua
of a tneory. 1147
Popper argues that the problem he attacked both in t lla early twenties

and in his Logik der Forahung of 1935 was neither the problem ot meaningfulnesa or signi!ioance, nor the problem ot truth or acceptatility.

~1th

the criterion of falsifiability he claims to have been "drawing a line
(as well aa this can be done) between the statements, or systems ot statements, of the empirical sciences, and all other statementa--whether they
are of a religious or of a Qetaph3sical character, or simply pseudoacientific.••48

46Karl R. Popper, ''Philosop}q ot Science: A P~rsoaal Report," 8ritillh
PlliloaophY in the Mid-Centu~, edited by c. A. f.l.ace (New York: Macmillan
CompaD1, c.1957), PP• 157-l •
47mbid., PP• 159-160. Italica are hi3.

-

l+Sibid., P• 162.
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The positivists of Vienna assumed that Popper's criterion of talaiEiability dealt with meaning, not demarcation.
letter to the editor

or

Popper attempted, in a

l!;rkenntnis in 1933, to depict the Viennese con-

cern with meaning as a pseuQo-problem compared with his problem of
demarcation:
my contribution was classified by-membera of the (y1enl3!1 Circle
ask proposal to replace the verifiability criterion of meaning
by a falsifiability criterion ot meaning--which etfectuall7 made
nonsense of my views. My protests that I was trying to solve, not
their pseudo-problem of meaning, but t he problem o! demarcation,
vere of no avail.49
Although the pooitivista did not interpret Popper's intentioDS
correctly, they used his criterion ot falsifiability in their attempt to
clarity the verification principle and arrive at a theory of meaning. 50
The falsifiability of a statement provided the meaning of a statement in
delimiting a speci~ied area which, by contradictory empirical falsification, was ruled out of bounds.

Conversely, only synthetic atateroents

capable of falaificution were deemed meaningful by the positivists.
Findlay discusses the falsifiability criterion with this comment:
words do not mean by virtue of some raysterious internal property;
they only do so because the man who utters them is prepared in
oomo situation, actual or conceivable, to apply them to something.

49Ibid., p. 165. Erkenntnis was a jourcal established by the logical positivists in Vienna. Blanahard (p. 228) appa,.rently sees Popper's
contribution as a criterion of meaning rather than demaroation.
50Popper insists that his intentioDS were miareMd by the positivists.
Referring to the shifts and modi!ioationa which were introduced in ~he
positivistic diacu~sion of senso and nonsense as a nsult ot hia talsitiabilit1 criterion, :Popper remarks ·( 11.f'bilosopby of Science,'' Briti8h
Philosoplq, P• 165), "l wish to repeat that although I onatad this oontusion, I nH'er participated in it. Neithttr falsifiability nor testability were propoa.d by me aa criteria of meaning, although I may plead
guilty to haYing introduced both terms into the discussion; bllt, croas
141 heart, not into the theory of cneaning."
~
\

II

It, no matter what situation turns up, he still refuses to say
that this is what .he meant, it he persists in aaying that he :neans
•something different• or 'something more',we may rightly question
whether he means aD¥thing at al1.5l
Alasdair Hacintyre ~efers to the criterion in terms of asaertiona:
It we make any assertion we declare that some state of affairs ia
to be found to the exclusion of others. The occurrence of that
atate of atraira verifiea, the occurrence of the excluded states
of affairs falsifiea our assertion. An assertion which excluded
no state o! affair~, the lll8.int~ining 0£ which was compatible with
the hap~ning ot anything and evorything would not be a.n assertion
at all.~
One beneficial aspect of !alsifiability for the positivists was that
it allowed the inclusion of scientific laws as "rneaning!u1. 1153 But
according to Blanshard, there was a difficulty involved.

The disjunction

which Popper used aa hie fulcrum (the conditional distinction between
universal and pPrticular propositions) vas his Achilles• heel.

It is

true that one can f nlsify, but not verity, the proposition that all avans
are white.

But while one can verity, he cannot faloity the proposition

that !2!!. swans are white.

In such a logioall.J-particular proposition,

the particular can be contradicted or falsified only by the establish-

ment ut a universal proposition; this is impossible under empirical
methods.54 This difficulty necesaitated a more precise, but less stringent

51Findlay, P• 2j.
52.uasaair 1'iacintyre, "~he Logical Status of uoligious Belief,"
Metaehyaical Beliefs (London: SCM Preas, 1957), P• 180.
53Blanahard, P• 228.

54 Ibid.

Throughout Blanahard 'a diacuasion, J)opper' a intention in
propoai~alsi£iability (nwnely de~roation) has been ignored in favor
of the positivists• use o! the criterion. Popper :says ("Philosop~ ot
Science,". British .PhilosophY, PP• 165-166) in reference to the criticism
of his taloi!iabilit1 criterion, "Criticism of my alleged Tiewa w~
wideapread and highly successful. I have yet to meet a oriticism~of ~y
views."
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formulation of the principle, reinat~ting it in tho sphere of verifiability.
'l 'he fifth stage wae Ayer' s in his book Lt=mpta~, Truth and Logic,

first published in 1936.

Ayer distinguished between stron~ and weak

veri!ication. 55 ;jta0e five .signaled a transition from "verifiabilityn
to "confirmability": ''A proposition is significant if there are some

obaervutiona which >1ould be relevant to its truth or falait:,.".56 The
stringent demand.a of .,chlick dissipated ill the allowknce for univeraal
and general sentences, although the poaitivistic tempera~ent remained.57

It is extremely difficult to characterize the verifiability principle
in stage five.

The principle abandoned some of ita earlier dogmatism

and with that its clearly diatinguisbable cbaracteriatios.

Ayer, in com-

paring the final stage of the principle with its embryonic for1uulatiou,

paints a miuty pioture of the fully developed principle:
Because of this and other difiicultida the view which came to prevail au1ong the logical positivists waa that the demands that a
statement be conclusively verifiable, or ti.lat i t ~ concluaively
!alsit'iable, were botll too stringent as criteria. o! meaning. They
choae instead to be satiafied with a weaker criterion by which it

5c:;.,Blanahard, p. 229. In the second edition Wew York: Dover .Publications, n.d.) of 1946, Ayer de~onstrated a concern for a reatate~eut
ot the verification principle. Although he relaxed the principle somewhat, he adhered (p. 5) to the 1936 atate~ent of the principle with the
comment, "I still believe that the point of view which [the 1936 editiofil
ex,resses is aubstan~ially oorrect.r1 Two articles in A Modern Introduction to Plli.los ophy, edited by Paul ~wards and Arthur Pap (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.1957), are reprinta of discussions arising from
Ayer' s first edition. W. T. Stace's "Hetapbyoica and Meaning,'' PP• 565.575, was originally publiahed i n ~ , 1935. A. c. Ewing's Meaninglessness," pp. 576-585, which challenges Ayer's position O\.ltrightly, was
origirw.lly publiahed in Mind, 1937•
.56urason, P• 11}.

5?Levi, P• 373•
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waa required only that a statement be capable of being in solle degree
confirmed or diaconfirmed by observation, 1! it were not it~elt an
elemttntary staterr.ent, it had to be auch that eler.iontary statements
could support it, but they did not n~ed to entail it or to entail ita
negation. Unfortunately, thia notion of ~flupport 11 or confirmation''
has never yet been adequately formalized.'°
Blanshard claims to find a particular rr.Knifestation or stage ~ive in
America.

Carnap, for exaraple, argued that the disputes about "meaning-

fulness" and verification redolved theUlselves in "ideal language."

But

it was apparent that the solution was merely a maaked formulation of the
problem, !or the battle front was moved to a delineation of the boundaries
of "empirical" language.59

The Ayer-Copleston debate of 1949 exemplifies the difficulties which
stage five encountered.

Copleaton asserted that the proposition 11we both

have immortal souls" was capable of future veri!ication.

In the light of

auch verifiability, he adked, was the= statement meaningless? Ayer replied
that a predictive statement ~s only· a predictive sense.

~he atatement

merely indicated the possibility of further religious experiences; it
fou~d no "meaning" in the present by aimple virtue of its future
verifiability. 60

58Ayttr, Logical Positivism, p. 14. As late as his iaaugural address
at Oxford in November, 1960, A1er had "no wieh to disown the verification
principle, though it sutlers from a vag11enese which it has not yet been
found possible to eradicate. I doubt, however, if it is a ~holl~ effective means of distinguishing queationa of aaalysis or interpretation from
question of fact." .:iee bis "Philosophy and Language," The Concept of a
Pereon and Other ~ssays (New York: ~t. t-iartin's Presa, c.1963), PP• 20-21.
David Makinson, in "Nidditcb's Definition of Verifiability,"~. LXXIV
(April 1965), 2Lto-247, arrives at a redefinition of vorifiability, but
tails to satisfy himsel£ with it.
59Blanshard, PP• 23}-2}4. Carnap posited an ''ideal language'' in
"'l'estability and Meaning," Philosophy ot Science, III and IV (l9J6-3'7).

6oA;yor and Copleson, "Logical Pooitivism--A l>ebate," Modern Introduction to Philosophy, P• 614 •
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The iconoclastic nature o! the verification principle was clearlJ
evident even in the principle's imprecision.

Ito claim to be a touch-

stone for every "meaningful" statement \fas both its ~eakness and its
strength.

Ian Crombie notes that the "doctrine that unverifiabla !State-

ments are ~eaningless is lika the doctrine that cara are fast; not entirely false, but blanketing so many important distinctions as to be use-

bao. "

61 In the following eection of t he chapter we will examine the

disarray which tho verification principle crs~toa in tho sphere of metaphysics.

At present our conc6rn is with di!!icultie3 integral to the

principle's Iormulatiou.
!hat the verification principle waa an attempt to put teeth into the

analytic-synthetic dichotomy
ita evolution.al formulation.

ia

apparent from the above description ot

But even for the "common man" the fully-

developed principle fell short o! r•quirement because it allowed no ostensive verification tor the common

1118.D'a

statements about the existence ot

some thing or other. 62

In addition, experiential statements generally lack conclusive verification.

Friedrich \iaismaon, a charter member of the Vienna Circle,

challenged the principle on this ground:
An experiential statement is, as a rule, not conclusively verifiable

for twc ~ifterent rsasons: (l) because of the exiatence of an unlimited number of ~estsJ (2) because of the open texture of the terms
involv~d. The3e two reasons correspond to two different senses of
"incomplete ness." 'l'ho . first is related to the !act that I can never

61 ran M. Cro111bie, ''The Possibility- of Theological

.:itatements,"

~

and i.ogio, edited by Ba~il Mitchell (.London; George Allen and Unwin, 1957),

P• }3.
62

.

Blanshard, P• 226.

?or exaciple, "The clock ia on tho untel.''

conclude the description of a material object,, or of a situation ..
I may, for instance, look at my table from ever new points in space
without ever exhausting all the poss:fi·b ili ties. The second (and more
exciting one) is due to the fact that our factual knowledge is incomplete in another dimension: there is always a chance that something unforeseen may occur • • • • (a) that I should get acquainted
with some totally new experience such as at present I cannot even
imagine; (b) that some new discovery was made which would affect
our whole interpretation of certain facts.63
Waiemann•s reference to "open texture" isolates an intrinsic weakness of
the verification principle.
The logical status of the verification principle was questioned from
the beginning.

Was the principle a verifiable statement? Was it a tauto-

logy inapplicable to contingent experience? Was it a persuasive definition?

Carl Hempel defined its logical status in terms of a pragmatic

referent:
As a. consequence, the empiricist criterion of meaning, like the
result of any other explication, represents a linguistic proposal
which itself is neither true nor false, but for which adequacy is
claimed in two respects: first in the sense that the explication
provides a reasonably close analysis of the commonly accepted meaning of the explicaudum--and this claim implies an empirical assertion; and secondly in the sense that the explication achieves a
"rational reconstruction" of the explicandum, i.e., that it provides, together perhaps with other explications, a general conceptual
framework which permits a consistent and precise restatement and
theoretical systematization of the contexts in which the explicandum is used--and this claim implies at least an assertion of a
logical character.64

c.

L. Stevenson, on the other hand, suggested that the verification rrin-

ciple was a "persU&sive" definiti on of meaning.

This factor, in his

63Friedrich Waismann, "Verifiability," Logic and Language, edited by
Antony G. N. Flew (First Series: Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), P• 124.
Paul van Buren in The Secular Meaning of the Gospel (New York: Macmillan
Company, c.196;), pp. 111-112, suggests that his use of the word "secule.r"
in the book's title is an example of an unfolding "open texture."
64Hempel, "Fmpiricist Criterion," Logical Positivism, P• 125.
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opinion, did not detract from the principle's importance, but alerted one
to different kinds of language exemplified persuasively.65 Blanshard
contends that the verifiability criterion was caught in a three-way selfdestruction: (1) it laid down a universal negative, but admitted the impossibility of investigating all statements in order to verify that no
statement which failed to conform had meaning; (2) the principle could
assume no status in the positivistic theory of truth since it wa.s not
empirical, a priori, or conventional in nature; (3) it could give no

l
Ii

account of the verification process.66
Men also questioned the verification principle because it failed to
deal intelligibly with the an~ous questiona--mc.taphysical questions-which continued to haunt even the man of positive outlook.

The principle

involved itself in quandaries from which it escaped only by flashing the
"meaningless" sign.

Consider Copleston's question to Ayer:

I don't want to assume the mantle of a prophet, and I hope that
the statement is false; but it is this: "Atomic warfare will take
place, and it will blot out the entire human race." Now, most
people would think that this statement has meaningJ it means what
it says. But how could it possibly be verified empirically?
Supposing it were fulfilled, the last man could not say with his
last breath, "Copleston•s prediction has been verified," because
he would not be entitled to say ·this until he was dead, that is,
until he was no longer in a position to verify the statement.67
We now turn to the positiviatic treatment of metaphysical questions.

65urmaon, p. 170. If Stevenson's suggestion were accepted, it
would invalidate conclusively the claim of logical positivism.
66Blanshard, pp. 239, 242, 245.
67Ayer e.nd Copleston, "Logical Positivism-A Debate," Modern
Introduction to PhilosopbY, P• 607.
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Monism without Metaphysics: Hetaphyaical and Theological
Statements and 3yatem::J under Logical Positivism
Perhaps the most striking feature of logical positivism wao its
iconoclasm.

Thia feature earned for the movei:1ent both its odiuc and its

popularity.

David Hume atte,:11pted to d$:Jtro:, the ot ructure o! ,,1etaphys ioe

t hrough empirical reasonings

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity, or school ~etaphyoicB, !or instance; let ua ask, Does it contain any abstract
reaso~ing conoernin~ quantity or number? No. ~oes it contain any
experimental r oaaon1ng concerning matter of tact and existence?
No. Commit it then to ~he !lataas: for it can contain nothing but
sophistry and illusion. 0 H
The logical positivists took another grip on the bull's horna--at the
point of proposition.

They viewed philoaop}q solely as analysis : the

clarification ot language and tho categorizati on of propositions, including the metaphysical, into meaningful/meaningless.
We have invostigated at length bow poaitivism divided meaningful
propositions into analytic-tautological and synthetic.

Thia proposition-

al dichotomy neceaaitate~ a mental dichotomy as well.

Ludwig '.:ittgenstein

in his early years dichotoutized thought when he
bifurcated all true utterance3 into the brutall7 ompirical, on
the one hand, and the emptil-y tautological, on the other; by
impliaation, he divided our thought-shifta into those justified
b1 tautological transfor~tion, on the ono hand, and by a ug~ented
experience on t he othar.b9
\Jhen CarrJap applied the criterion of a1111bolic convuntionall311 (conven-

tion by simple deoiaion) to analytic stater..ent3 and the oriter.ion of

68Dav1d Hume, An Enguirz ..;oncerning Human Under s t anding (Chioagoa
Cpen Court Publishing Compa111, 1930), P• 176.
69John 1aemayer Findlay, ''The Methodolog of liormatiTe Ethics (1961),"
La.nguage 1 Mind and Value (New York& Hu.maldtiea Preas, c.1963), P• 248.
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confirU1ability to synthetio statements, he provided criteria for the mental
processes of man no less than fr,r hia propositions. 70
By definition a dichotomy of the whole leaves nothing in exceas o!

the two parts.

'I'he positivistic bifurcation of thought bad its effects

also in metaphysics:
The ultimate
discovery of
metaphysical
positivis~.

consequence of' liume' s theory of causality anu the

non-Euclidean geometry is the rampantly antibias of the scien~ific philosophy of contemporary
This bias is all-pervasive, even axiomatic • • • • 71

Carnap stated categorically that what lies beyond possible experience aleo

lies beyond poosible expreaaion:
We have seen earlier that the meaning of a statement lies in the
method of its verification. A statement asserts only so much as
is verifiable with respect to it. Therefore a sentence can be used
only to assert an empirical proposition • • • • If solll8thing were
to lie, in principle, beyond possible experience, it could be
neither said nor thought nor asked.72
Even Kant suffered at the hand of the verifiability criterion in that it
is the "logical tool'' by which empiricisl!l ovorca.r.ce the supposed dichotomy
between "things of appearance" and "things in thernaelves. '' This tool
elimioated the "things in themselves" becal.lae it "makes it meaningless to
speak about things which are unknowable in principle.n73
The positivistic aearch for a Hunified science" epitomized the impulse which drove the poaitivists to mental-propoaitional bifurcation

70Levi, P• 370.

71 Ibid., P• 335.
?ZRudolt Carnap, ''The ,ii;liminatiou of Metaphysics Through Logical
Analysis of language," Logical Pos1tivi8111, edited by A. J. AT•r (Glencoe,
Illinois: Free Press, c.1959), P• 76. The article originally appeared as
"Oberwindung der Metaphyaik durch Logische Anal,Yse der jprache,"
Erkenntnis, II (1932).

?}Reichenbach, P• 259 •
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and subsequent anti-metaphysical biaa.

One of the primary objocth·ea ot

tb.e Viennese positivists waa to establish a unity of science, a "l!lonism
freo from metaphysiaa. 1174

If, a.a Carnap charges above, ono can neither

apeak nor think nor seek what lie3 "beyond possible experience," a "monism
free i'rom metaphyaics" t8.ltas the field by aimple default.

'l'he mny aciencea

give way to one:
with t he aid of the new logic, logical analysis leads t o a unified
scie nce. ~here are not different sciences ~1th fun:lamentally different methods or different sources of knowledge, but only one
science. Al l knowledge fincla its place in this science an,l:-Tnde4td,
is knowledge of basically the same kind1 the appoaranc$ of fundamental
differences between the sciences are the deceptive result of our using
different oub-lunguages to expres3 them.75
The equation of the experiential with the propositional in unified

s cience neceesitated an elimination of anything "beyond possible experience," that is, what is neith~r analytic nor synthetic.

Conse·.;,uently

a necesaery (tautological) statement has no dealings \11th a contingont

propos ition.

The Ayer-Copleaton debate shows this to be true.

In

Thomiatic fashion Uopleston po~its metaphysics as a ceces sary explllnatio~ of the world's exietence.

Ayer rules the ~ove invelid ~ith the

contention that is meaningl~as to discuss anything "outside" t he \o'orld.
He arguos that a necessary proposition is r.ot auto~atically a contingent
propoaition.76 There is room for the synthetic a nd t he a priori, but not
for the synthetic a priori.

74Joergsnsen, P• 76.
75oarnap, 1r.rhe Old und the Nett Logic," Logical .Positivism, P• 144.
76Ayer and Copleston, ''Logical f·ooitivism--A Debate, 11 'Modern I r.t~oduction to PhilosopbY, pp. 589-596. J. N. Findlay, in uean God'a ~stence by Diaproved," ~ E:s says in .Philosophical 'l'heoloQ:, edited by
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One cannot easily rueasure all the ramificntions o! the positivistic
attack on r.;etaphysical state:.::en+..a.

Pe:-hapa C. ;;;. ~1. Joad found all

rotten egg!l in tho one basket wi',;h hid e·~aluation:
Under [1ogioal pol:3itivism''!J influence young men and women coni'idently affirm that there arfi uo absolv.t~s , t.ht.it metaphy.;;ics is
uons en1>e, that the acientii'ic is t he only ma_thod which reaches
·1alid re:3ulta a nd t hat t he ord1.::.2:· of rea lity 1-l!'lich scie nce studies
ia the only order t hat t he re is.77
While perhaps the impact of logical positiviam was not au drar,intic as
Jood ,1ould lead on~ to be lieve, its iconoclasm did indeed rattle the

~icrlds of philosophy a nd philosophical theology.

We turn no-_ to the

explicit po3itivi3tio attitude towards m~taphysical and theological

'J.'ho claim of logical pos itivis m WD.S that metaphysical a x.d tileological

,-..ntony G. l'i . Flew !lt !d .1'\lasdair t·lacintyro ( New ·i ork: Mac:nillan Company,
c.1955), PP• 47-56, contsnds that t he the ist's dsfinition of ''God" makea
the notion or ideu of the s a me "m~c~'w sary.'" HEJ than rominds th~ theist
tha t logical ana.lyaia has demonstrated logical "necel3sity" to be found
onl y in tautological-o.ual ytic l3tate ,;er.ts, not in t he synthetic. As 1t
result, God'a exiBtence aa a contingent force upon t he world (with whi ch
the theist' a ayntha tic r:1tatements deal) is inconclusivoly d.amonstr&ted.
On tho other hand, in an article titled "Reflections on Necessary ~istence,"
Froceas ancl i>ivinity, edited by i.: . !... Reeso and E . Freol!"a n ( LaJalle,
Illinois: Open Court Publishing Compa~, c.1964), 515-527, Findla1 sug~esta
that Hartshorne haa raopened thG lin:Jolr.1ic ques tion o! t.he "ne ces sity" ot
God's exist ence with forcefulnoss . ~e l:SSYS (p. 516); 11 I have moved tar
f rom wy aimµle ~ ~ nd lfow .;ssayiJ 'disproof' o! God's exi::;tence, and
:i cannot, say how far t1 om each othd1- we ollall ultitt1atel7 i'ind ourselves.
I :.w.ve been powerfully moved by i:-'r of essor liartshorne 'a .sug~a tion, so
atrange to theological i;radition, that it ma.y be f'easibltt tc recognize
bvth a necesaary ,.md a contingent 'side' in God • • • • "
1

77c. i~.

r.;.

Joud, A. Critique 0£ 105ical Positivism (London: Gollancz,

c.19.50), P• 10. Joad's opinion of logical positiviam her~

expreased

~rallele a letter to (. h~ editor o! Philosophy written in :-lo.y, 1935. and
published in Vol. X (Jul11955), 259-263, in spite of a fifteen 1ear
s pan.
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statements flow from a misapplication of worda.78 Carnap contended that
originally every word had its own meaning.

A word frequently changed

meaning in the course of historical development, or lost its primary meaning in the course of historical development, or lost its primary meaning
without acquiring a new one.

In this way "pseudo-concepts" arose.79

"pseudo-concept" is a fundamental misapplication of words.

The

A word assuming

the form of a syntactical subject is not necessarily a valid conceptual
subject, although it may claim and appear to be.
God" as an example of a pseudo-subject.

11

Carnap discusses the word

Not even the firat requirement

of logic is met in the case of this word, namely the requirement of syntactical specification (the form of the word's occurrence in elementary
sentences).
is a God."

An elementary sentence would necessarily assume the form "x
The metaphysician either rejects this form entirely without

substituting another, or if he accepts, he neglects to indicate the syntactical category of the variable x.80 But Carnap claims to see a different
motive in the positivistic challenge when compared with the challenges of
earlier anti-metaphyeicians.

Positivism isolates logical conflict as the

difficulty of metaphysical statements. Metaphysics is not a false fairy
tale; it is a meaningless sequence of words:

78The positivistic insistence that religious discourse is by definition metaphysical was itself an alienating factor. For an interesting
discussion of the relation between metaphysical and religious language,
in which the historical particularity of Christian language shows itself
inimical to metaphysical theology and language (as in Hegel), consult
D. H. MacKinnon, "Metaphysical and Religious Language," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, LIV (1953-54), 115-130.
79Carnap, "Elimination of Metaphysics," Logical Positivism, P• 62.
It is possible that Carnap's view of the origin and development of language
betrays an evolutionary presupposition unbecoming a positivist.
8otbid., P• 66. Carnap includes among categories "material things,
propertr;;'"ot things, relations between things, numbers."
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The difference between our thesis and that of the earlier antimetaphysiciana ahould now be clear. ~le do not regard :netaphyuics
aa "mere upeculation" or " fairy tales''• The .st_,. terr.ents o! a fairy
tale do not conflict with logic, but only with experience; they
are perfectly rneaningtul, although f'alae. Metaphysics is not
"superstition" ; it is poasible to believe tru.e and false ~ropositions, but not to balieve raeaningleas aequencea ot word3.Bl
To r~legate metaphysical or theological stat ement~ to the sphere ot
"pseudo-statements" was a negative process.

·rhe positivists were not

satisii<:td to delineate the logical inado•1 uacies of these statements;
they also isolated the ;1positive" o.spect of p:Jeu.do-statements.

'l'hey

assured all who would listen th.at the Ue~pression of some emotioaal
attitude" may certainly be a "significant task."
they created

1a.

In their appraisal

place for metaphysical and t heological statet1.:e nts within

the re&lm of emotion;
analysis sho1,o1s that these sentences do not say aeything, being
ins tead onl;y an exproseion of some eraotioual a t titude. To express
this may cortait:il.y be a ::.ignificant task. However, the ade'iuate
means for its exprussion is art, tor example, lyric poetry or
music. It, instead ot tht.1 .-;e, tha linguistic dress ot a theory is
chosen, a danger arioes: a theoretical content, which does not
exist, io feigned. If a metaphysician or theologian wishes to
rtttain the ueual form of language, he should understand thoroughly
and explain clearly that it is not represent~tion but expression;
not theory, information, or cognition, but rather poetry or myth.
If a mystic asserts that he haa experience~ that transcend all concepts, ha cannot be cballengQd. But he cannot speak about i t ,

81 Ibid., p. 72. i.'"ried.rich iia1srnann, a charter membe1• of the Vieuraa
Circle."a1;";';. not diamiss llietapbysics with such rapidity. Ill ''lfow I See
Philosop.bJ," Logical Positivism, edited by A. J. Ayer (Glencoe, I1U11oia1
Free Press, c.1959), P• _3l10, he aays, 11To aa.y that inetaphysics is nonsenae is nonsense. It !a ils to acknowledge the onormouB part played at
bast in the past b7 those systems• • • • Metaphysicians, like artists,
are tho antennae of their time: they have a !lair tor feeling which way
the spirit is mo-Ying." ·daismanu' s article firs t appeared in Contemporary
.Britiah Fhiloaop!_f• edited b1 H. D. Lewis (London: Gdorge Allen and Unwin,

c.1956), PP•

447- 90.
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since speaking means grasping conQepta and roducing to facts which
can be incorporated into aoience.~2

Carnap leaveu room for expression of ono'a 11 baa1o attitude" in life, but
arguos that art ia a much more adequate medium than '-'letaphyaioal statell8nts:
we find that metaphysics also &rises from the need to give expression to a man'a attitude in life, hia emotional and voliti0nal
reaction to the enviro11111ent, to society, to the taska to which he
devot~s himself, to t.he r:iisfortunes t hat be fall him. • • • ',lbat
is here e~a~ctial for our considerations is only the tact ths.t art
is an adequate, 1.1etaph?1:1ics an inn<ie'-iuate means for t he ~xpre~aion
of t he basic ~ttitude.<53
It wa u noted above that positivism advanced beiond Hume in oouaidering
propositions rather than empirical reaaoning.

Ayer seizes this uuppoaed

advance in his atte1.1pt to vindicute the positivi3tic condemnation of eietaphysical utterancel:j.
the i wpoasibility

or

Logical poc.,itiviw, he claim~, waci ori~iual in making
metaphysics riepend not ~pon th~ natur" of what could

be k~own, but upon the nature of what could be said. 84 .?rom thie perspective ~er viawa the pooitiviatic-linguiatic challenge to t heology aa far

more radical than earlier epiaternological challenges.

He will not allow

the positivist1c challenge to be called "atheistic!! or 111:1.gno.stic":

82Joerganaen, p. 5. 'l'hi.s translated paragraph comea from :IiodandCha!tliche ~eltauffasaung: Der ~iener Kreia (VieUPa: Yolf, 1929), PP• 1617, tha Vienna Circle'G official poaition-stutel'llent. a. H. Price, in
"Logical Positivism and Theology," Philosophy, X (Jw.y 1935), 313-3.51,
diacuseed the effect of logical poaitiviam upon theological otat<it1:1ents.
Re argued that it the conditions prescribed by the positivists are accepted, theological statements aro meaningless and non-aensicul. But he
charged that the positivista bad delimited experieno• to acllieve their
purpose. 'rllere ia roor;: 1 he argued, for "religiou::1 experienoe 11 1 through
it theological statements can be verified or refuted.

83carnap, "Elimination of Metap~sioa," P• 79• Ben Kimpel auggesta,
iu .Language and auligion (New York: Philosophical Library, 0.1957), P• ?,
thM.t a philosophy about lan&uage in religion presupposes a philosophy ot
religion. Honce those who auggeat that roligiou3 language is punl.y "•motive"
assume that religion is totally ooncera.ed witll experience and experiential.

84Ayer, Logical Poaitivism, P• 11.

1+7
our view that all utterar.cea about God. are nons<tnaical, so tar
from being identical with~ or avon lending any aupport to, either
of ·tht>$8 familiar contentions , is actually incompatible with them.
For it the a s aertion that thare is a god is non3ensical, then the
atheist's s.:;sertion that there ia no god is equally nonaensical,
since it is only a 3igni!icant proposition that can be significantly
co~tradicted • • • •
In the same train of thou.gh't;, Ayer continues,

'r ho point which we wish to e1:1tablish is that there cannot be aey
transcendent trutha of religion. ?or the aentonce6 which the
theist uses to expre~s such "truths" are not literally signiticant.85

For the positivists, theological statements are meaningleas ouly when
they are put in propositional form.
allowed for mystical experience. 86

:from tho beginning the positivists
On the other band, they endor8ed

Dr. Johnson's statement referring to Jacob I3oehme•a mystical experience,
11

lf Jacob saw the unutterabltt, Jacob should not have tried to utter it. 1187
~hen discussing the varification principle, the positivists restricted

''possible experience'' to the i.ttorable.

fhey disallowed both l;he argument

1

that a conting1:tnt sta:t;ement could serve a.a a necessary statement and the
argument that empirical and supra-empirical statements could bo md:xed.

It

i.s all the more surprisiDg, then, when Ayer claims that the field uf ''possible

experience'' is not limited to the utterable when deall113 with ·t he realm

85Alfred J. Ayer,~
Truth and 1o c (Second edition; New York:
Dover flublioatil)DS, n.d.
9
, pp. 115, ll7-ll8. In another place,
Ayer says that belie! in a aupermttural deity serve::, three intellectual
needs: it explains the world's existunce and nature; it assures ono that
lite is worth living; it anawera the que:-stion of how one ought to live.
Conaiderfid logicall1, ho claims, belief dOGe not fulfill a~ of these
functions. See Alfred J. Ayer et al., Religion aud the Intellttctuals:
A :3;ympoaium (l,ew Yorka (:PartisanHuvio~, c.19.50), PP• .31-:54.

86see Joergenaen, p. 51 see also supra, P• 46, n. 82.
B?Nacintyre, P• 178.
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of "Godn:
we ore not setting any arbitrary boundaries to tha field of possible
experience. As an illustration of this let us consider the ca~o ot
the man who claim~ to have an immediate, non-aeneory experience of
Goel. ;:;o long as he uses the word ''God" simply as a name for the
cont~nt of his experience, l have no right to disbelieve him • • • •
I can at least understand that he ie having aoiile experience ot a
kind that I do 11o't have. And t his I may readily b1~lieve. • • • ,~t
tha !lame tima it muat be remarked that "God," in this uaage, cannot
be the name of a trunsc~udent being. For to aay that one waa iura1ediat~ly acquaigted 1ith a truns cendent being ~ould be aeltcontradictory. 8

In sum, the po~itiviet ha~gs the theist by his own rope.

If the theist

allowa that it is impossible to define God !ully in intelligible terms

(as all theists allow), the theist is simultaiwously allowing, argues the
poaitiviat, that it is impossible tor a sentence to 'be both siguif.icant
an<i ''about" God. 89 The po~itiVi$t says, "Ii' a mystic admits that the
object of his vision id $Ometbing which cannot be described, then he wuat
also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it. 1190
i;Jith thii:; state1,1eut he challengtta the theist to answer on positivistic
terms.

He invites the t i.~iat to enter his syat1u1.1; if the theiet does so,

he must either limit God to the mysticall7 ''unutturable" or biud Him oTer

to the

11

empirioal" of the naturalist.

3ome theologians are slow to dismiss the positivistic fra1t1e of reference.

'2homas 2-icrherson, for one, contends that the positiviatic position

is not without merit:

88.Uf'red J. Ayer, "Verification und 3xperience, n Logical Positiviam
(Glencoe, Illinoi~: Free Press, 0.19~9), P• 239. ?h$ article appeared
ic Proceedings ot the Aristotelian !:iociet:r;, 1936-Yl•
89Ayer, Langua,:e, Truth and Logic, 2d ed., P• 118.
90lbiil.

1iha.t to the Jews was a stum
bling-block and to the Greek.a foollab.nese ia to the logical positivists nonaeuea. There i3 more to be
learnt tp>m thia tiu:l.n ba11 yet, I think, been realized by- mcdt theo-

logiuna .. 91
.I8 it poa aible, he a.Jka , that logical pooitivism is a "friend" ot religion

in its allowance f'or t ho inexprusaible?

If otto's Idea of the Holy sought

to recover th~ osse utial element o! rcli~ion iu its non-rational a spect,
doeu po::Jitivia1u differ 3reu t ly?
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.:ittgenstein's oa rl:J tre 1>tise.

.Mc Pher son de rnoncstrntes hia ca~e fro•

R~ grants that at...tec:ients int.he ·r raotatus

( "l,ot ~ the worln i a , is

th(!

indeed the inexpressible.

'l'hia

laystical, but
s 110\tS

l!!!i

it is, 11 6.44; "?here is

itself; it is thu mystical, 11 6.522)

leave no room for the rnyotical question.

But• he argues, Wittgenstein's

conclusion--that in religion one i e a3kiog questions that cannot properly
be a sktld when ho i~ asking questions that cannot be anawered--is !llors apt

than any other could bo.9j
Logical Positivism in the .Larger Jontext
One arrives with difficulty at ~he role of logical poaitiviam in the
history of philosophy.

~ithout a doubt logical positiviiilll served as the

9l.l'homaa HcPherson, "Religion as the Inexpressible," New ~says in
Philoso hical i'heolo , edited by Antony G. N. }'low Qnd Alaodair l'..a.clnt,re
}lew York: .14.acmillan Company, c.1955), P• 134.

92 Ibid., P• 139. HoPheraon•s emphasis is not without parallels in
the theology o! Karl Barth.
9.}Ibid., PP• 138-139. Robert Calhoun, in 11'1'he Place ot Language in
Heligio~Philoao v of Holi 011, editod by George L. Abernethy and
Thollllls A. Langford New Yorks Macidllan Coinpan,, c.1962), P• 302, rellliDda

the myistio that a tremendous affirmation underlies all hie negationaa

that God is transcendent, incoai.r.1ensurable with all that is infinite;
"hence, unles5 one is to keep wholly silent, avoiding even negative
assertions, it s ~ems necessary to probe !urther after some groUDd tor
affirmation."

immediate precursor ot contemporary lin3t1istio analysis.

But froa another

perspective, logical positivism was an unwelcomed interruption in the deTelopment of linguistic anal.yais.

Il'lBofar as Wittgenatein and Moore differed

from Carnap and Russell 1n allowing for a consideration of the sphere ot
ordinary language and not solely an analysis of symbolic logic,94 one can
argue that logical positivism was a Qo~entary freak in the eTolutioD&17
development of philosophical analysis.
and made it atandardz

n•r o

Logical positiT1511l froze a method,

uae the words of a recent anal.yet, it tended to

'freeze the philo~ophical method of Moore and Wittgenstein into slogan and
dogma. 11195 Logical poaitivism srew out of embryonic linguistic analysis,
but in tho end proved itself inimical to a.na.lysia.

Logical positivism

waa at the same tira~ parent, child, and prodigal son.

Wittgenstein, .for

example, contributed in his early y~~a to the development of logical
poditivism.

But his major contributions, as will be demonstrated in

Uhaptor III, 111ere to the fi-,ld of ling,.dstic analysis.

It is not surpris-

ing thure!ore that stringent logical positivi5al did not long remain a
viable option in the philoaophioal world.

Once its conce~ns were Yoiced,

it was absorbed by a more inclusive movement, philosophical anal1sia.
Urmaon explains vtq logical positivism-empiricism, at tho end of the

1930'a, was forced to alter itself. It bad conceived language as a clearcut truth-function structure.

But "indefinite statements," auch aa the

reductive analysis of the word "nation," or the chllllenge to otter a
phenomenalistic analysis of statements about material objects, were not
easily explained.

Supporters were driven to the cornera

94Levi, P• 443.
95Cbarleaworth, P• 127. The anai,st is Stuart

Haapshire.

Such a viow of language had seemed eDaer.tial to empiricism, since
it ahowed how the edifice of our knowledge was securely baaed on
experience; to give it up involved as raciical. a change ot view aa
the abandonment ot ·the view that all our conceptual apparatus vas
built up out ot aimple ideas would have meant for Locke. ~uch a
def~nce of analysi6 • • • was therefore impossible for the allB.lysta
since in employing it they would have abandonod their whole conception of the purpose and nature of analysia.96
'l'he positivist~ knew that it' they deserted their original purpose they
would abandon the truth-function view of language, and with it the appeal
to ~~piric~l v~rification. 97 Urmaon clai~o that a decisive disavowal of
logical poaitivism-ato~.ism was first linked with an endorso~ont of linb"Uistic analysis in John .iiaclom's article "Philoaophical Perplexity,"
publiohed in 1936. 98 This ar·t icle viewed language as "orciinary" lauguage
rather thau a.a u torm of syro'bollc logic.

"In philosophical method it is

far more siruilar to present-aay work than to a111thing which bad preceded

it."99
It 1$ safe to conclude that ~tringent logical positiTiaa baa run its

course.

rt is not ~t present a viable option in the field of philoaoplq

although itu influenc~ io !slt within contemporary lingui~tic analysis

96urmson, P• 159.
91
~ . , P• 161.
98 Ibid., P• 173. John ~,iadom•s article, 11Philo::1ophical Perplexity,"
appearedin Proceedings of tb.e Aristotelian 3ocietz, XVI (1936). Urmson
recognizes the ditticulty involved in isolating any one specific point ·
such as the one indicated.

99Ibid., P• 178. Warnock (p. lo6) qU!llitiea tJraison•s historiograplq
111ith a remind.er that as early as 1931 Gilbert Ryle had suggested that
11philoaoph1oal analysia" might be the "sole and whole tunotion of philosopbJ. 11 Ita goal was to be 11th• detection of tb.e sources in linguistic
idioms of recurrent misconstructions and abaurcl theories," said Ryle 1n
113ystemat1cally t., ialeading Expressions, 11 Proceedings of the Arii:stotelian

~ociety, XI (1931).
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and tha modern acientitic method.loo
Aa late as 19.50, however, C. E. M. Joad delivered an impasoioned condemnativn

or

the movement in A ~ritigue of Logical PositiviSffi.lOl ~en

in 1950 stri ngent "logio~l poaitivism" cui pictured by Joad waa no longer
a brea:~hiug philosophy.

In upite of Ayer'tJ second edition of .Language,

'fruth a nd Logic in 19'+6, by 1950 the movea;snt ha d di.:3.sipatad c1nd ent ered
the .:lt rea1n

of philosophical a oalysis. 102 Joad. ahoweci little familiarity

with t his tre.nsition.

As a conaei1uonce he attacked

l\

straw r:ian who might

po6sibly have adorned tho Vienna Circle, but who cortainly \:lould not have

welr.od tho Oxford campus in 1950.

His wrathful and i mpa~sioned attack

waa "er..otive" at best. l03

100

Frederick Ferr, saya in "Verification, Faith, ~nd Credulity,"
Holigion in Life, XXXII {i~inter 1962-63), 461 "Logical !Jositirlsm, a
favorite object of theological fury for nea~ly a aeneration, has expired
as a movement and scarcely anyone can be found to mourn. Theologians are

quite understandably triumphant • • • and philosophera, even the most
'tough minded' eort, are now at pains to diesociata themselves !roe the
brash excesses of t,he Vienna Circle anJ Ha sympathizers of t he 1930's•"
C. A.. \ adir, in"Contemporary l:u ilosophy and l<eligion," Internatiozwl
Philosophical ;$uarterlz, V {.>eptembar 1965), 365, notoa that evec iA
Pakistan, with an ur.d.erstand&ble cultural lag, logical positivism ia
largely a spent force.
101c. is. M. Joad, A Critique

or

Loe;ical Positiviam {l.ollClozu Victor

Gollancz, c.1950).
1020. J. i'larnock, in "Analysis and Imagination," ?he I<evolution in
Philosophy, edited by Alfred J. Ayer {London: Macmillan and ~ompauy, o.
1956), p. 124, olarifiee the aaalyata• view of logical positivisms ''I
should. like to ®1 in V'4ry plain terms that I am not, nor is aay philosopher of my aoquaintanc~, a Logical Foaitiviat. Thi~ is worth saying,
obvioua though it must be in tho light or this series ?f ~oct~~, . becauae thl:lre has seemed to be a current belief that Logica.1. Po.nt1v1sm
is somehow the official doctrine of contemporary philoso~. There ia,
in fact, no such offioial doctrinei and it id even more certain, if
possible, t1'.at Logical Poaitirlsm is not it. 11

103,.
->Upra, P• 4}, 11. 71.

On

tile

other hand, Burllhnm Beckwith' s Heli;,ion, r~hilosophy, and

;,;cience: ttn Introduction to Logical Positivism, publiobad in 1957, attempted to recroate tho pp.ilosoph1 of Comte within the forlllBl ~tructuro of

lo3ic~1 poaitiv:l.sm.

104

.iilthough written in

1957, the book took little

cognizance of tho ;:;t-ausitional clif'.ficulti~.:; o! thu verification principle,
or for that matter, the relaxation of the principle.

All me·takihysical

staterr.euta reI;Jainad oor.aplet.ely uiaaningleaa !or Beckwith.

It iu obvious

that this Aracuican itork divorced itaelf !rom 3ritish developments, for

it i'ailed to appreciate the logic of any "language gauw" other than the

rough-and-twublo a~gby or logical positivism.
Logical poaitivian1 left its imprint within linguistic anal;yais
althvugh it loot its iclontity.

rnent::S is cocaplex.

The relationship be·c ween the tvo

::iove-

The influence of the former within the latter will

bacoma more apparent as we investigate linguistic analyais and the status
o! religious Ul\nguag~ in it..

lo4Burnham P. Beckwith, Reli ' on Philoso h knd ~cience: Au Introduction to Logical Positivism New iorki Fhiloaopbical Library, ~.1957 •

..
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CHAJ!.l'r~t< III
Tlli LO!{:i; OF THB PAitl.': Lil'iGUIJ I' IC Ai~ALY:.a s

Linguiatic Analyuia as Related to Logical PoaitiYiam

<lithin the :scope of thia study it is impossible to iuvestigate all
of t he cowplex ancestral, social, and ideational interdepondenc:ies bet~~en lo~ical poaitivium and linguis tic ana.lyaia.
cemented &.lli&ncea is a pparent.

But that ~here are

It ...,ill be our taak instead to exat.:iiu

tho eGaenti&l Cotlnactivo links bett1een the two movements in discussiug

ph1loso1,hical analya13.

A brie! surHy of the work o!

t1t10

bridge-builder&,

George ~ . Moore and ;\l£red J. Ayer, vill provide a good begianing.

Brari.d 31.anahard canouizeis Georgct E. Hoore as t he ''patron saint" of

linguiatic analysis.

rallied.

,,round hill both poaitiviata and later atllllyate

liis iuturest .. woro theirs:

he

uhared a common disiucllaatioa

towarda .~etap~sics; nia was an intellectual integrity which eTen the
most destructive respectedJ his was a diatate for rhetoric, and a prefer-

ence tor simple language.

La3tly,

ho gaTe to th8 'philosophers of ordicary language• the sugge.11tioa
that started tham on t heir way. He a~geated that co:JJ11011 sense
and its language supplied to philosop~ both its main probler.u1
1
and a touchstone by ~hich ita epeculati-nt claiaaa might be checked.

Hoore•s work ia !!lore fully described. by G. J. Warnock.

Moore con-

cluded that philosophical writing was infected with bAetiDess and confusion.

Philoaophera arriYed at answ•ro before considering exactl.J what questio11a

1 Brand BlaDSlwrd, Reaaon and Analysis (Londo1u <Jeorge Allen and

Unw1n9 c.1962), P• 310.

to aak.

l'i orking out these concluaions, t1oore concerned hiiMelt with th•

problem ct saying ~hat a proposition !S!!!!l in hio anal1~~s.

But ho com-

plicated th.iD6o by forcing analyaiu into a atnr.idard patturni

analysis

waa alwa,1s to couai.1t iu a. v ::rba.l parapbra3o lon~or than thd ori~nal

stutawent, uynonymous, but ~ore oxplicit.

Although Moore C01ru.iitted hi,a..

self theoretically to a pattern of philcaophizin{!; which paralleled hia
~etaphy~ical predaceu~ora, hio practice defined vhilosophy iu ter~a of

clarification rather t.ban discovdry.
entiroly in the purauit of analy~ei:s.

His practice consi3ted almost
2

It ""as the practice of anal:,,sia

which guara.nteod Hoore'a revered status in the ancaetral ranks of linguie-

tio ana,...y o1 :i. 3
\Jhile Moore's philoaophizing was Ul"(.)Cl.d enoui,h to aerva aa a rally-

ing point tor both lo0icul pouitivism and linguistic ~nal.Jaia, Alfl'$d J.
Ayer evok~d deci~ion.

Ay8r helpod to oryatalize tho objectives of liDg\d.a-

tio analy&iia in his def'anse ;)f logi cal poaitivia&A.

Iieaction to his 'ltork

wa~ an important factor in the historiet.t.l developmont ot philosophical

analiais.

In thia u.an atringent logical po3itiYiem found its most able

~oglish proponent--and its last.

Conversely, ling~iatic anal.rsi~ aaw ill

him an Krchenemy who dauw.nded a a:ore exact de.tcription of t~e movaroent'o

identity aa uistinguiahod !rom lo0 ical positiviWil.
On th• one hand, Ayer contributed positively to tho developaant ot
linguistic analysis ira t:.is second edition ot .i..Angu&g.t 1 Truth and Logic,

2 o. J. Harnook, Sngliah PhilollOphY Since l90Q (London: Oxfo1.~d Ubiver-

3ity Pre~, c.1958), PP• 15, 24, 27, 29.
3Moore • s work cle11101u:1tratea that embryonic aulyai3 had a strong be•
ginning b<tfore logical positiYiam appeared ae a reQognisable pbeDomenon.
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19l+6, with the aul)e;estion tnat the philo3opber is concerned lilith "detini•
tion" o! words.
11

B.r "de!inition'' he meant aomethinG technical, nar.ael1

deiini~ion in use,.,.'+

'~ his "definition in use'' AJer derived from rtuasell.

l;,hilosophical "definition in u.ae 11 is the defining o! n phrase without
employing tho defiendum or any of its s;ynonyutS, while still indioatiug t he aignificanoe tha phrase bears in its cont;:,xt.5 :maaell had been
led to tho thoory of deacri1Jtious, adopted by Ay&r in 1946, by a consideration of tho misleading form of a state::nent Bllch

a.3

"!he Loch lieaa mon-

6
stor is a sea-aorpent. ' 1 Jimply because words can btt arranged syntactically dott,;. not indie&te, arguea aussell, that t.h~y havo a definition

apart from their context.

In fact, definition in

U3e

is tho only propor

mode of analyaia, for it pro~eots one !rom broaching the realized dis-

crepancy between the structure of language and the actual nature of thin«e.7

'•Blanahard, PP• 32.}-}24.
5 Ibid., P• 325. Ian iui11.1:,ey, in Heligious La.ape (London: ~CM Pnse,
195?), PP• 94-95, claims that John flltvldn's Horaa .:>ynopticae (1909), with
ito strong atatiatical intereat in st~diea of the Gospels, echoed uussell's
ideal of a sciontific language. rt aaeumed, in dum, tbat "odd" passages
haYe no value. ~imil.arl,y, Bavkins sa.w little need for the repetition
found in aowe sactiona vf the Gospels. .iamaey iJIJ.ys this approacll iilAY
parallol iiuaoell Is insistence that the.·e is 110 need to haYe J! (a proposition) twice. ln a chf;j>ter titled ·':"oruial Knowledge and .wligious Glai1118 1 "
aeligious Knowledge (L~lencoe, Illinoi,il: Free ~reas, c.1961), PP• 33-43,
Paul Jch.rrddt contends that religious claims are not to be parallaled with
the formal system of logic developed in tlltt twentieth centu17.

6.Blanshard, P• 332. Auto~ G. n. Flev, in bia editorial. introduction

to Logic and Lans;uage (.r'irst .;erieaJ Oxford: Basil iUackwell, 1952), P• 7,
notes that Wittgenctein credited to ~usaell the di~oovery that t.he apparent
logic&l form of a proposition need not be its real form. Flew aculaima
tb:Ls disco•eq as the central and tundamentttl discon17 of modena .aritiah
philosophy.

7ill.an.shard, P• 329.

Ayer uaed the "ti1&ory of deacriptions" or definitions in hiis ut tempted
demolition c.,f 1aeta1Jhyaica.

lt :,1a1;3 ai.:1 argument thnt th~ theory prevented

tho extrapolation o! diacrepancy between lani~age und the nature of things
into an improper metaphysics.

B

riith his in1Siatenca upon "dofinition in

uso" Ayer drew atteutior. to a proctJdure 11hich lilt.er achieveci r~cognized
ata·~ua in lin0 uistic analy ..is.

,'ih1le he used Huasoll I a emphaaia in his

logical-positivistic attack upon r.1etaphyaics with lit~la int~ntion o!
extending it to tha sphere of "ordir.ary lauguagu," A1er contributed,

porhapo unknowingly, to the employment of "use" in later analytic methodology.

Cn the other hand, ,'..yar•s work aldo produced negative reaction.

In

part at leaat, linguistic analy~ia formulated its methodology to oontraut

with Ayer•s.

The aecond edition of Language, ~ruth and Logic in

1946 en-

couraged the analysts to clarify their objectives and wetbodology.9 fhe

lesaons from Ayer's Jecond edition were not easily learned, but neither
were thoy aa:»il:r forgotten.

ii::.ierging analysiG pondered thr@e leasona:

(1) tno failure of the v1>rificotion principle, evident in the imprecision
of its definition, de~onatra.ted that analysis waa ueith~r to assume nor
encourage un empirical vidw r.,f tho world; (2) the imprecioion ot the .,...,ri4

tication principle showod that an attempt to base analysis on a "principle,''

or to characterize explicitly t.he teohni{ue of aual.yais, was doomed to

8Ibid.
9An i~~ication of Cambridge reaction to Ayer's new udition oi lanesuaee,
~ruth and Logic is found in John wisdoa's revi@v ot the book i n ~ ,
LVII (1948). The scathing review ia .reprinted in 1.1isdom'a Pbilo•ow. and
l:>sycho-Aualysis (N1tw York: Philosophical 1.ibr,-ry, l95J), PP• 229-2 7•
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tttchnical failure1 (3) by deduction Oxford philosophers we1·e tree to
conclude· that ea ch kind of propo15ition had its own "logic. 1110

In s t1m,

Ayer contributed both positively a nd negatively to th~ development ot
emerging linguistic aualysia.
Jeacriptive Definitiona of Linguistic Analyaia
I t is uo leas di!fic1.1.lt to uefine "linguistic analysis" aa
sophical movsment chan it i s to define existentialiam. 11

~

philo-

.;;1nce the ad-

herenta of both existentialism anJ a nalysis recognize methodology aa their
unifying bond as opposod to a body o! mutually acceptell presuppositio11a.
und concluai ona, th~ participants rejact atto~pts to define the two move-

ments when they t uil to empb~:Jize the primacy of ~ethodolog;y.

'.Ii.th thia

caution it is advisable to ottor descriptive definitioDS--moro descriptive
than de!initive--o! philosophical arialysis in order that the L.ethodological
processea of an~J ysia are not alighted.
~ven .deacrintions
will be difficult:
.
Apart lrom a reluctunce t o s ubscribe in common to any general formula, there ia a good deal of quite serious diaagree:1.ent amongst (a'D&l;rata] I while there is undoubtedly a •ta.m.ly rQoemblance• betwee11
their views a ud their methods l.t ~tould be lw.rd to find a descripti~n,
however loose and elastic, which would apply to all or even most.

The attempt to find a "oommon core o! method or conclusion" in vbat

BJ1•

and Austin have said about knowing; Pears and Paul about metaphysicas

lOMaxwvll John Cb.arleeworth, l?hilosopb;, and Li~iatic Analysis
(? ittsburgh: Duquesne University, c.1959), PP• 148-19.
ll,J:erm.s such as "linguistic anialysia," "philosophical anal,raiu,"
"philo~oph)' ot language," and ''analysis" are aynon,mous and interchangeable.
12

J.

o.

Unnson, .Philosophical Analzsia (Oxford& Clarendon ?reaa,

1956), P• l64.
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.Stra)taon and .111rnoclt about logic; Ha.rt e.bcut law; ifoldon about politics;
Hare, 7oulmin, Urrnaon, ~.aiapabire, !And ~o,1ell-J,!lith about ethics, ia a
most difficult aa3ie;nr.1ent.

1'he task ia complicated by thtt diaiuclinatioD

ot the.;e philosophers to talk about what they are doing. "It they are
asked what philosophy means for them, they are apt to IIBY, 'it ia the Gort
of thing I am doing now' and return to thoir work. 1113

At least their work

ia not repetitious, for a. constantly changing complexion ~races the ta.ce
of ~rutlytiia.

14 J ince the face of the movement chan3es .so quickly, onlJ'

a deacriptivo approach, using "descriptive datinitions," can hope to iaolate

and Chfiracterize the ''common core" of ana.l1sia through an investigation of
its l!1~thodoloiu.
One description of linguistic analyaid emphaaizea especially the
logical-poaitivistic parentage o! the movem~nt.

G. i. Eughes appears ta

pattern analytic methodology after logical p.o :iitivism when he ~ya,
:'he technique of analyl'iing ~tutettenta into their empirical uflC:l
non-empirical elements and then displaying the empirical elerllenta
as contingent and the non-empirical aB non-existential, posaibly
even aa tautologies, and o! examiniug the often intricate and curious waya in wbicb these elemonts can be combined in ontt statement-this, I should be the last to deny, has proved a most valuable device
in that it often throws a flood of light on the ways in wnich we
describe the worla~l5
lllansbard, too, de13crib&s the movuraent in term$ ot its positivi3tic
ro~nciations.

H@ contends that although the analysts have stress~d three

13alauahard, P• 3}9•
1

\1.

J. r'aton, The Noclern Predicaoent (London: ueorge Allen anc1 U~wia,

c.19.55), P• 32.
1

5a • .il:. Hughes, 11~11 God'a ::Xistenoe be Di.s~oTed - ~." New ~says iD
Philoso ical Tlieolo • edited by Anto111 G. l-4. 1'"'lew and Alaadair Haclntyn
~ew ~orki Macrd.llan and Co., c.1955), P• 61. Hughes protests th~ extension o! thia methodology bo~ond. its legiti111ate sphere.
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elements of the positiviotic tradition, they have not bound themselves
to it by an unbreakable alliance.

First, while analysis stresses the

verification criterion of meaning, the verifiability principle has not
become a bond of unity because of the principle's many definitions.
~econd, while analysts generally endorse the analytic theory of the a
priori, the analytic character of a priori atate,nenta is not accepted
by Arthur Pap, Wilfrid Sollars, and C.H. Langford.

Third, ;. ..ilc the

emotivist theory of value seems to characterize thd analytic movement,
one of its founders, G. £. Moore, oonatructed an ethical philosophy of
another atripe. 16
The paradoxes which appear in any descriptive definition of linguistic

analysis illuminate the movement's methodology in that they preclude a
precise listing of assumptions and presuppositiona.

This is the caae

when Gustav Bergmann differentiates between two types of linguistic philosophy.

The "formaliata," such as Carnap, devote themselves to construc-

ting symbolic systems and artificial languages.
probe and prune "the language we speak."

The'~ntif'ormalists"

Both view philosophical problema

as verbal complexities. 17 The task which Bergmann assigns to th~ formalists

closely parallels the logical-positivistic attempt to construct a unified
scientific language.

But Bergmann's formalists are not logical positivists

16Blanshu.rd, PP• 93, }41. In "The Philosophy of Analysis," Clarity
is t4ot ~nou : Essa a in Criticism ot Lin istio Philoao
, edited by
H. D. Lewis London: George Allen and Unwiu, c.19 3, PP• ?6-109,
Blanshard expands his descriptive definition of analysis in terms ot
its logical-positivistic parentage.
l7Gustav Bergmann, "Two T1Pf1B ot Linguistic Philosophy," The Metaphysics o! Logical Positivism (First edition; New York: Longmana, Green

and Company, c.1954), PP• 10?-108.
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in the stricteot aen.se v! thu veri!ic1;tion principle.

'rheretore the dis-

tance between the foriUali3ta and t he antitormaliats iu q,uantitative
rather than qualitative; their r1,e 'thodolos.y differs little.
offers

a.

Bergmann thus

descriptive d.ofinition ot analysis which &lllpha.sizes ita poditiv-

istic parentage when be makes all philo:sophical problemo "Terbal" tor
both f or ~ lista and antiformaliat8 ancl when he emphasizas the qualitative
similarity of methodology used by both.
5ince i.nalysis is more a 111ethodology th.an a "school," a descriptive
definition emphasizing its poaitividtic parentage cannot b~ wholly exhaust ive.

Ana1yei~ is not revived posi tivism.

~il liam Blackstone argues

that the philoaophy of lunguage, in contrast to logical positivism, does
not allow analysis to become a reduction to constituents.

lt rejects

aa well the formulation of an ideal logic associated with reduction.

Instead t he conoern is t9 oearch out th~ "intormal 11 logic ot statements
and concepts in their use.

ln swri, philosophical analyais

doe8

not use

the method of 11 translation," or other subatitutional methodu. 18
A

second descriptive definition of analysis emphasizes the movement's

intero.::1t in langua{Se "use. 11 '.l'he epi:Jtemological queat ot traditional
philosoph,Y takes a new turn when "use11 ot lafl8uase is the point of

departure:
To know !or ~lato mean~ to have intimatiolU:I of the !urm~ from

which ~-articular things deriTe their reality; to know tor Kant
meant to respect the synthesis which the mind creates within the
golds ot the understanding. To know in the newer torma ot
1'h 1loaophical Analyaia is to ha.,. tO&atered the machi11ery ot
discow-M, to bave subjugated the Ncalcitrance ot gra:uE!IU'

18w1111am T. Blackstone, The Problem ot ~eli oua Knowled
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ball, c.l 3, P• 33.
notes that Peter .Jtrawson encouraged the recognition ot

(~l••
1
BlMokstone
11
iatormal" logic.

to the requireruonts ot facile uae.19
'!o be concorned \1ith tha uae is to be concerned with induotion rather

than deduction.

An inve3tigation of language use rulea out preconceived

cla.ssif'ica tion:
An attewpt to ~ake clear the precise nature of tho lingui3tic pro-·
cedures implicit in any puzzling exprea3ions wit~out a preconceived
classification ~uch ao the principle ot ·veri!icatioiiJ is t he hallmark, not, ala.a, alwaya dttserved, of the newer &~>proach.20
".Don't a ak for the maauins , uk tor t he use," and

;;.;ver, statetl8nt has

11

its own loisic," are two alogans which identity tho emphasis 11pon use. 21
Propositions are not limited to a singlo function as in logical positivism, or to t wo or threo.

It 1::J a tactical error, ;;;a.ya t he anal.Yst, to

approach l a nguage with preconcoived categoriGs , for ono thereby di.aregards t ho use of language.

'l hiu de:scriptio11 o! o.naly:1is empha"izos the covelllent 'a radical dissociation from lo3ical positivism.

Hhereae positivism a.asumed that all

non-tautological propositions describe aenaa-exporiences, at least in

l9Albert ~iilliam LeYi, Philooo
and the ~1odern world (lll.oomington9
Indiana: Indiana University Press, c.19.59, PP• 45-4 • T. ]:(. Hiles,
in ;leli~ion and the t'.)Cientific Outlook (London: Allen and Unwin, c.19.59),
PP• 62-04, otters a healthy correct;ve to :i.Avi in suggeating that current
analyai~ is concerned with ':.ho traditional "theory ot knowledge." Its
queationa, ''F.ow do wo know this?" and "~Jhat arguUMtnts ara relevant to
establishing its truth or falsity?" d~utionstrate it to be within the streaa
ot philooopby and epistemology aa traditionally defined.
20

Urmaon, P• 199.

21 Ib1d., p. 179. Gustav Ber5Cl'lr&11, in Meard.f. aud i;;xiatence (Hadiao1u
Unive:r·a~of' ·Wisoonsin Press, 0.1959), PP• 67-6~ eugge:sta that in ·rollowing the slogan ''Oon 't a ,l k tor the meaning, nak for the use," Oxt'ord
(the tdl'II Berg:nann uoea to identif7 the Oxford aaalydta) slips into the
debauchery o! 'behavioria11 which it so long avoided in psycuoloS,Y. Cixf'ord
"propounds the psychologists• context theory as still another monolithic
theory, ot meaning, 11 ~nd in thii:s regu1'd philo:;1opbJ.cal aoal,13!.s ia both
bebD.vioriotic aad Hegelian, aays Bergmann.
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principle, urialysis does nut affirm or deny this poasibility.

Analysis

rules out the possibility that all menniogtul stnte111ents 3erve a 3ingle
purpose with ita er:aphasis upon uae.
&lt any one doacriptive definition of analysis fails to provide a
p1~ecise and complete characterization of the movement.

Thia becor:iea

evident in tha definition which laya special empha::.ia 11pon "use."

For

while they agree to recogt.ize varied "usea" in language, and while they
ado,it to no proarran1:,-ed claaaification, some analysts fail to divest

themaelves fully of tha positivi~tic insistence that all state~ant~ serve
as seuse-uxperienco do~criptionu.

~Jbile they · find numerou3 "u3es" in

lanc;uuGe, t huy ultimately uncovtJr one "use": that of describing a. senseexperience that i-1 in some >way verifiable.
insisto upon th~ atudy of the
issue,

22

11

Thus when Hollllld Hepburn

particular in:Jtance" and not the general

thereby offering a doucriptive definition of anal3ais which

emphasizaG its con~orn for ''use, 11 he deceivea himself in hia failure to

raoognize that t.he .5tudy of particular inst.ancu is not truly analytic,
or concerned ~ith "use" alone, if tho scneral iaaue is li,rdted to the
·empirical by implicit de!inition.
Gilbert l~le, on the other hand, ofiera a doacriptiva definition ot
linguistic annlyoia which avoids the subordinat'i on ot :iudOa'' to el4pirical ''use."

Ue views the task

or

philosophy as an intere3t in the ''infor-

mal logic of the employment of expressio11S, the nature ot logical howlers

that people do or ,tight commit i ! thay strung their words together in

22Roaald \'i. Hepburn, ".Poatq and ~<oligioua Uuliet, '' lktta>?f.aical
Beliefs, . edited by Alasdair !~cintyre (London: .;;.;H ?ress, 1957 , P•

160.
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certain ways • • • • ,.23 ~tyle e~phusizoa buth po3itive nnd n~gative eleruants of n concern with uue.

Poaitively, an invaf. ;ti~ation of thd ''informal

logic" o:f expro:;si ons is a study
certain Ltoea of lan~ua ~e.

or

non-Ariatotelian lo6ic pre:Jent in

'l'hia otudy, for .:>xnmple, might ir.iuicatt! that

n ,':ltaternont made itl a ,~aoe of checkar.J has i t s o'lin 'intoru1al" logic. 24
1

Nogatively considered t.he concorn for uae ia t he 13oarch ror and elimination
of "logical hoo1lera" committed by people when l;he;y switch catdgori4ita or

"uoos" unknowingly.
A t hi1•d de~criptive definition of philoaophical ana.lyaia entails a
de~cription of the psychological approaoh-avoid~nco sot common to tOBny
of its adherect:::i.

This dei;cription takes s1Jecial notice of the frequent

oc.:urronce of t hu pr onoun "we" in the wri tingr, of 3oaae analysts.

P.1. B.

233lanahard, Heason and J\nalysis, P• 353. Ryle'a words are found in
llhiloaophicul ,iuview, IJCII (1953), 1g5. i3lanshard disagrees Bharpl.1 with
i<yle, and viewa the taak ot unalysis with somt: disrespect. He seea little
validity in tho analytic approach t1:) problems of philoao~, and refers to
analysia a~ an atte~pt to wake molehills out of mountaina, following the
uncanny genius o! •:Jittgenstein. .iee eapecially Blansbard, Reason and
Analysis, PP• 364-365.
24
Gilbert Ryle discusses iutormal logic in ~ilemlUIUS (Cagbridge: Ulliversity Pross, 19.54), PP• 111-129. In reference to ir.for1al logic he says
(p. ll'l): "Not all strict inferences pivot on tho recognized logical conatanta, and not all topic-neutral ~xproaaiona quality tor treatment aa
logical co113tants." Aa an e:xamplo of iu.fonal logic !\}'le give1:1 the following (p. 118): "If you hear on guod authorit7 that she took arselli.c and
tell ill you will reject the rumor that she tell ill and took arsenic.
Thia familiar use ot •and' carries ~ith it the teapor:al. notion expressed
by •and subae ;.u ently' ancl even the causal notion oxpreaeed ':,y •and 111
con~o~uence•. Tbe logiciana• conscript •and' doea only ito appointed
duty--a duty in which 'she took ar38nio and fell ill' ia an ~btiolute
paraphraoe ot '1:1he fell ill £ind took araenic'•" E:xamplea ot infonaal
logic are mlll.tiple. For a lover to aa.y, '',.jhe'a prett3 and wie•s not,"
llllkes no "aenae," but it is perhaps the be~t metb.od. to doscribo hi:;s beloved. Ir. the ... rmod forces tho phrase "'i.'he co~r.wu1'1er re,1ueats" i.s bracketed by the logic of military diucipline; the phrase indicates far more
than a polite re~uvut.
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Foster contends that repeated use of the pronoW1 derives neither from
empirical observatioM nor from rnetaphyaical presuppositions.

\-/e'' does

11

not refer to an;· r::c1pirically-delimited group of men, for philosophical
analysis does not begin with an empirical statement about the linguistic
usage of certain historically-determinable groups.
the certain analysts refers to the whole ot marJdnd.

'l'he use of "we" by
The decision to

include himself in the "we" is uot a decision which any aD&l.yst can aver
suppose to have "tv.ken," or the taking would be verifiable by empirical

means. 25 Foster includes the following as examples ot the phenomenon:
"'L'he philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the
physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way
in which we apeak abo<it them." A. J. A1er, Language, Truth and
Logic. Ch. II.
"In ordinary language we call a person 'rational' it he is capable
of learning froJG experience." H. :l!"'a igl in ".Logical ~piricism,"
Headings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Feigl and Seli ars, p. 15.
"A lull understanding of the logic of value-terms can only be
achieved by continual and :tenaitive attention to t he way we uae
them." R. M. Hare, Language and Horala, P• 126.
"Philoaophera• arguments have frequently turned on references to
what~ do and do not say, or, more strongly, on what~ can or
cannot aay. '' G. Ryle, "Ordinary Language," in Philosophical
Review, 1953.26
l""'oater concludes that the analysts who include themselves in the "we"group are men who have moved from a timeless deduction. like Descartes,
to a temporal study; !rom a "spiritualistic metaphysics" to "hwaani8111."
ln !aot, these aa:Jertions are a type ot "theological anthropology. ,,2?

2

.5M. B. Foster,""We' in Modern Philosoplq," Faith and Logic, eclited
by Basil Mitchell (London: George Allen and Unvin, 19.5?), PP• 217-219.
26 Ibid., pp. 194-195•
27Ibid., PP• 218-219.

Italics and casual references are Foster•a.
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l•'oster de:3cribes aual3ais in torma of o "we..iam'' domonstrative of
an undarlying contemporary humanis ~, assuredly temporal but not empirical..
ly ver ifia bl~.

Hi.:. ,1e s cription is oor.ic·11hat akin to Blansl.1&.1rd' s whon

Slanaha rd atte~pts to iuolato a set of teudeucies, taates, an~ aversion.a
com1oon t o a r.alysts.

An a JL'iiral:ion of 3cie nco, an av~.r-,ion to motaphysica,

a mutaul aicil i ke of a Dything pompou3 or tdgh .. flown in l anguage, s peculo.-

tion, or mor1:d . claim, Blansharcl su~ge a ta, are characteristic of analy-

.

S l.~o

28
A des crip·tive uefinition wi.ich cielineatea mutual inclination.::. and

av~raions run$ t he dao3er of &lyin0 little about analytic methodolot;1.

In feet, all thl.·ee d~scriptivo definition~ here offered have this weakness i n comr.1on.

i·urhap3 only in examining the process o! ''analy3i u " will

a d~scriptive definit ion

or

lingui stic anal y:Sis come clclan....and even then

i mpori'ectly.
Catibridge Philo3opbical Analy-sifH Hetaphyaical Therapy
J e s criptiv~ definitions o!fer no pardon from th~ rigors of accurate

hiotoriogra phy.

While a purely hietorical account of tho devulopmont ot

analyaia does not lle \,ithin the scope of this stuC,.y;, an examination o!
tho historical m,1u.ifeutationa of analysio i:s e s s e ntia l.

It will be

advauta~eous to exa~in~ aualy~iu at Cambridge and Oxford from a hiatorical p~r~pectlv~.

29

28.al&nahard, wr,aaon aud htialJ;ais, PP• 93--94. Blat.allard also uottts the analyuta• aversion to pbi~oaophers described by i-tc::ai;0,art as the :sort
who ''wanted to believe that t he~- ato a ~oo.:i dinner only in oruli:r to
strengthen themdelvos to appreciate Z>ante. ''
2 90xtord rtt1nains the hi.lb of ana.lJsia although currently analyots
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'l'ne t.;ar,1bridge uool.1ata concerned thomaalvoa priul,E).rily with c,ot&pn.ys ic<il stat.e,t.ont.:s.

Ji

psychiatric term, "th<:tra~eut.ic~," accu.rcltaly

~eocribes t h~ uchool' ,J a ctivitiea.

~harlosworth includes John ,:,/iadom,

G. A. ~-nul, l· orris i.clzerowitz, anJ Norlllan .~lcolm awon~ tlle 11~a111bridge

Jchool" an(;lly~tti.

l'ne 3chool doraii.w.ted t.he field of analysis rough.Ly

from 1933 to thu e1.d of .,orld War II. 30

The Gazr.uridge "thero.piats" bo;r<1n thor.-py where a counJalor begins
counseling--with the immediate problem.

For th~m ~etaph7uical 3t~tement3

were Vcllua~le--not neceasarily moauinglesa--preci~eli b~~au~e these statements 51.,.v.a opportunity !or analytic therapy.

bridg~
i~ts.

Ayer charges that the

[eam-

logical analyata wer~ far more indulg~nt than the Viennede positiv1\lthough they opposed raetaiJhysics when it was merely "rhapsodical, 11

uiay bo found elsewhere in Britain, in the United Jtates, in aome ~candin-

avian countri@s, in Au.stralia and Now ..:ealand, and in th\l .etherlawis.
Berri.bard .:.rling, in :,at...ro and lliatoq (i.und: C.JK ule.trup, 1960), P• 13,
notss t hat a ..iwede, llarald ,~ lund, u3ea anal;y.ui:i in aevtira.l of hi:3 recent
esoaya incl:..ding :ro arturenhet verkli· het (.)tockholm, 19.56) anu Personli
och sakli
roli ionafri or .>tockholm, 1958), :~rling also mention.a P• ll) that ~el Gyllenkrok'a J at~i.;atisk tuolo
och veten3ka li
metod med .ltfrakild b.Uns D till dtiken Upp:Jala: ~unde~u.eat~ka bokhandeln,

1~59 ~ppaala. univarwitets ra~kritt 1959,2]) u5ed contemporary ih-itiah
aualysis in arriving at its conclu~ion that ocienti!ic ~yatematic theology
is unattainable, althougll a ::.y atematic and normat,ive etni.ctJ .:1ay bo po:sai.ble.
C. A. ,~udir, in "~ontctraporary Philosophy arid ~ieligion, '' Inturnational
1
hilosophic~l "uarturl.y, V (o>eptember 196.5), 364-..)65 (M presidential
uddros.:3 otfored betore the Pakiata.n Philosophi~al Congress in Hyderabad
;

in ,.. ~ril, 1964; ori.p.r.ally publisi:lod iu 1=0.kitita1& .:lhiloaophical Journal
of July, 1964), says that no small number of younger philosophers in
l·akistan think anll \4rite in th~ style ct ,·.nglo-1\i:actricans, and are con-

cerned with analysis ot language.
30(;harleaworth, PP• 151-1.52. Cha1•lesworth notes that .Jisdom was
trou1 Cambridge Universit7, l>aul t'rom Oxford, azerowitz iro• ~Iii.th (;ol-l ege
(U~A), and t-lalcolra from t;oruell. l'he wide geographical disbursement
evidently did not interfere with ~mbridge unity. ~. A. li'arrell, in "An
,~ppraisal ot Thoro.peutic 1'ositivia11," Mind, L'J (January 1946; n.pril 1946),
2.5-48, l}.}-l.50, diocuases wiadom, Paul;-;ii°a Maloolm in a somewhat critical,
but appreciative, evaluation.
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they allowed the contention that tho "raetaphJsioia11 trJAY someti11ea be seeii.g
the world in a fresh and interesting way; he may have good reason !or
being dissatisfied with our ordinary concepts, or for proposing to rovise
them."

Brrora manifested in caetaphyaical atatements may be instructive.

If Wittgenstein was right in suggestin~; that problems in philosophy arose

because men are ~eluded by features of their lang~ge, "the metaphyaician,
by hia very extravaganoies, may also contribute to their diasolution."3l

Thia recognition of the intrinsic value of metaphysical statements
is foreign to Ayer'a positivism.

i'or the "therapeutic analyst," the

poaitivist's verification principle waa simply a linguistic proposal
valuable in ita illumination, but not absolutely true.

Propo:Jala of the

transcendontalis t~ were no l~aa valuable and illuminative.

For example,

the statement "There ia a God" is valuable in that it isolatei:l structural
features of the cos111os. 32
A

recognition of the intrinaic value of metaphyaioal statements

argues that when past metaphysicians claimed to construct ontologies, in

many cases thuy undertook a tar more advantageous task: "creating nev languages witl.ch bring out certain analogies more pointedly and more systematically than is potssible in our current language."

For the tharapiate,

the etudy of any form of philosophy is a valuable endeavor regardless ot

3lAltred J. Ayer, Logical Positivism (Glencoe, Il.linoisa Free Press,
0.1959), P• 17. Undoubtedly Ayer is referring to ~ittgenatein's statement (#123) in I>hiloso ische Unterauohu
Philoao
cal Inveati tiona,
tranalated by G. 3. 1;. Anacor.1be Oxford: .Br.usil Blackwell, 1953 , P• 9•,
"A ptd.losophical problem baa flle form: 'I don't know my way about.'"

32C.'barlesvorth, PP• 159-l6o.
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perplexity or confueion.33 John Wisdom described the Cambridge attitude
towards metaphysical statements in Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis:
These untruths (.paradoxical, provoking etatementii] persist. Thia
is not merely because they are symptoms of an intractable disorder
but because they are philosophically useful. The curious thing is
that their philoBophical usefulness depends upon their paradoxicalness and thus upon their falsehood. They are false because they
are needed where ordinary language fails, though it oust not be
supposed that they are or should be in some perfect language. They
are in a language not free from the same sort of defects as those
from the effects of which they are designed to fr ee us.34
From a positive evaluation of metaphysical statements the Cambridge
analysts advanced to depth therapy.

\·lisdom asserts that ''therapeutic

analysis" is somewhat parallel to psychoanalyais: ·the patient does his
own work guided by the analyst.35 Wisdom's handling of the verification
principle is an excellent example of "psychoanalytic therapy."

lie finda

the principle an opportune candidate ·for therapeutic analysis.

There is

33John Niemayer Findlay, "Some Reactions to Recent Cambridge Philosophy (1940-1), 11 ~uage, Mind and Value (New York: Humanities Press,
c.1963), pp. 37-3~The article originally appeared in Australasian
Journal of PsychologY and Philosophy (1940-1941).
34John Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity," Philosophy and PsychoAnalysis (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953), p.·50. The article
originally appeared in E!1>ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XVI (1936).
In "The Hodes of Thought and the Logic of God, 11 The Existence of God,
edited by John Hick (New Yorki Macmillan Company, c.1964), p. 298,
Wisdom posits two questions for therapeutic analysis, and thereby asserts
the value of metaphysical questions: "And yet in spite ot all this and
whatever the answer may be the old questions ' Does God exis·t?' 'Does
the Devil exist?' aren't senseless, aren't beyond the scope of thought
and reason. Gn the contrary they call for new awareness of what has so
long been about us, in case knowing nature so well we never know her."
This broadcast, originally made over the British Broadcasting Corporation
in 1950, is an exercise in wrestling with what Wisdom calla philosophically
useful "untruths." Warnock (p. 93) notes (comparing \1isdom and
Wittgenstein) that while Wittgenstein visualized a philosopher's paradox
as both interesting and important, Wisdom allows that it is also defensible.
35charlesworth, P• 157.
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therape11tic value for the principle's friends no less than for ite
enemies:
I say that the verification principle is a metaphysical principle
because I want (1) to draw the attention of those who accept it to
the deplorably old-fashioned clothes in which it presents itself.
Indeed, it resembles not only positivistic theories but also the
worst transcendental theories by appearing in the disguise either
of a scientific discovery removing popular illusion, or of a logical equation (incorrect) from which deductions may be made. No
wonder our conservative friends cannot accept it. I want (2) to
dr~w the attention of t hose who reject it to the fact that because
they are taken in by its disguise they fail to recognize the merits
which like other metaphysical theories it conceals. Both those who
accept it and those who reject it do not realize what they are doing
because they do not notice that it is disguised.36
By drawing attention to two paradoxical, "provoking" statements Wisdom

proposes to demonstrate the logical validity of each in its particular
use.

This type of analysis will not be decisive, but it will be infor-

mative.

The Cambridge analyst did not claim to clear away metaphysical

confusions with his linguistic analysis:

Wisdom suggests that analysis

"leaves us free to begin. 1137

In sum, the Cambridge analysts developed "therapeutic analysis."
In cases where metaphysical difficulties arise, analysis isolates the
features which impel one man one way and another the other.

Once this

is accomplished, analysis demonstrates that no absolute answer is possible
in cases of "decision. 1138

36John Wisdom, ''Metaphysics end Verification," PhilosopbY and
Psycho-Analysis, p. 55. Wisdom continues his therapeutic analysis of
the verification principle in "Metamorphoses of the Verifiabil:l.ty Theory of Meaning," 11!!!!!, LXXII (July 1963), 335-347.
37Charleswortb, p. 160.
38tbid., p. 159.

Wisdom says one is left "free to begin."
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The value o! ruotaph,Jsical stat er.ientG resides in thair proper analysis.

j~lthou.gh the .;ambridge ani-lyats would have denied aey purpoae iD

analysis oth~1· thun "therap1 • '' one gets the impression that the unspoken
goal or acalytic t.hero.py is t he avoidance of taetapbysical traps once one

haa bean set "free to bogin11 anew.

In any case, cainbridge therapeutic

analysis waa an important historical manifestation of the anal1t1c movement in itd begir4ninga.

Oxford: the 1ogica of .Languago
If ~he concern of Cambridge therapy lay with tho analysis of metaphysical atatoments, Oxford ie no l~as the center of a study ot the logic
of laneuagee--or the logics of language.

cambridge therapy was distantly

rolated to classical philosophy; the relation of Oxford analya1a to classical philosophy is more tenuous.

Methodological purpose ultimately dis-

tinguisheu Oxford a nalysis f rom Cambridge therapy, and radically aeparatea
it from traditional philosophy as well.
1nvestig~tion from th~ sphere

or

The tranuteronce

or

philosophical

human experience and thinking to the

logics ot language signitieH that metbodology--not ontology, epistemology,
or therapy--ia the esaence ot philosophy.
therapy is washed clean.

In Oxford methodology Cambridge

To involve oneself in Oxford analysis is to

involve oneself. in the di80oYery and delineation ot the logics of
language~

The pbilosop}q ot language reached the ''term of its revolution" ill
Oxford aoalysid.
positiviatic and

On the one hand, Oxford aDlllyttid is ulldogaatic; the
11

reductioniatio'' tendency ot &Dlll.)'sia 1a al.moat vho~

elimiDated.

On the other hand, the philosophical pretens1ona ot anal7-

a:la are

severe~ l.J.Jlited.

IION

"ADlllysis appears now

110

longer as the
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whole of philosophYJ it is rather an inGtrument ot philosophy. 1139
Included among t.he "Oxford philosophers" are two principle figures,
John Austin and Gilbert Hyle, and num~rous attendants, including Herbert

L. A. Hart, Peter

F • .itrawson,

:Jtuart Hampshire, .;;tephen i . Toulmin,

Xichard Harry Hare, ?atrick Nowoll-Jmith, and Isaiah ilerlin.4<>
In the cuae of philosophical arw.lyois the perennial intellectual
dependence of Cambridgo on Oxford re~ereod itself.

Oxford owes much to

Cambridge, tor it wQa Ludwig ~ittgenot~iD of Cambridge who provided the
initi.D.l stimulus to Oxford analysis.

'W hile at t.:ambridgo Wittgenstein

demonstrated the po~sibility and necessity of examining the language
of priuciplo domaina.

In his Tractatuo he endorsed th~ imprecise veri-

fication principle of logical atomism, later formulated in logical positivism.

Thia endor3ement oi8Daled a re~triction of th~ function of lan-

guage to the descriptively empirical.

But Wittgenstein's position changed

radically in hia Philosophical Investigations.

ln the ·r ractatue he

included inti~ations and suggeationa o~ tho centrality of language, even

39 Ibid., p. 170. Italics are Ch.arleswortl1' s. i1itb the statement
that analyeis is no longer the "whole" of philosophy Charlesworth compares
Oxford analysis with logical positivism. \·/hen he suggests that aDB.l;ysis
is an ~··ustrument" of philosophy, be tails to differentiate caretull7 'be•
tween Cambridge and Oxford. ~lbereas in the Cambridge school analysis ~a•
an "inetrument" tor therap1 (and thus also "philosophy" somewhat classically deficed), in the Cixtord school analysis is an "ii:wtrument '' inaotar as
"in:strument ~11etbodoloa] ot philoeop}q" and "philoaoplq" artt univoc&1:.
4oibid., P• 168. Morris W1eitz, in "Oxford Philosophy," Philosophical
neview, Llt1I (April 1953), lU?-23.3, givea his impreaaion (after a year's
viait to Oxford) of oome of thQ ourlier papers ot ~trawaon, oerlin, Ryle,
llart, and others. Auotin died in 19601 'i'ou.lmin bas been director of the
r,uftield Foundation Unit !or th8 History ot ldeag sincv 1960; Nowell-.imith
is at Leic~ator Univeraity; llampshire moved to ~illcoton u. in 1963; Hare,
.R,yle, Hatrt, Strawson, and Berlin are at Oxford UniYeraity.
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ordinary language, but in the Investigatioll!J ordinary language became
the major them<!.

41

1./ittgenatein concluded that language consisted of

"languages":

Han kllnn aich leicht eine Sprache vor atelleu, die nur aus Befehlen
und Meldungen in dar Johlacht besteht.--Od4r einv dprache, die uur
nus Fragen bes teht und oinem Ausdruck der Bejahung und der Verneinung~ Und unztthliges Andere.---Und eine :3prache vorstellen heioat,
sich ~ine Leben~form vorstallen.42
He

used the phrase

11

lane,'11age-garae 11 to describo the widespread variation

in langunge, and confedsed· to the inadequacy of his Tractatua-tbeory
of linguis tic structure:
Das ,/ort "Sprachspiel'' aoll bier hervorheben, da3B das Sprechen
der J prache ein Teil iat einer TMtigkeit, oder einer Lebeuaform.

FUhre dir die Ma nnigialtigkeit der Sprachspiele an die~en l3eiapielen,
und aridern, vor Augen:
8etehlen, und nach i3efehl.on bandelnBoachreiben oines Gegenatandts naoh dem ,\neehen, oder nach Mesaungea-Hers tellen einea Gegenatandu r.ach einer .Beschreibuug ( !..eichnung)-Borichten eines HergangsUber den Hergang Vermutungen anstellon-t'11ne Hypothese autatellen und prUfen-Oaratellen dor ~gebnieae eines LXperiments durch ~abellen und
Diagramme-~ine Geschichte er!inden; und lesen-Theater spielen-Heigen aingenHlltael raten-Binen 1-litz raachen5 erzllhlen~in angewandtes Nechenexempel lijaen-Aua einor Sprache in di1t andere Ubereetzen-Bitten, Danken, Fluchen, GrUssen, 3eten.
--~ ist intere.3sant, die Mannigfaltigheiit der ,./erkzeuge der Jprach•
und ihrttr Verweudungsweisen, die Hannigialtigkoit der :lort- und.
.;;atzarten, mit dera zJ vc:tri;;lcticll.tn, 1oW.a -Lagiker Uber den Bauder

411.ev1, P• 464. Warnock not•• (p. 66) that Wittgenstein's viev ot
language in the f ractatus did not <lifter greatl7 from liuaaell'••
42wdwig ,-littgenstei1a, Philoao hische Untersuchu
Investigations, translated by G. ~. M. Anscombe

1953), P• 8.

1
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.Sprache gosagt haben. (Und ~}ch der Verfas~r dttr Logiachl'hilos ophiachen /~bhandlung).
He dismissed thoso ·~ho accused him of taking

tne

"easy way out•"

and offered instead a challenging new analytic methodology: ·
tliar stos aen wir au! die grosae r rage, die hinter allon diesen
I3etrachtungen ateht.--Uenn man kf:5nnte mir nun einwenden: "l>u
machet dir'a leichtl Du redeat von al1en mf:5glichen j prachspielen,
hast aber nirgenda gesagt, waa denn da~ Jeaentliche des Sprachsp~ela,
und also der Sprache, ist. Was all en die3en Vorglngen gemeinaam iat
und sie zur J prache, oder zu T~ilon der ~prache ID'1oht. Du schdnltQt
dir als o gerado den '£uil der Untersuchun6 , der dir selbst aeinerzeit
das moiste Kopfzerorechen gelllicht hat, nimlich deu, die allfS!meine
Form des 3atz115 und der Sprache betroffend."
Und das 1st wahr.--~tatt etwas anzugeben, was allem, waa wir jprache
n~nnen, gemeinaa.m ist , aa~e ich, es ist diea~n .i;;r~chuinungon garnicht t.:ines gemoiuaarn, weawegen wir !Ur alle daa ;:;leiche ,./ort ver•
wenden,--sondern oio aind mit einander in vielen verschiedonen
,leisen verwa ndt. Und dieser Verwundts clu&ft, 1ttr dieoer Verwandtachai'ten wegen nennen wir aio al.le 11..iprachen".

43,·tittgens tein, pp. ll-12. ? he provided .r;nglish tranalation (pp.
lle-l2e) reads: "Here tho term 'lan~ge-S!!!!.' is meant to bring into
prond.nence the f act that the speaking ot language io part ot an actiTity,
or of a form of li!B. Heview the multiplicity ol language-games in the
following examples, and in otbera: GiYing order9,and obeying them-Describing the appearance of an object, or giving it3 moaauroments--Conatructino an object from a description (a drawing)--Reportiug an event-·>pe-culating about an event--1' orcd.ag and teating a hypotheais-Pre3ent.ing
the res ults of kn experiaent in tables and dingrams--Mo.king up a storyJ
and reading it--Play-acting--~inging catohoa--Gue3aiug riddloa--Maki.ng a
jokes telling it-..,jolving a problem in practical arithmetic--t ranslating
from one languttge into another--Aslciag, thanking, cursing, greeting, pra,ing.--It is interesting to compare the multiplicity ot the tools in
language and of the ways they are used, the multiplici ty of kinda ot word
and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure ot language. ( Including the author of '.r'ractatua .Logico-Philoaophicus. ) 11
44~ittgenatein, p. }l. The provided ~ngli.:lh tranalation (p. 3le)
reada: "Here we come up agaiDSt thct great question that lies behind all
these considerations.--For someone might object againat me: 'You take the
easy way outl You tulk about all aorto ot langua.5e-gamea, but have nowhere aaid what the es dence of a language-game, and h11nce of language,
ia: what id 001:unon to all thu.:Se actiYities, ~nd what makes I.hem into
langWlge or parts of language. ~o you let yo....raelt off the very part of
th~ investigation tlwt onoe gaYe you youraelt mo3t headache, the part
1
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Nittgenatein realized that the criteria of meaning used in logical empiricism derived from aDalyziog the uae of atatements in mathe1118.tics, logic.

4

and natural science. 5

T~~

w~y was clear to analyze the use o! language

This brief 3ur.unary of viittgenatein'.s work is not out ot place in a
consideration of Oxford analysis.

In point of fact, Jittgenstein exert-

ed greater influence at Oxford t han at Cumbridge.

His 1nvestigatiol13

stirred gre~ter itterost among the Oxford analyst~ than among his Cambridge compatriots.

Alr.iost single-handedly he turned Oxford philosophy

to a concorn with aDh.lysis.
Wittgenstein' $ thoory in the Investigations was a complete turnabout
from the Tr&ctatua.

His reversal sugge3ta an illuminative comparison

betweon logical positivism and Oxford analysis.

Logical poaitivism pic-

tured language as un invention of man; linguistic analysis saw it as an
organism.

46 Viewing language as an organism diaallowed a reductionistic

t~ndency, eapucially if it were poaitiviatic in tem~rameut.

47

about the 6eneral form o! propositions and ot language.• And thia is true.-Instead ot producing aomething common to all that we call languagtt• I aa
saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes ua
use the same word tor all,--but that they are related to one another in
maey ditf'erent ways. And it is because ot this relatioruship, or these
rela~ionships, that we call the11 all 'language'•"
4
5Paul F. .5chmidt, Religi.oua Knowledge ( (Glencoe, lllinoii} : Free
Preas, c.1961), P• 75. Jchraidt makes no explicit reference to the
thought ot Wittgenstein at this place, but t h~ argument is parallel.

46
Frederick Ferri, Lapgua~ 1 Logic and God (First editions New
York: . Harper anJ Brothers, c.l l), P• .58.

47cbarlesworth, P• 183.

11
~he Oxford disapproval ot propoaitional aoa1¥1;ic-synthetio dichotomioa
derives from an oruu-'c
~Q...... vl.·ow o•~ langua"e•
Q

~! an expreaoion !ita into an

~

or~anio whole, and if an expro~;sion nas no meaning apart from a · particu-

lar context, by definition therd are no reducible analytic statements.48
On the other band, the po~itivistic .t·eduction of a;,nthotio atatementa

into true/false and meaningless is no lesa unaure for t he analysts.

For

example, ''performatory" statement are perfectly meaningful and ''objsctive" although properly neither true nor faloo. 49

In "porfol't'Jatory"

discourse, language is an "intervention in t.he world."

scribed, nor is the aim to arouse emotion.

Nothing is de-

liather, attar the words are

spoken ("I promise,'' "I approve," "l, Nancy, take thee 0 ) , the situation
ia changed by the vary utteri~ of the words •.50
It is evident that Oxford analysia views language as an organiem
which may bavo "int'orr.ial logic" irreducible in term~ of formal elements.
Lansuage is not an instrument.

Friedrich \taiamann, a char ter r.lember of

the Vienna Circle, adequately summarizes our discussion ot tho difference

48

Ibid., P• 173•

'+9Ibid.
50Hepburn, "Poetry and ~9ligious Belief," Metapyisical .3eliefs, P•
121. ~arnock notes (p. 154) that John Austin was e~pocially concerned
with per!ormatory utterances. Auatin 1 s account of perturmatiYes is found
in llow to do Thinga with Words, edited from lecture notes by J. c. Urmaon
(Oxford: University Presa, 1962); see also John i\.uatin, Philosophical
~apers (Oxford: University Preda, 1961). Donald~. ~ns, in The Logia of
Self-Involvement (London: SCH Preas, c.196}), au1111111rizea Au.9tin's diecuadion of portormativea and proceeds to atudy Christian use of language
about God as ~reator from that perapectiYct. l. a. Hiles, ill ttelig,µ.on and
the Jcientitio Cutlook (London: George Allen and Unwiu, 0.1959), PP• 185186, suggests that "pseudo-caual." prayer language should be abandoned
in favor of "performatoq" prayer. Thus the prayor ''Thy will be done" is
to be ullder111toocl aa "I hereby aolalowledge the need to do aocordiug tot~
will."
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between logical poaitiviam and ling~iatic analysis in his reference to
the ''texture" and "logic" of strata:
"The formal motifs whioh we have been considering all co14bine to
impress a certain stamp on a stratum; they give us the 11eana to
characterize each atr~turn 'from within' that is with reference to
the st:tbject." It we caro!u:i.ly study the texture of ti1e concepts
which occur in a given stratum, t he logic of its propositions, the
meaning of truth, the web of verification, the sun.sos in which a
de5cr1ption may bo complete or 1ncomplote--1f ~• consider all that,
we r:iay thereby characterize t.ne aubject-mattar. • • • 'l'ho anal.oa
with acience is obviou.:J. 'i'he queationll, ''"hat io a point?" "'tlbat
is a s tra i ~ht line?" have been debated for ~ore than 2000 years
until the uolution was found in a reveri'.Jal of t he problem situation. • • • ln like ,aanner we ma.y say i;hat each stratum had a
lo~ic of its own and that thi3 logic de~arrainea the meaning ot

certain baf1e terma.51

By implication ~aismann admits that language is net eaaily reduced to a
single function, that ot do3cribing tho empirically verifiable.
Oxford analy3L~ :ieal,3 wit' , the logics of or3anic lat1gUage.
I

Its

methodology d.evelopod I'rom a aharpening o! :iittgen.:Jtein • s tool:, and an
extrapolation of his initial efforts.
in terms ot the us e of lanew,ige.

Wittgenstein referred to language

Language was meaningful without a philo-

sophical Juatif'ication of its aense or signi!ioance • .52
defined "meaning" in terms o! word use.

riittgenatein

For Oxford analysts, tbie defini-

tion lent itself too easily to .a "behavioristic" theory of meaning: "to
mean" consists in uaing vords in a certain way.
nition the analysts ma.de it their own.

BJ' sharpening this defi-

Oxford anal.7i,ia defines 1Ntaning

5lFriedrich •:iaismann, "language Strata," Logic and Lancyae, edited

by Antony G. N. Flow (~econd Jeries; Oxford: 3asil Blackwell, 1953), P•
30. G. c. i:>teau, in "How 'l'beologiaws ~<eaaon," l"aith and Logic, edited b1
3a.3ll Mitchell (:.ondon: !Jaorge Allou arid Unwin, 1957), PP• u4-115, retuna

to make logical generalizations about theological atateh1enta because of
their "opon texture." m, sug6'9:sts that "the theologian is cono41rned to
state thiugo, and it may be esaential • • • that [his statement•~ 0011notation is not pro\liaely delimited.''

.52~harlesworth, P• 114.
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in terms of .!!!!• not in tor,att of "oonsiating'' in tho certain uae ot words.
This definition of meaning is a methodological rule of thumb.5}

In

addition, Oxford analysts oppooe the auggeotion that all words "mean'' in
4
the same way that proper namea "mean, 115 tl1at is, b3 ostensive definition.
Combining this emphasis with a definition ot Qeaning in terms ot use, the
analyeta focuaed t heir int~reat on contextwil relations.

Put another

way, dofinition of meaning in terms of use ia a definition in terms ot
the "occasion":
in3tead of a aauming that expre~eiona have a fixed and abaolute maaning quite iudepondent of t he speaker and the context, we must admit
that oxpres siona only have meaning in context. We muat look not
f or t he "object'' to wllich the expression refers, but for the "occa~ · 1 which givos its uae aigni!icauce.
So, Nowell-!imith sa:,s-;-inatoaci of t ha queation, 11'4b.ut clotta thll vord 'X' r.ioan?" ve should
always ask two queatioD8, ''For what job is the word 'X' used?" and
"Under what conditiona is it proper to uae the word for that job? 11.5.5

53Ib1d.,
-

P• 170 •

54 Ibid., P• 174.
55 Ibid., p. 172. Niols Sgmont Christensen, a Jnniah analyst, distinguishes between hia own and the Oxford anal1sts• t heory of meaning in
On the Nuture of Meani s: A Philoso hical Ana ais (Copenhagen:
Munlwgaard, l l , P• 1.53: "for us the 1.ute or role by which ve define
raeaning 13 only one uae, that of referring or making truths." Again, P•
14, "the meaning ot an expression pertaina to the capacity of that expresaion ot being right~ produced when aud vhera, and only when and where,
something specific of a non-linguistic kind is present, be it an object,
property, relation, situation, or wh.at~ver it may be. The abstract entitJ
defined by this capaoit1 ia, we maintain, the meaning of at leaat a large
claas ot expre~~ions and accordingly the 'thing' sought by ana~io philosophers wh8n raising the general queatioa. [What sort of things are meaniuas?J."
His definition shows a diotinguishable link vith logical poaitiviam. Peter
2.illkernapl, another Dane, agrees with much of Oxford philoaop~ in his
Conditiona for ilescri~tion, tra~lated b1 Olae Lind.WI (London& Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 0.19 ), but he betrays asi alliance with logical poaitivism . vhea. he charges (p. 118) "that objective aoience, more than a~thing
else, is a precise fol"lllulation of characteriaticd ot evaryda.J language •• • •
Oxford philosophers ~ometimea seem to torget that aucb sciences aa geoaetr7
and physica are investi(llltiollS into fundamental 0011.cepta ot our language."
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(.)xford aoalyats aharpened not only 'IJitt,;en:Jtein.• a definition ot
meaning, but also his handling of the interrelatiou ot language "ga11ea."
vJhile the analyota wore no leaa aDXioua than Witt&enatein to dupict the
preciae interrelations between "logics" or "gamoa," they have been more
successful than he in isolating the variety of logica.

Reluctant to dis-

cuas tha precise relations between gamea uf languages, Bernard ·,,illiams

includes among the diatinguiohing marks of a lunguage ga!:18 the fo'.i.lowing:

Cl) types of logical relation holding within languai;e; (2) subjeotmatter; (3) ueeu of tachnical terms; (4) purposes; (5) ~ore generally,
activitie3 with which the language is a:isociated.56
Gilbort Ryle of Oxford prefers to .t;;peak ot "categories" rather than
gac:ieu.

liyle defines categories as ''uentence-.tactors," and contends that

each expression belongs to a diatinguiebable type with an indefinite nua-

ber ot instanoeo.57 Ryle demonstrates what he means

by

category in a

discuaoion o! ''.use" and nuaage. 11 lie diatinguishea between ''ordinary uee"
and "ordinary usage," and apparently makes each a categor,~

lie terms it

a philosophical "howler" to identity tho two and to pretend that actual
11&e o! expressions is in some wa1 a criterion for significance.
analysis is not Mass Observation."

"Job-

He suggests that one diocovera the

ordinary uae of an expre~sion much as he diacovera the ordiD&r,Y use of
a tool--by manivulating ~t.58

563ernard iiilliama, ''Tertullian' a Paradox, " J;ev Eoaaya in Philosophical Theolop, edited bJ Antorq G. N. Flev and Alaadeir MacIntyre
foew Yorkt !'iacmillan Compa~, c.1955), P• 191+.

57Blanshard, Reu.:>on antl Aoal.yaia, P• ,i.6•
.58Gharlesworth, PP• lSo-181.

"Maas Obaerfttion" is the Br1tidh
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John Austin and Peter F. ~trawaon are two other Oxford aualysta who
have taken their cue from ~ittgenstein, but advanced beyond him.
differed from ~vittgenstein botb in method and motive.

Austin

In method, he dis-

sected the details of linguistic uses with leao ol a flair.

Inatead of

providing hints, olues, and pointers of a set exposition, he trained his
ears for t.he fine nuances.

;~ittgenstein held that the purpoae of lau-

guage description was the dissolution of philosophioal problems.
motive cliffered.

Austin'•

He gave the impression that there_was aomething to be

learned, both fror.n and about language.

He did not disliliss the multitude

of adverbs that daacriba, for example, one•a action:.'j, in order to limit

invoati3ation to "voluntary 11 and"involuntary'' action.

For Austin, lin-

guiatio distinctions were informative; language appeared· ~o be a store-

house ot 1'long-garnered principles and distinctions. n59 :Jtrawson,

Oil

the othe1· hand, attompts to clarify some ot the older terms of philosophical claasit'icatior-.

'.41th H. ll. Price he has investigated "catego-

ries, 11 • "particulars," "universals," and other tert1s. 6o

equivale11t of the Gallup poll. 1/arnoak (p. lOl) quevtioDS .;tyle • & ~ethod
ot catogory-anal1ais, especially in ~le's ~oncent of Hind, by a ~6orting
tho presence of a ''ghoat'' within the a11aiysis. He finds the "ghoat of
fi'loore'~ old programme of 'analyais', the atterapt to reduce to some
single approved grade of basic tacta such propositiollil aa seem to cention facts of other sortsn--in Ryle'e case, a behavioris~ic interpretation. R'arnock furl;her clais:1s (p. 101) that such a method is "unlike
tbat species of unprejudiced investigation the 3ole aim of which 13 to
achieve a clear zra~p or th<1 concept.a we employ.'' J;yle'a ''onu-world
theory" is criticall1 analyzed by ,.;. "• -.;ampbell in ''Hyle on the Intellect," Clarit is ilot. ;;oou , e'1ited by U. il. Lewis (London: 1Jeorge

Allen and Unwin, c.1963, PP• 278-JlO.

·

59warnock, PP• 14?-151. Austin died in 1960. ~luatio~ of h.is
work are given by J. o. Urmaon, Norman Malcolm, ,t. V. -iuine, and ->tuart
Hampshire in JourDB.l of Lhl.lo:sopb,Y, I.XII (October 196.5), 499-513.
6o~arnock, P• 15'+. For a diacttasion of the metapbyaioal implicationa
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tfa have already touched on the honing

ot 'iittgenstein' a analytic

methodology in our diac uasion ol the Oxford eff ort to 3harpen his defini•
tion of ''meaning" and to describe more aJequately his lunguage games.
3ut it tnus't ba notod. that at the hands of the Oxford &nalya tlJ -:Jittgenstail!.' a
methodolo6Y has reuched a point of keen precision.

The Oxford analysts re-

fined the "paradigm case technique" and the ''significant comparison11 in

polishing \·, ittgenstein' s method.

Analy:.sis employs the paradigm case tech-

nique in clarifying the function of diacourae.

The technique parallels a

fir~t <.:aae with a :Ja oond to understand more fully the !irat.

Use.1 in

parallelud contexto are uaea that are the meaning of the expreo~ion.

61

t'l.e\il ro!eru to tho paradigm ca.;e in the:3e tt1rli!S:

the ceaning of (a wordJ can be elucidated by looki~ at simple
paradigm caaes: auch as those in which !aatidious language users
e1aploy (.that wore!) when the madneaa of weto.pbysica is not upon theai1
ouch as those by reference to which the expression u~uallJ is, and
ult:iC1B.tely h~a ulways to be, explained.62

In "significant comparison," a _p hrase is compared to other !orms ot langua ge, or other activitiea, vhich accomplish an identical purpose • . This
procesa of contraat illwaines the original phrase.

63

The search for the logics of language baa not proceeded vithout
heckling and philosophical rebuttal.

Condescendingly, John 'tJisdom refers

of Peter .:,trawson'a Individuals: an

~aa,r ica ~eoriptive Hetaphy:tioa (1959),

aee F. Zabeeh, ''Oxford and Hetapbysioa: a Nev Page in ~ontemporary Philosophy, 11 International t·hiluaophical ,uarterly, III (l-lay 1963), }12-31'+.

61Ferre,

PP•

64-65.

62Aaitorq u. H•.flew, "Divine OmDipotenge anci iiuman .freEtdom,"
Essays, P• 150.

63Ferrl, P• 65.

~
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to the 3uggos tion that overy expression bas its own peculiar logic as the

,,1.d.iosyncrasy platitude. ''64 Charlesworth contands that ~he ~pproach sanctifie3 t he status ~uo.

Jutisfaction with the sta tus quo is evident, he

cla ims, in t he coucret e work uf Oxford a nalyaia.

One is .f orced to pretend

tha t every proposition has itu own logic; at t eu1pt6 to show t he logic false
are cona truod as misdirected effortB to reduce it to an alisn logical
!orm. 65

Blanahard' o contention that "cates;;ory-mistakea'' occur exclusive-

ly in t hou5h~ or belief, and not in oxpreasions--as ~le ~ontands--is a
parallel cri~icis m. 66
A mor o concer t ed attuck on tha "idiosyncruoy platitude" involves.

tra ns ferring th.:i s crim!l'W.i:;e i'rom the field of lirlguiat ic unalysi3 to the

f i eld of epi1:»t emolo~.

In au,1tte atine; that rtyle i s uot au totally con-

c ern<:1d with linguiatics a;; he ad.~t ima,Iine, J3lanshard as:3ume1:1 tha point

he sets out to prove:
Now t he only ~ay to decide whether it ia a howler to oo..y ''thinking

is apeaking" is to 3et clear whether thinking!! speaking. It this
i a in truth the wa y to de cide, then philosophy will reraain ahat
me~ have commonly thought it to be, a reflective exploration of
tht1 nature o! tbinl{4•67
Blanahard's arsument parallels Cliarl9sworth's ~hen Charlesworth accuses

the analysts of inoonsi.itctncy.

'i'ho analyst.:3 claim both that language

ic.1 cor.apose<l of ''public words, 11 and that through inape.;tion ot ordimaey

language difficulties ara cleared.

The analysts ara inconoistent in

64Charlesworth, P• 182.
65~ . , P• 184.
66aianaburd, .aeason and '1.n&lYsi.s, P•

67Ibid., P• 354.

-

.}36.

Jee also P• ,54.

Bl+
their contention that difficulties arise out of the confluence of "categories" within , otdinary language. 68

Blanshard and Charlesworth haTe diffi-

culty with the auggeution that both the problem and the.30lut1on are found
in linguiatics.

An appeal to the court of language appears foolhardy it

it is truo that problem3 initially reside in language.

Putting the argu-

ment another · wuy, Churlesworth critici~ea Oxford's attempt to scuttle all
word-reference.

rha analysts accurately argue that all words do not

"mean'' in the .same \'la,; ua proper uames; but they are not thereby reliev-

ed of t he necessity to explain their ascription of words to categories
such as "porformatory,"

11

a acripti'V'.e, 11 or

11

con!irmatory."

•'ihat is r,reaeut

in a specific circumstance to make a particular utterance appropriate?69
Answering questions like these is part ot the Oxford analysts' recreation•
al program.
C~llengoa to the World of Theology
Oxford analysts r~de a brief fora1 against Ox!ord theologians in a
short-lived periodical called Univeraity in 1950. and 1951. 70

In addition,

the analytic movement puahod itaelf into the worshippipg COIIIIIIUDities at
Oxford and Cambridge; tho influence of the movawent was clearly evident.
V. ll. H. Green notes that
At both UniTeraities, though latter}¥ to a more marked degree at
Oxford than at ~r.1bridge, developments in che treatment uf philosophy could be seen to challenge religious orthodox,. Trends ill

68Charlesworth, PP• 177-lSO.

69~ . , P• 175•
7<>~ic Lionel l4ascall, ".iords 11ud Images (l~ev York: Ronald Preas
Comparq, 6.1957), p. 14. Some ot the University cliacusaioll.l are found
in ~ew ~says in .f'h ilosopbical Theolop, PP• 96-lo8.

8.5
the interpretation of philoaophy, the reaction to the dominance of
absolute idealism giving wuy to aasumptiona that were non-mentaph1sical
and primarily linguiatic, sapped the foundations of r eligioua b~liet,
even though their exponents theroaelvea were sometimes sincere churchmen. The •10rk of G. r;. Moore und Bertrand aussell, the.: profound if
partial ideas of Ludwig ·. 11ttgenstein • • • raised fundat.lental question::1 about the nature of reality which by-passed religious iaoues
aince religious oxperienoe was incapable of veritication.71

The confrontation between analy3ia and theology was not limited to
the skirmish between philoaophora and theologians in the University discussions, or to the aphere of corporate worship at Cambridge and Oxford.

The challenges to t heology are more inclusive.
in t~o areas of confrontation.

Our

investigation centers

The first challenge of confrontation de-

rives from a restateinent--within linguistic anal1aia--of some basic ele1aenta of logical positivism, especially verifiability, or conversel1,

falaifiabilit1.

~he second major challenge is the analysts' demand that

theologians isolate and explicate the distinguishing characteristics-the "logic" or "logica"--of religious discourse.
Properly under5tood, stringent logical positivism is no longer a
viable philosophical option.72

It ia true that the principle o! verifia-

bilit1, or confirmability, finda heart1 acceptance in the scientific
method so heavily endorsed in the technica~ world, but it dould be incorrect to equate this weakened principle with verifiability as it was
rigidly interpreted in the earlier stages of logical positivism.

Similarly,

only in referring to the earlier stages ot toe movement may one claim

71v. H. H. Green, aeligion at Oxford and Cambridge (London: 5CM Pre88,

c.1964), PP• 342-34}.
72~d.les (p. 140) isolates as the essential characteristic of logical
positivism the tenet that moral and religious assertions are not to be
taken aeriot.isly; in this ~use, he contends, the label "logical poaitiviam" is no longer appropriate • .;jau also supra, PP• 50-52•
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that logical positivism is l~holly defunct.

But it would 'be unv1ae to

eliminate the terr-.1 completely in 3pite ot ito imprecision.

;Je :Jhall here

refer to tho earlier 11tu;~ea of the movement. a3 ''stringant" logical positi'V1.sm, anu t he latur sta,~us as ''modified" logical positivism.

In view of

this distinction, .:Stringent logical positivism is a ir.atter of hiatory;
modified lo~ical positivism manifests itself in a variety of guiaea,
including the scientific method and 3ome types of linguistic analy~is.73
All this has to do with the first analytic-positivistic challenge
to theology in tbat some contomporary atll.tlysts und anulytio theologians,
while adopting the methodology of linguistic analyoia, have not ceased
to bracket the totality of ''meaningful" logics with the qualification
that ultimately all logics are empirically baaed.
verification principle in new dress.

This apparently is the

~ome of its iconoclastic nature is

bidden, and some of ito rigid dogmatism aottened, but the principle of
Terifiability (or falsifiability) has crept into contemporary philosophical ant\lyaia as a positiviatic carry-over.7

4 ?hia type of analytic

challenge ultimately puts t heology and r~ligioua language to the empirical
test:

ia the language of relicJioua discourse empirically verifiabla, or

falsifiable, even in principlo? i!e shall conaider each eleuent in turn

73writiD8 in tho "Introduction" of 1aith and :..ogio (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1957), Basil Mitchell mkk.es this 3tatement about logical
poaitivi~ta (p. 4): "It ia converJbnt to reatrict the term 'Logical
Positivist' to thoae who regard the verification principlo us the sole
criterion of mEuuli.n~. ln thia aense of the word there artt few Logical
Pos1tivii,ta in the fidld to-day."

74John Wisdom carries out "therapeutic analyaio" on the verification
principle in "i·letumorphoseu of the Verifiability Theory of Heaning, !i!a,
LXXII (Ju~ 1963), J}5-Jlt7, when he dvJAonatratea the posdibility of logi1
'

cal positivism's reincarnation in the mothodology ot ''use. 11 He asaerta
that the po~itivistic dichoto!i1,J into meaningful/meaningless was atructurallJ
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aa we characteri~e the tirat ot the two anal1tic challenges to religious

language.
The challenge !or empirical verification (also in principle) ot reli-

gious discourse appears in various forms.

John wiadom grants that when

a man sings of God b"3ing "in His heaven," his words obviously express
inward emotions .

But when this man writ9s about beliet in God, and his

writ i ngs are read by young men to s~ttle their doubt3 1 the impression is
not one o! rnen iiirnply conoernod to settle their doubts once and !or all.

The disputa nts speak as if they are concerned with a matter ot
scientific fact, • • • but still of tact and s till a matter about
which reaoona for a nd againot may be ottered, although no scientific
roa oons in th~ aenae of fiald SUJ:Yeya for foss ils or experiments
on delinquents are to thu point;/;)

dependent on deductive consequences which could be drawn !rom verifiability. Verifiability, as~ wed6-e between the meanin5ful.-moaningleas,
"was a necessary condition ! or the mea.ningfulneois ot arq kind of nonanalytic s tatement" (337). rbe obvvrse is to suggest that 11for a theory
to be unverifiable it ia neoes~ry that there is no possible aet ot
initial conditions enabling a vori!ication to be deduced" (3}8). Thus
the ,Jrinciple (theory) of verifiability presuppoaod u principle of no
initial conditions--and its def@~e appeared to ba preposterous (}39).
l f ..he tneory was to bu unvorifiu.ble, there uiuat be a true theory domewhere in t.hu world o! the uame logical f orm (}4o). ·r he 'iueation is,
,Jould logical positiviota be pre pared to accept this? 'lhiu is ~!i s doea'a
reductio ud absurdum.
rlisdom contends t bat neither can a wedge be driven betwt1en the
meaningful/meaningless by ,ceans of an aD!ilyais o! t he "uae of'' ( ..542).
One o! the priDlllry aime of this method of :1h1:1.ving a use" is to ''provide
a eure basis to which to refer philosophical cstatements." But if philosophy utilizes this restriction ("that what ha.a a uso irJ veritiable 11 )
haphazardly, tho analyst's model is a reincarnation ol logical positiviaa.
I! t he analyst doea not take this ap~roach, he porhap~ f~il~ to penetrate
the philosophical doctrines under attack, although all too often, disde>11
claimu, the "extre:ne horn" ia adopted (346-347). Jee also ..~. \i. Ashby,
"Use 11.11<1 Verification," .Proceedine;a of !.he Aristotelian ..:;ociety, LVI
{1955-.56), 149-166, 1:1.mi ,l. B. 3raithwaite'J argument swn:,arized intra,
PP• 119-120.

75Jobn tJiadom, "Goda," Lo~ic ar.:l Langua,:, edited by Antony G. N. Flew
(Firs t ~eries; 0xford: Baail Blackwell, 1952~ P• 194. ..:isdog ia here
referring &ither to Bishop Uore or to c. ~. N. Joad.
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,iith this comment ·..:iadom a.ssumoa thf!t religious atatem~nt:.. claim a concern with the cosmos .

,ihe n they make such staterattnts, theologians must

be pro pared ' '.:.o support th.)rn through empirical justification, and allow

contrary scientific evidence to enter tho cuae a3 we11.76
Ian Crombie parruits the :•criti c '' in hid article t o apply the verifi-

cation principle to reliGious di~cour~e from another angle.

The critic's

difficulty with theological assertions beBin.o when .:1tatementa "purport
to be about a particular object, which it is in principle i~po~sible to
'ir1dicate' in auy non-lin5uiatic wa:,"--that is,

~od--,

tlD

object which

ia "differeut from any other particular obj~cts in whoae existence we
ho.Te any

around .for believing." The critic's di!f iculty doubles when

t he theist clairu3 i1is statement1:J to be true, to havu a "determinate
meaning, '' but insists that neither he nor his statements can become

''embroiled in ocienti!ic dispute." The theiat ultimately ''claims an

fact. '1

ln oum,

r ule3 laid do1·m about hou such uttaranc~a tire to be taken
(e.g. that ''God'' ia indeed a proper m:une, but that it ia in
principl<: impo.'lsible to sea God) ar1:S such that h~ {j.he philoaophei=l
caunot sea oither what it~ re!erence can be (tho !ir::1t ~rplexit1J
or what ito contunt (the second).77
the

~rombie'a critic coruplain:J th.at the Christian raters his statements
to a particular boing--God-''with particular kinds o! events, 11 including

76u. J.
and Unwin,

f 'aton suggests in Tho Modarn Predicament (London: <leorge Allen

c.1955), PP• 42-43, that the vor:1 intelligibility ot theo-

logical aaaertiono ,:,a.y be put in doubt it the "cruliely anthropol!lorpbic
interpretatiou," which makes the aasertiooa appear aa empirical statements, were abandoned. Paton advises extreme care in tha UStt of o.na~aia.

77 Ian 14. ~ro.2bie, 11! he Po:Jeibility o! Theological ..itateNents, '' Fe.1th
and l.ogio, PP• 39-47, 48. Crombie employs the critic's argwae11tation ~o
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creation and juo.gment.

But if the theist is queried ("Which person?, 11

"Where is lie?," "What events are you talking about?"), he construes the
questions as a "crude misunderstanding of the nature of theological
language."

The critic unveilo his covert reliance on the verification

principle with these words:
Yet if/ he Ghe theistj uses words which appear to be proper names,
or which appear to refer to cosmological happenings, or to occurrences in human personalities, aurely such quostions are perfectly
proper ones to ask.78
Here again one confronts the iconoclasm of modified logical positivism
in new dress.

"vlhich," "where," and "what" are empirical watchwords;

in assuming that these interrogatory adverbs are valid in examining religious discourse, the critic applies the verification principle to the
sphere of religious language.

H. A. Hodges provides another view of the verificational challenge
when he describes the encounter between theologian and analyst.
raises qu~stions to ·,,hich he offers theism as an answer.

The theist

The difficulty

is that the analyst is unprepared to accept a:n.y interrogative sentence as
a reasonable question, or for that matter, !!lZ sentence beginning with a

causal particle as a reasonable explanation.

liodges continues,

We think there can be "idle" questions, and before accepting a
question as reasonable we require some indication of a possibility
of answering it. If we are not satisfied on these points, we may
dismiss the question and its alleged answer as logically meaningless • • • • 79

make way for his analogical, authoritative, self-justifying theory of
religious language. S e e ~ , pp. 16Q-164.

78Ibid., P• 36.
79H. A. Hodges, "What is to Become of Philosophical Theology,'' Contemporary British Philoscpb;r, edited H. D. Lewis (London: George Allen and
Unwin, c.1956), p. 219. Hodges does not endorse this position himself.
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While some analysts insist on interrogative questions which begin with
"which," "where," and "when," others discount the interrogatives, and
explicative propositions as well.
A second form in which some contemporary analysis betrays its positivistic parentage is its demand for the "falsifiability" of religious
assertions.

Above falsifiability appeared as the fourth stage in the

development of the verification principle.

Popper's theory of falsifia-

bility was used by the positivists to salvage scientific hypotheses and
general laws.Bo Falsifiability is the converse of verifiability; the
challenge of falsifiability is in principle the challenge of verifiability.

Those analysts who rely on falsifiability in their search for reli-

gious logic conclusively demonstrate their positivistic ancestry.
Charlesworth puts the case succinctly:
faced with the problem of accommodating religious language, many
of the Analysts fall back, defensively, upon a kind of disguised
verificationism which enables them to dismiss religious utterances
as logically meaningless.Bl
He further contends that only with the introduction of an arbitrary metaphysical. assumption ("that an assertion is meaningful only if we knov
what would count against its truth in the way in which we know what would
count against the truth of an empirical assertion") are religious statements deemed meaningless.

This "truism" is in fact "identical. with the

verification principle of the Logical Positivists. 1182

80supra, PP• 31-34 •
. 81M. J. Charlesworth, "Linguistic Analysis and Language about God,"
International Philosophical Quarterly, I (February 1961), 140.
82Ibid.

Italics are his.

ot some~ification.

Charlesworth's statement stands in need
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The moat ardent falsifiability-challenge comes from AntoD,1 Flew.
rii.;;

c ~~itention that theological assertions are doomed to the "death ot

a thoueand qualificca1tions" is a precise !orn1ulation

challenge.

ot the faleitiability-

Flew uses John Wisdom's pa1·c.1.ble oi the gardener to make his

point: what originally is offer~d as a theological a3sertion ultimatel7
may disaipate throu13h t he death of a thousand qualifications.
the parable.

Two men discover a w~ll-kept garden.

gardener umda t :1e g ..,rden.

'i'he

11

This is

One argues that a

Believer11 and the other mnn pitch tents

a.:J they keep their watch for the gardener.

They set up electric fences

and train bloodhounds, but discover no gardener.

The 13oliever remains

convinced: ''But there ia a gardener, invisible, intargiole, insensible
to electric shocks, a gardener who haa no scent and makes no sound, a

gardener who comes aecretly to look after the garden whic.h he loves. 11
Flew aaks,

Just

11

how does what you call an i ::visible, intapgible, ete:;r,-

nally elusivti gardonor differ from an imaginary gardener or evun from no
garden~r Ht ,.tll'/1183
~xtrapolating tha parable of the gardener, Ylew next conaidera the
"lalsif'ication" ot theological stater11enta.

He uses the principle o!

non-contradiction as a fulcrum:
,,ow to aaaert that auch and aucb is thv case is neces3aril1 equi-

valent to denying that such and such is not the case • • • • For
if the utterance is indeed an assertion, it ~ill necea:sar~ be
equivalent to a denial ~r the negation of that assertion. • ••to
know the meaniDg of the negation of an assertion, ia aa near aa
makes no matter, to know the meaning of that assertion. And it
there is nothing which a putative a~aertion denies then there ia

83Anton,y G. N. Flew,

:fheology ana l!'a lai!ication," Nev Eaaaya, PP•

11

96-97. new took the parable from iiiedoa•a "Gods," Logic and I.angua.p,
First ~eries, pp. 187-206. ~isdoa•s article tirat appeared 111 £!:2oeedinge of the Aristotelian Society (1944-1945).
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nothing wbich it as~erte either: and so it is not really an as~ortion.8'+
Flew•a fal~ifiability-challenge is the converse o! thi, challenge of verifiability.

lie poses the questior.i ut falsifiability in thi~ wayt "What

~ould l:u:lve to occur or to have occurred to conetitute tor you

M

diaproof

ol the love of, or of the exiatence o!, God? 1185 The question demonstrateo l''lew• 5 indttbtedneaa to the positiviatic heritag~. 86
There are several logical alternatives to Flew'd challenge o! falsitiability, but only two, thtt t i,ird and the fourth, take hi14 at his l!ford:
(l) theological statameuts aro rctlevant to !alsi!ication, but ·never concluaively falaifiabl~; (2) theological statements are wholly un!ala1-

fiable because they are not aaser-tions at allJ (}) theological statements
are a~aertiona which can be falsifi ed in principle and in practice, (4)
theological statements are assertions which can be falsified in principle,
but not in practice. 817 Busil Mitchell accepted the firc1t alternative,
arguing that tho tlature of taith precludes .the taking ot theological
assertions as "proviaional hJpotheaea."

..{. .M. Hare elected the second.

84nev, ''Thctology and Falsification," Nev Essays, P• 98. It is
interestin6 to consider Blanshard's answer to falsifiability in this
context. 3ee supra, P• }4.
85
Ibid. , P• 99.
86Jnmes w. wloelfel, in '"Non-Mehphysical'' Christian f•hiloaoplq and
Linguiatic Philosophy," New Theology t~o. 2·. eclitod by Mart~n E. Ma-rty .arid
Doan G. Pear~n (~aw York: Macmillan Com!)QDY• c.1965), P• 51, refers to
Flew as a proponent of "aJJAlytic positivism" in theae words: 11 .ihat theology confronts todny in men like Antony Flew is a returbiahed and broadened poaitivis1i1 sharpened by the methods of linguistic al'lalyeis. The
verification principle reiaains t~r the newer positivist the corner-stone
o! philosop~." V:oelfel's article !irat appeared in Scottish Journal
ot 'fheologY, XVII (March 1964), 10-20.

-

87Ferre, PP• 50-51.
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alternative.

Ian Crombie and John Hick selected t he fourth, ::.ugge:itin13

that falsification in JJractice is i mposs ible because ultimate evidence
to the contrary is avail~ble only in death. 88

Our concern is not to

analyze t he logical alternatives, but to recognize that the endorseiaent
of the alternatives suggesta the serious nature of the chuller.ge in the

first place.

J oae theologi ans lay bare the very nerve of their t neology

in the face of this challenge.

As Hepburn sugJe!:.t.D,

l'he value of t bis :!louified verification-challenge is precisely this,
that it forces a theologian to expose the very nerve ot hia position, to become clear with himself (and to express to other people)
on what his theology stands or falla. And incidentally he may discover by his very inubility to do this that his theology is logically
confused, or not at any point properly anchored to reality.~9
The analytic confrontation of theology entails not only a restatement
of tho verifiability-falsifiability principle.

The second major analytic

challenge more accurately mirrors tho methodological core of analysis in
demanding the "logic" or "logics" of religious discourse.
it is found in a variety of configurations.

For this reason

The first confi8uration io

that the constructive philosophy o! analy,3ia is r,ot a speculative metaphysics

in support of theology, but a lingui3tic re-description of the familiar.90

~8 Ibid., pp. 51-52.

Austin Farrer, in "A r,tarting-Point for the
~-hilosophical. Bxwnination of '~'heological Belief," Faith and Logic, edited.
by Basil Mitchell (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), P• ll, answers
f lew 3traightforwardly. He suggests that it is impossible to take any
single theological statement and proceed therewith to its logical analyais.
This is the case because the sentence will be a ''parable," and to e::.tablish its rnore religioue sense ia "to recover the context of very strangely
contrasting parables in which it stands, together with tha art cf balancing parables. This is a long and complicated task. Aud it is a task tor
believers.''
89Honald ~J. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox (London:
and Company, c.1958), p. 12.
90

~ . , P• 9.

c.

A. ;Jatts
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\'ihile theology ha s at times allied itself with philosophical i.1etapeysics,
supportive alliance with linguistic methodology ie impossible.

Linguis-

tic philo3ophy deniea that it is anything other than an analytic method.
Fhilosophical analy:sis is far reroov0d from Kant, who would limit reason
''to make room for f a ith. 11 ~)hilosophical anal ysis conatructa no metaphyaica
like i.3radley' s, which i.ot only leaves room for God but necet:Jaitatea ilie

exiatonce.

'l'heology fears a philosophical moveuient whoso theological

rnethodoloey, in Hepburn' s terms , iG the ai!tintS of aense froui nolla{;use.
Hepburn' a c liullonge to theology aeurna simple enough.

tests to sift theolo3icnl sonze from nonsense:
wordo uhich

CHll

Ile offera t.o

(1) Are there othor

be used instead of the expression in queation?

(2)

How

can you teach the expresaion?9l \ihile thooe U1ethodological ques tions at
first glance appear to oo innocuouo, thoy offer a. serious challenge in
providing no set metaphysics for t heology's environment. 92

15'+.

Thoy limit

91nepburn, "Poetry and Religious Balief, " Metaphy3ical Beliefs, P•
92
A

recant article by ~-. Zabeeh, "Oxford ar,d Metaphysics: a l,e-, Page
in Contemporary Philosophy,'' International. Philosophical Quarterly, III
(¥.ay 1963), 307-320, suggests that Oxford analysis has not alienat.ed
itself totally from a qualified metaphysics. The appearance of three
works, P. 1. ~travson's lndividuala: an ~asay in ~escriptiTe Metaphysics
(1959), K. A. Harr,•s ~heories and Tbicgs; a Brief J eudy in PrescriptiTe
Metaphyaica (1961), and o• .s. Jhwayder's Modes o! lteferri and Probleu
of Univeruala: an Essa in Meta aics (19ol, validates, 28.bueh asserts
-,,. , what ii. M. Hare recently :said about hia Ox!ord colleagues in
11
:-ichool for Philoaopheru, 11 l!!ll2, II c:~ebruary 1960), 115: "what ve
spend mo3t of our time in Oxford doing is metaphysics • • • • We insist
only on diatinguishing betwesn ~erious metaphysical in4uiry and verbiage
disgu13ed as auch." For tho attempt of oriti3h churchmen to evaluate
the atatuo of aetapbysice in contempora17 British thought, a•~ the
collection of eaaays edited by lan T. Ramsey, Prosoect tor Metapb.Ysics
(London: George Allen and Unwin, c.1961), especiatlly the essay by c. B•
.Oal7, 11ttetapeysics and tho Limits of Language," PP• 178-205.

9.5
theology · to methodology-, and the content ot the discipline to that which
is non-transcendent.

£or at time.s there are no "other worda which can

be uaed instead of :;he expredaion," as iu the caae ot ''Ood."

ln cii.sea

like tilis, theology lay3 itself open to the cbarse ot "non-sense."
Hc?hclr.;.on distinguisheu four typos o! "non-sense'';

we neell only compure "''l'was brillig, and the slith1 toves i.)id
~re and gimble in tht, walle," and ''This boo!·. is reci nnd grean
all over, '' llnd ''All only every but,"· and ''Socrateoi is nuo6rous."
~ch of th6se utterances ie nonsensical for a different reason.93

l.inguistic analyaie challenges theology to select the ~ost appropriate
"non-oan3e 11 as its own, or to demonstrate that its discourse iit net "non-

sen3e.11 The methodology of analysis otters little escape to the realm ot
metupeyaics aa u justificatioa for any sort of ''non• sense."
~iichael Foster contends that analytic methodolo~ is inirAical to

Christian theology both intrinsically and in its correlative disincl1D&tioo tow~rds raetaphysics.

One of the assu11tptions of philosophical ao.a.1)--

eis, he asserts, ia that all thinking--and therefore all philoaophical
thinking--consiato in solving problems.

The analyst pictures himself

allied with the scientist in the task ot dispelling myater;y.

~~steI'7

arises from two sources& lack of knowledge, and unclear thinking.
cares tor the first; the business of philosophy is the second.

Science

It the

task of analysia is the eradication of unclear thinking, says Foster, b7
definition ita methodology neith.-r .1'oeters nor allows for the mysteries

ot theological language.94

9"1-homaa HoPberaon, "Religion aa the Inexpreasible," New ~sa;,;a,

P• lJ.}.
4
9 Micbael

s.

195?), PP• 18-22.

Foster, !1,Tstery and Philosophy (!.o11do1u SC~~ Press,
Foster inoludea Hana Reichenbach, Moritz Johliek, and
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A second methodological confrontation between analysis and theology
which is not directly concerned with the restatement of the verification
principlo involves an appeal to pragmatic results.

The analyst challeng-

es the theolo3ian to me&·s ure th& practical accompliahments

ot analy$1s.

liepburn contends that theology is uneasy ';lith philosophical analysis
becau~e of its partial 3ucceas in "therapeutic" efforts.

Even though

succesG~s 6.r\:! infrequent, the th-toloiP,an feara the advance of analysis.
He seea his o~-m parudoxes not as exhibita in the museum of metaphysical

rJE11'Vels, but as candidates for dissolution.95

,

J. J. c; • .:,1uart atte1npt3 to achieve s1.tch a therapeutic coup d' atat

in his application ot analytic methodology, for ho reliahes the poasibili•
ty o! turning "metaphysical marvels'' into logically analyzed questions.

Jmart asaerta that analysis advances the task o! theology by applying ita
logic to metaphysical qu~al;l.ons.

l'.aey tlleological quautiona are "meta-

phyaical," -chat is, confused; they must be atudied in tho light of logical
knowledge before progreus ;-1111 show its face. 96 3u1art defines linguistic

"therapeutic'' anal.yais as a philosophical rnethodoloQ' whoH "logic" (in
the wide aense) ia a~ "oonceptual inveatigation. 11

Thia logic is con-

cerned with logical rather than GWtapb;,-sical queotiuns.

For example,

aoae .British aualysta (inoluding <.iilbert lqle) in this description. Ill
the remaininB chapters ot his work Foster inveatigatea the concept of
tOy:Jtery iu Grtiek philooopb.y, in the Biblo, in conflict with aoience, and
in correlation with etbica. In general the book is an apologetic against
tho aual.ytic thrust at my;Jtery, although Foster does not deal apecitically with the quedtion o! ·i,>y~terioua langu~ge.

95Hepburn, ~hristianity and Paradox, P•
9~J. J.

PP• 24-25.

c.

?•

Smart, "MetaPblaics, Logic and 'l'heology," New ~says,
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"ls goodness reducible to a :iat of non-athical properties?"
to "Is the ,'fill froe'?"

,ir11art

is preferred

contends thnt teohni!.iues for answering

logical liUestiona are avail~ble; though one mJ.y not in fact be able to

answer logical ~uo~~ions, he knows roughly what sort of an.swer i3
required. 97 Smart u.3sllrts that ao-called "metaphysical ~ue.,tions'' will
disappear if t he proper logical questions are ask~d.

Tho following

charuct~ristics are gauerally found in ~etaphy~ical ~uostion~:

(1) the

queution haa the ap,)eurance of being factual; (2) it is in some way
puzzling, a nd one doe:;; not know how to set al)out answering it; (3) on•

feels that it rnat.toro what the answer is. 9B As an exa:uple of theologi•
C&.l

11

therapeutic .:u1a lyeia" Jmart take.:i to hand tho lJrol:>leill ,)! evil.

He

b~51ns with th~ theological difficulty involved in positin3 tho con-

current exi::,tenco of evil and God.

This metaphy.~ical '-l.uestion diuaolves

into a logical question if' "logic" i3 properly applied.

argumentation ie complex, but logical.

'the clarifying

Firat-order evils exist, the

theia~ might· s~y, so tlwt men might have second-order goods, such aa
sympathy and kindness, which are impossible without them.
evila provide the third-order good, forgiveneao.

ot tree will:

Jecond-order

~hen enters tha queotioD

iJid God "buy" !rec will for man at the expense of evil?

Why did God not make people so that they always freoly choae the good?

5mart ultimately finds the rasolution in a logical que~tion:

"ls there

a contradiction in .3aying thzlt God could have U1ade us ~o thl.lt we alwa:,u
freely chose right·f 11 ~his ar.alytic conclusion, Swart contend~, allows

97 Ibid., PP• 14-15.
98Ibid., PP• 15-17.
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the theolo3ian to see a meta physioal ques tion as it reall7 ia:
ques tion. 99

a logical

It appears that Smart vindicates the analytic approach to

metaphysical-theological 11uvstions by ~rguing that the logical ~ueution
ia prior.

While he

anJ

liapburn do not find absolute methodological agree•

ment, both view t he analytic approach aa a threat to a theologian's psyche,
if not also to his theology.
Up to this point the theolo~ian who assumes a podition ot complete

But philosophical aaal.y•

reliance on revelation raay count hirnuelt secure.
sis challenge:;s him aa well.

The third facet of the aecond ,ajor challenge

ia tho argument that any appeal to the self-validating nature of revelatory statements ia \.lcacceptable.

The ques tion of "meaning" is uot with-

drawn from thoolo~ians who retreat to an authoritative position, relying

totally on "revelation."

In fact, the question is pressed doubl1 hard.loo

~.ascall's suggestion that theological language eludea exact characterization because its aubject matt8r,

God

transcendent and beings related

to

Him, standa in sharp oontraat to eTery other concern of hwnan thought and

diacourse101 is not exempt.

The analysts• immediate reaction is the

question, "What do you mean?" Retreat to the ael-t -validatiag nature of
meauing in revelatory statewenta is uo answer.

The anal.ysta persist in

their demand !or t he "logic" of theological language, its rules of ideation.al syntax, its points of empirical contiguity.

Tiley are not content

99 Ibid., PP• 25-26.
100Hepburn, ~hriatianity and Paradox, P• 6• ~ee also Hepburn's
"From 'iiorld to God," Mind, LXXII (Januar1 196}) 1 4.}, where he links together the appeal to historical revelation and the coamolo~oal Mrgwaent.

101

Haaoall, P• 93.

99
with the answer, '''l'hua says the Lurd. 11 ll. J. Paton allows the possibilit7
that theological dic:tcourlfJe is a form of ''ideal" language.

He even inc:ludea

thtt poasibilitt of a cJelf-vulid£ttiDi5 °meaning" as proposed by the authoritative poaition.

But he doe3 not dismiss the analytic challenge, noting

that the ''ideitl character of a lan~uage depends

011

wluit it is to 88.7•"102

·t hu~ f1;1r we have conaidered one type of analytic challenge which, in
its reliance upon lo15ict:tl poaitivisw, demands the Vttl'ifiability or· .f'alsif'it.t.oility uf reli~ious discourae.

.~. have examined, in addition, three

facets o! the sucond type of challenge, which is mathodological in
character.

A fourth facet of the second major analytic challenge con-

corns argumenta for tho existence of God.

~nguiatic analysis has re-

stated an~ sharpened t he attack on traditional arguments for God's exis-

· tence.

103

Hapourn provides an excellent example of analytic reconsidera-

tion of ariSW!leDta for God• s exi:Jtence.

Ho

considers tne Tho1aiatic co3mo-

logical argument from the analytic perspective.

(l) The coamolo~ical.

argumant conclude3 that there ia one Being who owes exi~tence to Himaelt.
(2) Among the prttllliaes of the argwnent ia tho cl.aim that J!2 'being owes

its existence to itself.

At this point, saya Hepbunl, the Thomist inter-

rupts anJ reminds him that no linit• being oweo its exiatence to itself;

that doea uot rule out an iufinite being.

Hepburn continues with the

question, (3) How icJ the Thomiat to characterize this

11

in!inite being"?

klong other attributes, ·the theist must include that ot "owing exiateuc~

102Paton, P• 4J. Ninian dmart, in ~eaaon3 &nd £aiths: an Investi tion of Aeli ious Discourse Christian and Non-Christian London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 0.19 , P• 200, contends that proponents ot'extreme
revelationiam aro unthinkingly allied to those who would aadert ~bat
rel~gioua propo.sitiona are, because unveritiable,. meaniDgleas."
lQ';\_

-u:epburn, Christianity and Paradox, P• 4.
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to itsel:t." Hepburn concludes that the theist posits an idea which covertly contains the original puzzling idea.

This is tho intrinsic ditti-

culty in "halting the regroI:Js of causes."104

In short, Hepburn roaorts

to tha "idiosyncrasy platitude,'' the ''logic

ot each expre::Jsion," to dis-

allow the ·l 'homistic coa.~olo~cal argument.

·rho apologist• a ability to

aak if t hore is any one thing in the world without a prior cause is no
license to extrapolate the queation to tho univerao at large.
we con roject this aucl any similar version uf the Argument by refuaing to identify the nobula or atom or whatever it ia vith the
universe. I'o identify them is to forget • • • that thing-worchs
and words like •cosmos• and •universe' have crucially different
logics.105
John Findlay uses another v~rsion of thc:t ''idiosyncrasy 11 platitude in
questioning t he ontological argument ot Anaelru

if God id to aatisty reliilioua claims and needs, ne must be a
being in evury way inescapable, One 111hose existence and whose
possea3ion of certain excellences we cannot possibly conceive
away. And the views in ~iuestion really raake it selt-evidontly
abaurd (if t hey don't 1nake it ungrat!lruatical) to speak of such
a Beina and attribute existence to Him. It was indeed an 111
day for Anl:ielm ~,hon he hit upon hi3 famous proo!. for Oil that
<lily he not only laid bare somotbing that is ot the osserice ot

lo4Ibid., P•

166. In "From World to God,"~. LXXII (January

1963), 43, Hepburn tries to make his analysis of the cosmological

argument one not easily di3111issed by contemporary Cnriatian apologetics:
"I wa.nt, in fact, to aum~eat that tile Gosinological Arg\llllent-or some
transformation of it--is not juat one approach to apologetics among
others, ond to be diatinguisbed altogether !rom apologetics baaed oil
historical revelation. It is an indispeDSable part o! any Christian
apologetics whatever, illcluding those that centre on revelation. For,
aa we have seen, at some point appeal must be made away fro~ the finite
and historical locus ot revel.Mtion to the in!'inite and eterlllll God to
vhom those allegedly testify."
105nepburn, Christianity and Paradox, p-. 169. Italics are his.
Brian ilicker, in God and Modurn Philoao
(Glttn Hook, New Jersey&
Pauliat Pross, c.1·
, exaCli.nes the Thomistic cosmological arguments
anew in thu light o! liD&Uistic analy3ia. Be concludes that their
basic validity has not been at:teoted by the claims ot anal.Joie.
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an adequate religious object, but alao something that entails ita
necod.:Jary non-exiotence.1o6
In suri1mary, t he confrontation botweeri theology autl anulyais fall•
into two parts.

First, one segment of linguistic ar.aly313 betrays its

positivistic anceatry in chal lenging theology to provide the veritiability
or falsifiability of religious discourse.

Thie group ot analyst3 demanda

either the empirical contingency, or tha falsifiabilitl of religious statements.

1'he second 3I"oup dc:nands tho "logic'' ot roligioua discourse.

cont16urationa of the s econd type oi asaault were noted:

}"our

the intentional

refu:>al of philos ophical aualyaia to provide a ·nutritive metaphysics for
theology; the generat ion of a r~arful attitude on the part ot some theologians at t he l:luccessea ot therapeutic analyai:3; ~he argument that any
a ppeal to the Delf-vnlidating nature of the meaning ot revelatory atatementa vas unac~eptable; and the subjection :ot traditional arguments for
God'~ existence to new linguistic acrutiny.
In actuality tho confrontation includes more than t hes e two major
challengeo, which hEAve a negative air about them.

Analysia a:Jks theology

to i8olate and explicate the, logic of religious discourse.

is as much a probing inquirr as a disguised trap.

Tlle requeat

Viewed !rom this per-

spective, the query of analy~ia is no less an opportullity than a cball.eng9.
The analysts have vindicated the analytic approach to
is possible that the same approach

may

maL's languase. It

illwai.ne the theologian'~ taskd

l06John l~iemayer Findlay, "Can God's ~11:Stence be i.>ioproved {1948),"
I.annuage 1 Hind and ialue (New Xork: HW111.nities lJreas, c.196}), p.103. A
footnote adds at the end of this quotation, "Or •non-oigniticanoe', it
this alternative is preferred." Findla1'a article is an attempt to demonstrate that there 111 an ontological argumeut to disprove the existence of
God, namol,1 the wor6hipping attitude of man which do exalta the conceptio~
that there ie no room tor its apprehension. But see aluo supra, P• 42, n. 76.
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and problems if pursued.

Wol!hart Pannenberg uses "universal history" as

the hypothetical framework !or theological investigation, lhldolt Dultmann
existential historicity, und G. 1;rneat ;/right "Heil:Jgeschichte." The
challenge of linguistic analysis may ba an additional hypothesis for
working the mines of theological complexities. 107

For example, Robert C. Coburn, a philosopher from the Univer3ity of
Chicago, uaeo linguistic analysis to examine the naturo of theological
diacourse.
que3tions. 11

He frames hia discussion in terms of "religious limiting
'iJy a "limiting

que;1tion" he moans "an utterance or inscrip-

tion which has the gr&mmatical atructure of a queotion, but which doos
not do the job o! asking a straightforward queation of oithor a theoretical or practical sort. 11108 He define.a a "religious limiting question"
in terms of problems to which Christian theology' speaks:

"moral"

problefll8 (ordering ot ,values)1 problems of morale (the inabili.ty of

aelve~ to reconcile thomaelves to illa of tho fleab); and problema regard•
iog the "meaning" o! thingo (yearnings to see things as a whole, to find

an intelligible (Jattern in experience).

A typical religious limiting

question is, "What is the meanina ot li!e?',109 Coburn contends ·that

011•

of the primary !'unctions of theological language is to provide a logically

l07William liordern, in Speaking ot

God (Nev

York: Nacm:Ulan Compa~,

c.1964), p. 186, contends that two theologians, F.

l!. Cleobury and~. L.

Mascall, discover little theological value in a converuation with analytic
philosophy because they doubt tbat Christianity can stand on revelation
alone. liordern argues for a cordial and poaitive rel~tionship between
theology and analytic philosophy (pp. 185-200).

lo8Robert c. Coburn, "A Heglected U3e of Theological 1anl)uage," Mind,
LXXII (Jul7 1963), 371.

-

109

Ibid., 37J-374.
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complete answer to these questions.

H~ defines the logically complete

answer as
an answer the acceptance ot which by the pers on raiaing the que.stion
is logically incompatible with his continui~; to ask tho que..;tioni
that is to say, incompatibl@ in tho den~e that hia continuing to
ask tne que~tion in aome torm or other would normall1 be taken as
showing either he had not understood the anawer which haa previously betm provided, or he hnd not accepted it • • • • an anewer to a
question ia a lo~ically complete one provided it renders a~aubsequent utterance of the ~uestion it an5wera lo5ically odd. 0
A person's acceptance

or

the answer that "The vayo of the Almighty and

all-wise God are righteous, thou5h beyond understanding" is, for exae1ple,
logically incompatible with the same person•a asking the question, "But
why w~a & child crippled by polio?11111

Our purpoae is not to endorse Coburn•s interpretation of theological.
discourse, but to indicate that analytic philosophy is capable o! addres.ting a theological inquiry in a positive fashion.

Coburn demonstrates hov

analysio may provide n valuable hypothetical frame~ork tor the theologian's
task.
The two succeeding chapt~rs summarize some of the answers given the
analytic challenges.

Chapter IV deals with represe~tative Yiews which

describe the nature of religious discourse in terms of its verifiabilit1
or falsi!iability--the first major analytic challenge.

Chapter V examines

"logics" ot religioua discourse--addressing thu second CAajor analytic
challenge. 112

In both chapters, the analytic challenges open doors !or

llOibid., 315•
111lbid., 376. In the article Coburn also analyzes the explanatory
power ott'iirs function ot theological discourse.
l.l.2.ni1s i~qui17 does not imply that this tvo!old approach is the onl.7
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discussion.

lllanslmrd ,mticipata.s the apprehension a theologian might

foel in addr0~sing himself to analysis ~hen he says,
One of tho worat danger,1 in philosophical and theoloc;ical thinking,
as in political thinking, is prof'essional sGlf-juatif,.cation. That
a no\,t theory would find ua with our occupation gone is no argument
against it. A groat many occupations obviously ought to go • • • •
What the philosopher is called upon to do if his methods are queationud is not to fly incontinently to their defence, but to examine
as objectively as he can ~he propo~ls offered in their placa.ll}

possible way to approach the answers given the challeugea o! analysis.
~Joelfel (p. 50) dL,tinr,uiahes betwoon "metaphysical" and "non-metaphysical''
thinkers who have encountered linguistic analysia from tho Christian
perspective. His "non-metaphysical" men (Haro, Hiles, Hepburn, Braithwaite)
in part parallel our Chapter IV, while hia 1101etaphyeical'' section (especially \lhun 1aul!ley ie trumpeted) r.iay partially indicate what we have in
mind with the 11logic11. ot religious languo.ge. In addition, Jerry li. Gill,
in '.!The Heaning of :~eligioua La.nf~uage, '' Christianity i'ouay, IX (January
1965), 384-}39, reviews the work ot some of theae men as -chey addresa,
in varying rr.ethods, the following syllogism: 111. All cognitively meaningful langual)e ia aith<:r definitional or er:.1,irical in nature; 2. no religious languugc is either definitional or empirical in nature;}. no
religious language i s cognitively raeaningful langua~e." His article ia
short and lacks desired breadth, but tho syllogiam offers another way
to approach the answers given the analytic challenges.

113

lilanahard, 1~eneon and Analysis, P• 259.

CliAP1'£.R IV

V.ERIFIAI3ILITY-.l!"'A.WifIAJ3I1l'l'Y Ill :rtt~iUE.S OF &;LIGlOUS LANGUAGE:
AW;',~ii.:.itllm 'l'HE :~L<.i'f .ANALIL'IC CliAJ..1,.d;i~QE

Introduction
Chapter III s hows that tha tirst analytic challenge to theology be:-

trays a discernible positivi~tic parentage. This liraita di3cuaaion of
the "logic"

or

religious discourse to the realm ot -ehe •~rii'iability or

falsifiability ot religious language. 1 Chapter IV proposes to review
the works of representative 111en who have accepted tb4! challenge as given.
The writers addresd that analytic challenge which is structured in a poei•
tiviatic frame of reference.

Thereby they affirm both the validity of

the atuted que$tion and the re~trictive framework which is its setting.
F.ach reapondont acknowledges either the verifiability or talai!iability
of some aspect of religious language.
There are at le~st threo ch~racteristics of the first po~itiviaticanalytic challenge attirmed by the writers here NYiewed:

(l) the dis-

inclination to identify more than one "language game 11 in hWlllln languageJ
(2) the empiriaal ancuorage of all meaningful statements; (3) verifiabilityfalsifiability as the losical tool tor the apprehen~on ot meaning.

Not

all reapondunt~ equally endorde each characteristic by ~pplying it to religious di~course, but each endorsoa some ~spects ot at least two oharacteristica.

1

supra, PP• 86-93.

lo6
A olaritication ot the thre~ ch.araoteristica which are generall.J'
af!irllt8d proviJea au excel lent orientation to the 8\lmmariaa.

The disi-

inclination to identify roore than one "language game" in human lall;.."llage
(l) 1a a carry-over from stringent logical positivism.
diacuasad construe raligioua
utterances.

atat&iil&llta aa

The men here

differing little !roes other

A corollary ia t he argument that co~nition ot oorae sort is

an eaaential element ot religious thought and language.

Religious state•

menta are not considered to be "emotive" in the logioal-poaitivistic senae.
In reference to the empirical anchorage of all meaningful statements (2),

the majority of the men bracket linguiotic "logics" with the empirical
sphere; hence only one "logic" exists.

~uestions about God which are

ordinarily interpreted aa miounderatandinga of religious language ("Which
Person?,"

"\-Ibero is He?,"

considered irrelevant.

"What eveiita are you talking abo12t ? 11 ) are not

The empirical placement ot religious language

implies, in some of the casea, an empirical inveatigation o! the action
said to be implied in th5 uae ot religious statement~.

For othera ot

the men here discussed, an individual's religious oxporienoe provides
the contact between empirical base and resultant religious statement.

In reference to veritiabilit1-falsitiabilit7 as the logical tool uaed to
apprehend the moaning ot religious otatementa (3), 14ost ot the men asaua
that a proposition is aigniticant if there are observMtious--eveu theoNtical-releTant to its truth or falsity.

:"or some the

11

1188

priDoiplo"

oomes into play as a modification of the verification principle: the mean•
ingot a religious statement io restricted to an empirically verifiable-at least in principle--uso.

ConTersel.J, empirical confirmation also allova

tor tho admittance of contrary eYidence.

Others of the DMtn a.esert that
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talait1ab1lity ia the logical tool to be uaed in ~~tracting the meaning
o! a religious uttoranoe.

For tha~ a religioua aaaertion is moaningiu.l

only when one known what counts ag9.inst the posoibility ot its truthful-

nese.

Asserting "that" i9 a~so asserting "that not"-at least in prin-

ciplo.
The ch.apter begins with a position of reJJarkable affinity to the
mthodology of logical positivism.

In turn the chapter conaiders men

vho, wi~h inoreasiJ18l1 lesa zeal, demonstrate a positivistic bias in theirendeavor to di3sect and describe tho nature of religious language. 2

Four

polarizatioiw emerge in the study (moving from a greater to a leaser dependence on aoroe form _of verifiability):
perience,"

11

Veri:t'iability and Relioioua l:«-

''Verifiability and Religious Propositions, 11 "Falsifiabilit1

and Holigioua r ropositio11a," acd "Proleptic Verification and .Religious

2.

Chapters r.v and V of this study are structurally arr~nsed so aa to
demonstrate a rather complex phenomenon wrdch has co~e to light in ~eaearch.
The phonomenon is this: aa decreadingly less emphasis is laid on the
verifiable-falsifiable r.aturo of religious languaga (Chapter IV), there
ie a corresponding need to emphauize the esoteric-peroonal 11log1c" (or
"blik") vhich binds togt,ther the diacourae ot ruligion (Chapter V). Th\ls
it one views the works ot tho writers summarized iri the.s~ two cbaptei.~s
from the perspective of the !irot anal7t1c-pos1t1Tist1c challenge, the
two chapters together~ arranged in order or decrea5ibg acceptability.
On the other hand, if one Yi.ewa the ~orks of the writers here ew:ur.arizecl
in these two chapters !rom th& p11rspective of the aecond analytic ch.al.lenge, the request for the ''logic" or 11logics" o! religious language, the
two chapters together are arranged to proceed from a position ot least
acceptability (the first man in Chapter IV) to one ot greatest rapport
( Chapter V) •

The concept "blik" originated with .Richard Hare, vho uaed it in the
"University Discussions" reprinted in New . .u sin Philouo cal Theolo ,
edited b1 Auto~ a. 14. Flew and Alasdair ~.aclnt,r• tlew York: Maordllau
Compa~, 0.1955), PP• 99-102. In reply to Antoey flaw's parable ot the
gardener Mare used the term "blik" to denote the iveltansbauung which is the
Christian's (in contrast to tho nonbeliever's). t he ~~rm describes the
belief-complex which uuderlles and gi·Hs meaning to the C,'hriatian'a use
ot religious language. Among othor:s, Paul van .illirea a11d William Hordern
have used the term which Hare coined. In all probabiUt1 th• tera is a

Gercan loan-vord.
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Propositions." The chapter moves along a cur,e rather than along a straight
lino.

The chances are leao dramatic than subtle.

maries SpGak for th~maelveo.

In aey caoe, the sum-

The coucludiu5 ata.teu,ent of the chapter

d(.monstratoa the interdependence and t he intttrveaviS16 of tb.o diverse strauda.
Verifiability ancl Roligioua E.xperience
John B. ~Jiluon ancl David Cox are among the philoaopher-tlleologia11S who
address themselves seri ously to thu request for ver~fication in the sphwre

ot religious thought l;'l.,Jd lan(;uase. .Both demonstrate an affinity to the
logical-poaitivistic otrain in attributing a aigniticant role to reli&ioua

experience, an affinity not found among the rest of tho men conaidered 111
this chapter.

Ultimately it ia in the realm of religious experience that

each applies the criterion of veri! iability which he finda to be an
integral oloment in religioua language.
John il. ,,ileon

. John Boyd rlilson:; provides both a tboory of general languap and a

specific rationale for religious la~~age.

In his discus31on o! gen~ral

language he isolntes five types of stateme~ta.

Imperative and attitudill&l

statementa are not verifie.ble at all, or onl.¥ iD a trivial way.

Their uae

and meaniug are in the expreasion of a speaker's foollDgs or deairea, but

they are valueless in argument because their conc~rn is with expreaaion,

31111aon is an At'..glican, the son- ot an As;.slioan clergyman. .Ln 1956
he was assistant master at King' a J chool. Canterbuq, .,;116land, and aened
as second l!!&&ter until 1962. Be waa professor of religioua ~nowled~ at
the Univeraity of Trinity College, Toronto, 1962-63. Cu.rrectl.3 he loct1.1res in philosophy at tho University o! Sussex, Brighton, i::ngland.
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not truth.

4

An empiricul atatoment, tho ~econd type, provides information

about ~n'a experience ot the 11orld.

Analytic atato111ente are tautologoua.

Valno stateu,enta are proce~1 ses ot conu.'teudation; they uasign valuo.

'l'heir

meaning depondLJ on t.hu accepted method ot axiological v<>ri:tication.

For

a:x:amplo, a ''good" kni!e ia good if it fulfills the ·1ualities of sharpness,

veight, and othuro.

Hete.phyaical ate.tements &re t he fitth t.:,pe.

On theil"

ineuning and method of verification it is difficult to agree; perhaps there
tire none.

This admi :seion does r.ot clnasify meta phyaical .stateeient.a as

"1ne.1ninglei:l:s, J.' but :puto them in the tray labelod "waiting11 !or further
explication.

Since rnen do not know ~hat a ~eta.physical statement cieans

or how to verify it, ''we muGt reo:Jerve judgment about whethor it is true
or not. 115
·,'1ilaon liats threo requirernenta ot a true statement in ordinary lan-

guage:

(1) one mu:!t kno11 \that the atntement means1 (2) ou must know the

right way t~ ve~i!1 it; (3) one must hava good evidence !or bGlieving it.
In exaz:iining the que.1tion o! a ''true" stnter4"nt

1~ilson turns to the

Tori!icational approaoh o! ~cience tor guidance.

He contends that a

comcon method of verificat ion in science has provided meaning tor ita

·state~ont5.

He proposes

&

parallel approach to metaph.:,sical statements.

From an intensive investigation of "experiences" aoGJe exporieucea WJ.y
emerge "which we sy all have which we should want to de:,cribe by state11onta that aro now clasui!ied metaplqsical. •• The reaulting atatement

would not be ••metaphysical" (in the oeuse o! tbc preceding paragraph),

4John •lilson, r.a~uage and tho Purauit of Truth

Univeraity Press, 19.56, P• ,56.

5Ibid.,

PP•

58, 60, 65, 70-73•

(cambridgei

110
but ''er11pirical," although 1t would not be verified through ex1ierience ot

the senses. 6
In ~ later work, Philosophy and l,eligi,on, Wilson resumes his diacus::.ion

nature.

ot metapbyoical staterilents, particulurly thoae ot a re.l igicus
He brackets hia inveatigation with three questions:

:lhat ia

1

the psychologicnl connection between religious ballot aud a~,;sertion,
and the

religious \·m y of lif'e? What is oupposed, by religious people,

to be the logical aonnection between the two? What is, in !act, the
logical connection?7

In sum, : lilson 5,.;elts a method

or

"verification"

\·Illich <iemon.stri:.tes the lor;ical connection beti-,een reli~iouo assertions
und tn~ r e lisiouo ~-1?.y of life.

lie distinguishes f'our types or religioua

tts scrtiona , aach ·with its own "lo~ic":

(l) assertions or e:.1piric&l facti

(2) analytic a s sertions concerned with meaning or use of religious terms,
(J) assertions

or

value; (4) a:;sertiona which "look like a~.$Ortiona of

empirical fact, but whose subject-matter appears to bo some supernatural

entity or state of atfair3.

The author solects the fourth type

for inveotigation becau.1»e it ie most relevant tor sociologiot, logician,

and philo~opher.9
\Jilaon evaluates three attempta to de~onstrate the logical nature of
th13 toui·th type

aa inadequate.

ot religious aasertion, and SWilEB-rily dism.s.ses all

three

The tirat, represented by neo-Thold.ote, ro~a1·da religioU3

6~ . , PP• 7,
6 93, 9b•97•
~
7John ~ilaon, Ph1loao
and R~li
{London: C>xford UniTersity Preen,
8
~ . , P• 30.
9 Ibid. , P• 33.

of !teli ious Belief

lll

a.:.sortiono a.a :;xplam:.tions u£ the: worlcl' ~ ex~s tence..
t ypo a reten tion

~r

t l4e 41iscou.:;;trued hope that t !le .superna t ural inheres

iri r,n:.l a f fo ct,:j t he na tura l :,w rld.

and expl ic~ndum.
t l' lc

II

::ileon l abels t his

Undor the impact of r~odern oicionce, the

~ils on cont e~d3 t hat t hu relation i~ more ~ubtle than

expl ar.,,. .1... ory ' I hypothe.u, ..:J su5i,;C!lta. lQ

1'he linGt,i stic t ht,ory--the ~ecoud attampt--i,hich expl a ins theologi-

cul a ~J rcli~i ous a.5oc:.·tion::s a~ "self-just.if~ing'' iu no lc.3.a i 111pre\!iae

.:tnu ina.deq.1.a te for .lilson.

If this theory arguoa that a s aertions perf orm

a job oth-:l' than J esc1~ibing, it.l e.dhercnt.s cann1) & ;;:..>u->t l.~e rclig iouo a ,~s ertiono aa 6•. muine ly f actual in uny way.

Ueithor can .i.·eligious a s $erti oD.S

i11f'orm "iu the wa:y ll,El] which they ,,ust if thay .ire to .ll.l;Jtain tht! fabric
o! a nyt hing which

1to

3hall cal l a. reli~on. 11

The underlyin.1 structural

belie f of a r eli~ion implie3 u corrolation between state~~nts of belief

and the wo.L'ld outuide, "beti1oen tne set ol ~ymilols and t l1e thing
aymbolized."ll
~Jiloon i~ola.tes t ho theory o!

assertions as derived from authority"

11

as the third mi3COI13tru.cted clarification of roligioua a~ater:.11nts.
t neor;, io i1'complete.

rt

'.i'be

resembleo a mati:l .eIU1tical table iu that one quos-

tiona whether or net the logical ~me of religion, ag it turns out to be
under .;;iucb an "a11thority, " is ew;;iiricall111aeflll..

~he viow preoupposes

that it ia logica lly inappropriate to give lo8ical reaaona for religious
belief und asaertion.

::;specially this factor o! the theol"l, sa,ya ~ilaon,

lOlbia.., P• 45.

11 Ibid., P• 50.

Wilson incladea !<laclntyre o.nd :C'arrer in thi3 group.

112
ia de!icient. 12
Hia own explanation of religious assertions i..ilaon basea on the con•
tention that "a statement is inforllllltive in proportion to its vulnerabil•

ity." "There ia a ten-foot, atriped, male, lop-eared zebra in the middle
of tha next room," is moril infor.1iative-and more vulnerable-than the
ata.tec:ient "'r here is something in ·t he next room. ,;i., ~Uson set.a out to discover how tho empirical and the 1'1!ligiou¥ c&n make sense logicall1 when

one a.ssumea that an aesertion•.a in!on'iative character varies in proportion to its YUlnerability.

To avoid poisoning the well when h• retera

to "r@ligioua experience" during the investigation, Wilson agrees that

the phrase need not imply an experience of aomethiug exiatiug indepeud.ent•

ly ot tho observer.
tive

rttitl i·ty.

To use the phrase does not necessarily impl.7 objec-

14

The inforr~tive und vulnerable character of a religious aosertion
1epende upon ita cognitive nature.

In consequence·, '.lilaon scrutinizes

two aioconoeptions tnat underlie the denial o! "cognition" in religious
belle! '1nd assertions).

The denial aseume&J first "that then is a basic,

ontologic~l difference between what can be said to exist and what cannot,"

12

Ibid., P•

.58.

l3Ibid., P• 66. In "Religious Assertions," Hibbert Journal, LVI (1958),
148-149, ~ilsou co?11C1enta reg~rding his theory of religious l&Dg1,&&ge to
this effect:

"The poaition I wish to defend begins by aoceptiag the new

ot Professor Flew and cioat otcher·aaod•rn philoaophera regarding vhat can
properly be said to count aa a moani~iul assertion or atatement ot tact&
oanael,y, that such aaaertions ~ust ~ Yerifiable and talai!iabl• b1 experience, 1Jr that th~re must bo tests fiJX' assertiou to :pass. I thillk
that it th:1.a acceptance i,~ n,~t ade, rolig:io\ls apologists .......,, bouDd to
conve1 au .imnreaeiou ot continuous rotnat and evasion.••• .Ill m,
Yiev, theref~re, the Chri~tian apologist noed not be ~onoerawd to a.aseil
the Yiev that all assertions muat (logicallJ) be falsi!iabl•, since lllllQ'
of bis ow ~saertiona a.otually are ...

1 ~1#1laon, Philosopb;t and rleli.p.o,a, PP• 71•72•

ll.}
and second, "that only perceptions or ooruse-experienca con be oogn1t1Te
(only sense-data c&n really be data). 1115 Wilson u:ses the toolu o! a pragmatic idealist to dissect the first misconception.

lie asserts that no

basic dif'fe1·onoe exists between a.n "exiatential'1 atate1ne11t and an

·.,exper1ence-atatement" except that the latter inct.ioates the permanent
and saneral availability o! certain experiences, while the former is not
necessarily applicable to tho majority o! people, althougn it is no leas
reliable.

To ri1ove from an existential to an empirical statoment, "all

we need is a certain number o! people ~,1th a common and recurrent exporienoe, and some way o! dietinguishing genuine from illu3ive experience. •116
,,ilson' a attempt to de111onstrate tho absence of logical restriction

in rdligioua a~sertiona is his answer to the second misconception.

He

parallels religious and aesthetic assertions in ordor to blueprint a
testing-system for religious a~aertions. 17 _ One must iuclude within the
structural asaumptions underlyi~ the logical possibility of an evaluatiTe
system of religioua assertions:

(1) the assumption that under certain

15Ibid., P• 81.
16Ibid., P• 84.

17Ibid., p. 8?.

Although Wilson does not epecificalJ.: refer to poetry,
it should be noted that the relation between religio~s language and poet17
baa come under scrutiny. w• .1-"'raaer Mitchell, in "The ~age ot Religion," Readinss in Holigious I•hilosophY, edited b1 Geddes MacGregor and
J. 1~esle1 Eobb (Bo&ton: Houghton Mi!!lin ColilpanJ, 0.1962), PP• 392-398,
writes as a poet who sees the language of religion aa closolJ akiD to poetey. Ronald w. Hepburn, in "Poetry and Religious Belief'," Metapb,Ysical Bel!!!!, edited by Alasdair tfacintyre {.London: ..;c~f Presa, 1957), PP• 8.5-166,
prosants an intrigtting study. lie states (p. 86h "I am confident of two
thinga1 first, -t hat the theologian.!is appeal to poetry can perfectly properly clarit1 some aspects of hia use of lan3uage, if used with caution;
aeoond~, that without such caution the appeal to poetry can easil.J result
in a blurring of necessary dis~inotions and a smothering ot unanswered
questions."
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oollditiono certain people will always have certain experiences of a ki~d
that exiater.ti a.L as:3ortiona could be constructed to incorporate tllem;
(2) the a .ssumpcion that theoo experiences nro important enough to onsure
c•:mtint1ecl intero~t in t he process of testing. 18 Hilson furthar :sugges to

that t he oonatructiou ot a plan through which peoplu might enter rol13ioua
experience ie esaeutially the religious expert'a--not the p~looopher•a-task.

19

The situational uGe of worship may be helpful, but in all caoes

the possibility of !alai!icution mus t be retained, at least in principle.
The pro~am ~ust necea!Sarily proceed without bias.

i he progrjm is ea:Mtn-

tiall.Y a ''logical skeleton for t he establishment of !Bl kind of entity,"
so moot cart~inly it should a pply also in the caGe cf the relisious. 20

ln eum, ijilaon argues that basic religious aasertiona have u statue which
philosophy can recognize, and there is a .pr.oper method of testing their
validity in experience.

18

w11aon, Philoaophy and ueligion, PP• 90-91.

19
Although ho does not JOO.ke Jpeci!ic refer ence to ~he t7pe or roligious experience he:,re deaori bed by ~ilson, John \larwick Montgomery, 111
"fhe Theologian's Gr£.lft, '' J oncora.ia Theologj.cul Honthl.y, ;ucxvII Uebruary
1966), 6?-98, lit tempts to r..arallel t he theologian• a and the scientist's
cratt. In contradistinction to :ilson, he argue::, that Scripture r a ther
than roligious experience i:, tb" basis of . t he theolofSian•a craft. 13\lt
:-iontgom~ry•s arg-~mentatiou is muddled and poorly or~anized. I t demonatrates the basic difficulty of his theaia which, if carried through logicall.7, should include an appe~l to religious experieno~s does ~ilson•a.

20
\Jilsozi, Philoaop& and l<eligion, PP• 8?-94. 1,t this point rJilson•a
discussion cloyetailo with his earlier book's. In "Religious Asaertiona,"
Hibbert Journal, !.NI (19.58), 148-160, :<Jilaon disou.;ses in ~...ter cletail
the measurelilent ot experiences which contribute to the meaning ot religious ut torancea. The parallela between }Jilaon • :s proposu.la aad those of
H. H• .Frice in "Logical Positivism and Theology-,'' PhiloeopbY, X (July
1935), 313-331 (8upra, P• 46, n. 82) are of considerable intorost, Kai
Nielsen, in "'Christian Poeiti•i•' and the Appeal to ileligioua ~perience,"
Journal of Helifaion, XLII (1962), 248-261, ori~icizea wil~on'o general
orientation &3 a carry-over trom early logical positivism.
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Wilson admits that hie r,rogram of testing may in tact "tie down" a

word such a3 "God" to tested e::cporieZ1ce, but he al30 poaits o sphere ot
"oxpandibility."

By a nalytic definition, "God'' can be defined as ''The Al-

mighty Father," "Lord ot tho Universe." Then too, one can 6round the
word in exparicnces of other people past and preGent, and truat their

a~aertiona about God when they arc reliable.
to the future by otati?lg that

"God"

In addition, one can move

means 11ot leaot ao-e.nd-.5o11 f'rom tested

GXperience, but th.at the word is capable of representing much more if one
could have the "neceasar:, experience." The tying of wurds to experience,

as in the CEJ s e of 11God," doaa not eliminate the mysterious:
r t is 083et~tinl that we should know what we mean by l'God" at an1

one timEt, and this invol'f'8B basing the word firll'.ly on experience.

But thia tloea not involve the iroplica.t i~n that we kpow all about
God himuelf.21
After all, the believer is correct in claiming that an experience is a

sine qua no11 tor the full
gious assertions.
analytically

&B

llleaning" of th• term

11

"God,"

and ot other reli-

A philosopher or non-believer ia abb to define

the "Creator

0£

"God"

the Universe," but he ia not thereby

granted a !ull understanding ot the vord.

22

Up to this point Wilaon claims to have dealt with the milieu ot logical clarification.

He also discusses the milieu

which he dee1DB inevitable

a3

or

practical decision

a man chooses a particular roligion, denomi-

nation, or aect, and works it out aocording to the above logical clarifi-

cation (alwa7s open to disproof').

·,iilson c·l aima that an exa.::aiaa.tion of

the first milieu precedes and clarities the second, ~hile tho .tJeCond

21
Wilson, Philo.soph{ and Religion, PP• 100-101.
22

~ . , PP• 104-105.
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reinforces the first.

clarification.

There can be no practical d~cision without logical

Conversely, without practical decision no lo~ical clarifi-

cation ia more than academic.

'dilaon closoo tho chapter with a plea tor

decisive pructice. 23

'dilson auma up his theory of religiou.J language with the argument
that throui~h relii:;ious .Jxperienoe, and not by ragilrding religious assertions as explanations, sol!-juatificntiona, or authorization:J, ono can
"rationally enter the raalm 0£ religious bolief. '' lie pu.t3 his caae succinctl7:
The exi!3tence of such exporienoe and tha tuct that it can (loc:P,cally)
be organized in such a way us to give aense and truth to religious
asaertiona is, so to speak,
ticket or paas-,.,,ord by whose virtue
.Hea.&on purraita us t.o en~er.2

ahe

David Cox

In 19.50 David Cox25 augge~ted an overhaul ot Christian doctrine accord-

ing -to the criterion ot logical positivism, the Teriticat.ion principle.
His intention was tho restatement of ~hri$ti~n dootrino to show its relation to human exper-..i.ence.

It the task ot reatate1;:ent is accompliahed, Cox

asserted that thcologiana are left not with a bod: ot doctrino consistiag

23Ibid., PP• 107-ll?. In Thinking with Concepts (Cambridgez University Pres~, c.1963), Wilson deBonatrates tne same pructical concern by
connecting the practice of philosophical anal.1a1s to daily problems. ·
24w11son, Fhiloaopb.J' and ~eligion, P• 108.

25Cox was ordained an Anglican priest in 1949, and was curate ot
';taraop 1948-51. He nae be'ln Ticar ot All Jaints Chatham ir. the diooese
ot aocneater since 1956. His books include ~u~ and 3t. Paul (1959),
God and the .3elt (19oO), liiatory and M:(th (1961, and ~hat Christian

Believe

(1963).
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ot "staternonts of f61.ct," but ~1th a number of "empirical h,pothesea. 1126
'.L'he resulting "ornpirical bypothesea," Cox claimed, would accomciodate the
verification principb.

As a i:subetitute f,:,r the at1sertion "God exists,"

Cox euggeated "Zome men and women have had, and all may have, experiences
called 'meeting God.•1127
Verifiability and Roligioua Propositions
Ben F. Kirnpe 1, Ji.chard Jl. i3rai thwai ta, Paul van ,1uren and Paul F.

Schmidt ara no le.::.u concerned with the verifiability of religiou3 atateLOents tu.an ~·1 ilaon anJ Cox, but in general they apply verifiability e1ore

directly at t he lev~l of religious propositions than at the level of religious experionce.

All four propoae that religious assertions are empiri-

cally verifiable, at leu.st in principle.

ot verifiability.

They differ in their definitions

Ben 1r. Kimpel .straightforwardly asserts the testabilitJ

of synthetic propositiona, including religioua propoaitiono.

Richard B.

Braithwaite afl'irms hid accord with the "spirit ot empiricism'' b:, omphaaiz1ng the empirical testing ot one's intentiona stated in religious propositions.

Paul van Buren alters the verification principle .to the "use

principle,'' and contends that theological statements have u• and meaning
in their expression or an historical perspective (expressed in empirioally-

anohored words) which poaaesa empirical conae~uences.
in turn, are open to empirical investigation.

These consequences,

Pal.ll F• .3chmidt :find.a the

26~avid Cox, 111.rhe Significance of Christianity,'' ReadiPfB in Reli-

gious Philosopb,y, editod by Geddes MacGregor and J. w. Robb Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, c.1962), P• }.58. The article fir.st appeared
in fil:!!!!, LIX (19.50), 209-218.

27Ibid., P•

362.
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uae ot religious l&nguage to lie in the attitudea it producoa, attitudea
which appear to participate in a nuturaliatic syotem.

In general, this

group of four is one atup removed from herd-oore verifiability.

The

evidence for this lies in tho tact that they deal with religious language
rather than religious experience.

neverthGle3~, in addre3sing the first

poaitivistic-analytic challenge, the men affirm and endorse tho basio
positivistic proauppcsitions which underlie the challenge.
Ben ~·. Kimpel

Ben 11' . Ki111pel

28 criticizoa the notion that religious truth is para-

doxical, and defanda the factual interpretation of taith-state~ents.

lie

accepts tho diviaion of all atate~ents (including t noological) into synthotio and analytic, and suggests that "interpretationis affirmed in reli-

gious faith are synthetic propositions." A taith-statemeiit "attirms

an interpretation of a reality believed to be other than language itself • • . • • ,..29

Beca.uoe he aasumes tho "realities" ot csynthetio state-

ments to be "otiutr than language itself," Kimpel supports tha teBtabili ty
of synth@tic propositiona, includifltl aynthetic theological statements. 30
Kimpel criticizes the notion that religious truth 13 paradoxical in
hie a~sumption that 3tatement and tact correlate.

He di~cusses at aome

length the principle of non-contradiction as it relates to the problem

2 8Ben (Jamil!) F. Kimpel io professor ot philosoplq at I>rev University,

Madi:Jon, New Jersey.

29.Ben F. Kirapel, iansuae and Religion (Hew York: Philosophical
c.1957), P• 75.

l.ibrary,
30

.!!!!a•,

P• 88.
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ot paradox.

Aristotle correctly demon~trated thb principle to be a neces-

sary condition J.'ur (a) thu t,Xiatenoe of realities independent of thought,
(b) thinking about realitiea, and (c) tnQk.ing a!fira-.ations about realities.
Kimpel conclude:J that religious utut e:aonts intentionally paradoxical in
form are not intelligible. "!'his ia the oaso not only because a property
cannot

be

both affirmed and denied a reality under the same aet of condi-

tions, as ~he modern analysts argue in positiD& non-contradiction

n3

a

logical elective freely r.oade in language; it is also true because paradoxical properties cannot adhere to a reolity under the aa:ne set

or

con-

ditions, as Ariototle arguod.3l
Holding a factual inturpret~tion ot faith-statements, Kimpel argues
that a dif.fere11ce in the m~aning of t heolotSie&l affirmatiollS doea uot imply different denoted realitba.

.r,or example, a refecence to "the .1..0rd,

the first, 11 ie u reto.r ence to the

&\t::ie

reality aa ''the Lord, who i'llilde

heaven and earth •• ,32

.Richard B. Braithwaite
.Etichard

:a. Braithwaite33 eete out to determine, in empirical torma,

what is the S!!. ot religiow, statements in a man's ralisious expression.
He summarily dismis3ea the theory that theological. propositions are scientific explanations of facto in the empirical world.

This ~potheais he

Kimpel notwithatandiDih l'.:rwin L. Lueker, in
Oonserntive and Liberal," Concordia 1'heolog1oal Month!:., XXXV (July-August 1964), 403-406, ott~r3 an excellent examplo oi the
proper uae ot par.ldox.
3libid., PP• 113-133.

"Jesus Christ:

32Kimpel, P• 68.
33Braithwaite has been KD.1ght11bridge Professor ot Moral l>hiloao~ in
the Uni.Teraity o! Cambri.18e ainoe 1953.
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analyzes as non-falsifiable, and concludes that "a hypotheai .l which ia
consiatent with evory poaaible empirical fact is n<it an empirical one • .,34

In analytic style, i3raithwaite determines to employ the "use principle"
a 3

a modified form of the verification principle, t hereby retaining veri-

tic ... tion b:, use:
..>inco I wiah to continue to employ varii'ication in the restricted
senae of ascertaiuing truth-value, I >hall take t he principle ot
iooauine in this new forlll in which th~ word "veritication 11 baa disappearod. But iu romovins this term !rolll tho a~te,11ent cf the principle, there i.:l no desertion from the spirit of empiricism. ·rhe old•
er vorification principle ia aub6umad under t he now uae principle:
the use of an empirical statement derives from th~ tact that the
statement is empirically verifiable, and tho lob"ica.1-positiviat thesi:3 of tho "linguistic" ciiaracter of logical and mathet:1atical atatemonta can be e qually well, it not better, QXpreaood in terms of their
use than of their rnethocl -of verification. !<foreover the only way ot
discovering how a atate~ent is u59d ie by an empirical enquiry; a
state::, ent need not itself be empirically verifiable, but that it is
used in a purticular ~ay is always a straightforwardly empirical
propo3ition.35
Since he will argue that religious assertions are~ as moral assertions, Braithwaite initially chooaes to diaouss moral ass ertions.
of a !lloral assertion ia to expreali the attitude of the aaserte,r.

':"~he u.:se

"It is

not used to assert the proposition that h@ h.aG tha attitude--a verifiable
paychological proposition1 it is used to show !orth or evince his attitude."
When a ll18.r. asserts that rthe ought to do so-and-so, " be i s in fact asserting that he "reaolvea, to the ba3 t o! his ability, to do ao-and-ao."

He

34Rfichar~ sG,variJ Braithwaite, "An ilipiriois t•s View ot the I,ature
of l{eliglous Belief," The l!«istence ot God, odited by John Hick (NQw York:
Macmillan Comp&~, 0.1964), p. 232. ~he article (pp. 229-252) is a full
reprint ot Braithwaite•s book of the ea.me title, originally delivered aa
the &idington Lecture on November 22, 1955, and published in 19.55 b~ the
Cambridge University Preas. The book (or lecture} itBelt is not readi~
available.
35 Ib1d., PP• 23.5-2)6.
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does an action aimpl1 because he intends to do it, it possible.36

In

sharp distinction to thoao who otter an "emotive'' theory o! ethics
Br-ctithwaite proposos a "conative 11 theory:

The form of · e.t hics without propositions which I ,;U1B.ll adopt is
therefore a conative rather than an emotive thoory: it r~~kes
the primary use ot' a mora '. assertion that ot expreasing the intention of tho aaQ~rter to act in a particular 3ort of way specified
in the assortion.~1
Braithwaite asoerte that t he prir4ary use of rdligious assertions is
to announce allegiance to a set of moral principles.38 ~he typical mean-

ing of the body of :.;hrintian ausertions ia to proclaim th~ in t ention to
follow the ''Qeapeistic way of life":
The viow which l put forward for your consideration is that the
intention of a Christian to follow a Christic111 way of lite id not
only the criterion tor the sincerity oi his belief in tba assertions
or Christianity; it is the criterion of the meaningfulness of his
aDaertiona. Juat as the meaning of a moral assertion ia given by
its u~e in expres sing tho aaserter•s intention to act, • • • so the
manning of a raligious a3aertion is ~iven OJ its use in expressing
the aaserter•a intention to follow a speoitied policy ot behavior•• • •
it ia tho iuteution to bobavo which conatitutes what i~ known as
reli6ioua conviction.39
Hraithvaittt contends that the unification ot convictional and intentional
statements ia assured because any alternat ive produces a destructive

36rbid., pp. 236-2}6. It

is interesting to note the parallels between Braithwaite and '?. l<. Miles 'in ite.Ligion a1.td t h'- Jcientitic Outlook
(London: Allen and Un"Win, c.1959). i3otb rsl;y on the "use principle'' and
begin their discussion ot religious assertions ~ith an examination of
the place o! moral a aHrtiono. :C"'or t•ti.les work, see ~ · PP• 203-212.

37Braithwa1te, P• 237.

38~ . ,

P• 2)9. As early as 1935, H. H. l'rice described an "attitudinarian" theory ot r ~ligious atatem~uts that somewhat preiigured
Braithvaite•s theor;r. Price offered his suggestion in ''Logical ro~itivism and Theology," ?hilosoph,Y, X (July 19.55), 313-_;31. Jee al3o supra,

P• 46, n. 82.
39.Braithwaite, P• 239.
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situation.

If religious assertions are severed from ~oral principles, the:

asserter is aure to ba quu.:Jtioned 1:tbout tho connection between a~:Jortion
and Chri.1tian practice.

11

Unlesa religious principle3 are :noral principle••

it mak.eti no sense to s peak ot puttic.g them into practice. 1140
i3rait-hwaite takf::ls ;::,ains to demoll8trate that his account ot tha lo$ic
acd meanin~ of religious state,nenta fully accords with the "spirit of

empiricism."

lie contonds that whether or not a man hau the intention to

puraue a particular behavioral policy "can be empirica~ tee.tad, both

by obsarvin8 what he does and oy hearing what he replies when he is ques.
t l.onad
about his intentions." 41
Although f$raithwaite construes religiouu assertions as moral assertions, he ca ref ul ly distinguishes the two.

Firs t, a specified behavior

policy i~ not completely and fally indicated by ao,y one religious assertion in isolation; t his prooeduro roay occur in a. r.., oral aaoartion.

:.iecond,

the conduct advocated oy raligion conc~rna not only external, but aloo
internal behavior.

It conoerne action not only ot the will, but not the

boart. 1142
3raithwaite hits on aatorieo'' as tile variable a nd influential back-

drop wlli.ch differentiates one ~orld-religion's aJsartions fron another's.

4o

-

Ibid., PP• 24o-24l.

41

Ibid., P• 2}7. Zric Lionel Mascall, in ~fordo and Images (New Yorkz
~onald ~ s Company, 0.1957), P• .50, chargea Braithwaite with fimbiguit;y in his use or the word "empirical": first Braithwaite invokes Locke,
Hume, 1,ill, and i'iusseU to du:lcribe t !'ie po::.ition that all ai~uificant factual assertions ooucern sensibly experienceablo objects; but then he uses
the word 11empirical 11 to des cribe th,a pos ition that ull aigni!ica11t factual
aa~ertiOD$ must be ~uch that it is poasible to bitve a aenaible experience
o! the -..a.yin which sorneona u~.-s t hem.

42

Jlrnithwaite• PP• 2~2-243.
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the intentions to pursue the bohavior policies,. which may be the
flllme for different raligiona, are aaaociated with thinking or dif•
terent stories • • • • By a atory I shall mean here a proposition
or set of propositions which ar~ straightforwardly empirical propoai•
tions capable ot empirical teet and which are thought of by the
religious Ulan in connection with bis reaolution to follow the way
ot lite advocated by his religion.It}

The ato17 "is a set of empirical propositions." Thia perad.ta tbe !,!!!!l•

!!!5 of the etory's language to

'oe apprehended "by the standard method of

understanding how the story-statements can be Teritied."

It is possible

for empirical atory-st~teroents to vary from Christian to Chriatiau, but
through it all• "the interpretations will all be in terms o! empirical
propositions. 1i44 Braithwaite tind.s the importance of stories not in
their "truth," but in their '~meaning":
For it is not neceaaary, on my view, tor the aaaerter of a r~ligioua
asaertion to believe in the truth ot tho sto17 involTed in the assertions: what ia noQes&ary i.s tAat the stcr,r sh"uld bo ontertained in
thought, 1.e. that the atate;aent of tho ator,r should be understood
aa haTing a meanin0 • I have aacund tlu.s bY requiring that the stor,
4
should consist ot empirical propositions.:,

43Ibid., P• 244.
44Ibid., p. 245. Hascall (pp. 55-62) criticizes Braithwaite !or refusing to aee that tbe 113torieo" ot Christianity are ot differing Tarietiea,
not all similarly ali18na.bl@ to his division of interpretation. lie suggest•
that Braithwaite otters no reason for choosing Christianity over, tor example, Buddhism. Braithwaite refuses to admit tho relevance ot so..
Christian stories even thougb the1 haTe empirical tacets (as in the caae
ot the birth ot Christ). Mascall concludes that if one starta where
llraithvaite chooses to begin, he is lik•lJ to end where he ends.

45Braithwa1te, P• 246. Paul van Buren, in The Jeoul.ar Meaning of th•
Gospel Cllew York: Macmillan CompanJ, c.196}), P• 145, ol.ai.P that
Braithwaite is inada:-iuate iu his explanation because he haa tailed to
do Justice to the historical aapeot of the Gospel, and had completel.1'
negleoted the peculiarit.)' ot the "aster EYeut." ~e intra, PP• 129131.
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Paul van Buren

46 endorses linguistic analysis as tho most suitable

Paul van Buren

approach to the problem which Bonhoetfer and l3ultm&nn addressed on the
continent.

Two consideratior.a, the fact that empiriciam ia traditioJJal.

and that industrialism and technology are a way ot lite, recommend to
him the analytic over the exi3tentialist approach in the ~ngliah-speaking
theological worlcl. 47 Hore explicitly, "The problem of the Goepel in a
secular age ia a problem of the logic of its apparently meanincless lan-

.

48

auage, and linguistic analysis will give ua help in clarifying it.''

Van Buren i,!jolates a 111odifled 'feritication principlta, the "use
principle," ae the heart ot lingui:;Jtic analysia:
If a statement bas a tunc·t ion, so that it my iu principle be
verified or falaitied, th~ statement i~ ~eaningful, and tUlless
or until a theological statement can be submitted in aome wa7 to
verittcation, it cannot be said to haYe a meQJliag in our lallg\lagegame. '+9

This approach neceaaitatoa a thorough examination ot the context ot
faith's language becaQse function and precise meaning will vo.ry with the
context. 50 Van Buren•a ~odifioation of the Toritication principle ..eka
to !ind "what sort of things would count !or an assertion and. wbat sort

46:rn 1963 van Suren taught at the ~pisoopal Theological Seminary
of the douthwest in AWJtin, Texas. Currently he teaches in tho department of religion, ~emple UQi'fersity, Philadelphia, Pa.

'+7Paul ftD Buren, ?he 3eolllar H-.ard of the Gos·
Analysis o! Its Langu,a.e Httw Iork: Macmillan Comp•Jl1',

16-17.

48

-

Ibid. 1 P• 84.

49loid., PP• lo4-105•
.50Ibid., P• 10.5.
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of things woul d count a guinst it. 1151 The modified principle contributes
to a re-evaluation of t heological statements.

It indicates that theologi•

cal statements, meaningless when interpreted as straightforward ausertions
about the world, have use and meaning in their expreaaion ot a historical
per:;;pective.

The historical perspective gives rise to far-reaching empir-

ical consequences in a rnr·m's life because the stating of the perspective
is tho declaration of an intention to live a certain lite.52

In sum,

the verification principle limits the nature of cosmological assertions
in tho aphere of religious dis cour66.

Conversely, questions a bout "God"

are answered only insofar as they are addressed to the history of the
Nazar~rno. 53
Van Buren admits his debt to the analytic traditions of rlamaey, flare
and Braithwaite.

analyaia

l1a3

He contends that theological employment of linguistic

centered primarily on eighteenth century theological prob-

lems, with a concurrent failure to apply analytic methodology to problems
of contemporary theology concerned with the kerygma and biblical studies.
Van Buren comraends Ian Rarttaey for his application of analysis to biblical

theology, and admita his reliance of Ramsey's di::.cussion of the "odd"

51

Ibid., P• 15.

52 Ibid., P• 199.
53Ibid., p. 148. Langdon B. Gilkey, in "A New Linguistic Madness,"
New Theoiogy ~o. 2, edited by ~.artin Marty and Dean G. Peerman (New York:
Macmillan Company, c.1965), PP• 39-49, summarizes and reviews van Buren's
work. He concludes that van Duren grossly distorts his material in apply·
ing analysis. Gilkey's article first appeared in Journal ot Religion, ~LIV
(July 1964), 238-243. Similarly, Hugo Meynell, in "Gospel Without God,"
Theology, I.XV.III (August 1965), 361-366, criticizes van Buren both theologically and philooophica.l ly. Eric Lionell Mascall, in 'l'he ..;eoul.ariaation of
Christianity (London: Darton, Longman, and ·.rodd, c.1965), PP• 46-105, gins
both a summary ar:).d a critique of van Buren's work trora the Anglo-Co.tholic
perspootive.
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logical behavior of certain ~orda.54

In addition, van 3uren notes three

agree1:ients with H. M. aare and .R. B. nraithwaite.

'.L'he first ia that

s111ple

11

literal thei::Jtr.11 is \'iron[$, and "qua lified literal theism'' 1Maningleas.

Literal t heism 13 :nythological, homele3a in the Glociern world, und discredit~d by modern 3Cience.55 ! he ~acond oon3ensus is that the ''language
of faith ho.a mea oing • • • it haa a !unction whioh may be clarified by
liuga i::stic analys is."

The actua l function ,::it ,1ords provideo the k ey to

undor8ta~ding faith's language.56 Third, even though a strai3ht!orward
use of tha word "God" is to be abandoned, "the language o! :t'aith has

moaning \-ihen it 1~ ta.ken 'to refur to the Christian way of lite • • • •"
'"l'he lo.:t" is thus

o.

central element of van Buren•s liugl.litStic inte.rpreta-

tion. 57
Van Buren choosea a non-cognitive, "blik" conception ol faith as

methodologicall1 tundarnental.58

54van

Logically, to find "me~ning in hiator7"

Buren, pp. 88, 104-105.
of "l"; ••• infra, pp. rn5-186.

!a.u11:.cy diGcusaea e.speciallt the oddneaa

PP• 99•100.
PP• 100-101.

57Ibid., P• 101.
58Ib1d., P• 97. At thia point a reader might question the methodology
of thia atudy and ask: Ia it proper to include van Duren ill Chapter IV
rct-eher than Chapter V, eopooiall)' ia view of hits espou&al of the 11 blik11 ?
In &ddition, bow does hia emphaai3 on the non-oognitive oharacter ot tai~b
(pp. 98-99) fit into the etruoture of Chapter IV? Th• present author haa
included van Suren in Chapter IV of this study for throe reasons: (l)
van l:3uren emphasizes the 11uso principle" llS the analytic equivalent ot
the verification principl_, and endorses it~• dUCh (pp. 104-105, paasill)1
(2) he states that the function ot theological language is the articulation
ot an historical perspective vith far-reaching empirical oousequencea
(p. 132), oonsequeucea which one would auppose to be empirically Yeritiable
or testable (even as all .etate=::euts r.nast ''be submitted in sollft way to Yerification, 11 p. 105), althol.l~h Tan Buren doos not d.ra'ti this concluaiozi as
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is to have a "blik. '' To have a "blilc" is to intend to behave in a certaill
w_a.1 in connection vitb tho "entertainment'' ot specified backdrop stories.
"Meaning" iu this contex:: signifies commitment, u clf}cieion which occura
in relation to a situation of discernmeut.59 Van Buren s~locts a noncogni.tive, "blik11 conc~ption of faith becau30 he diatruats a cognitive
conception built one. "natural uense of the: divine." ':'he cognitive conception of i"uith itJ rr.erely a wilderneua road in that it ieolutes a distinct seg;neut of experience

£113

"religious" and leada inevitably to a

defensive pooture. 60

\lith thase ground rules, van Buren prepares to analyze the Gospel •a
lunl)'Ua 0a.

i'hat is, hu endeavors to aacertein the !unction of theological

lan~uage.

lt to have a "b11k" is to have an intontion to behave in a

certain wo.y in connection with the ''entortaincient'' oi s pecific backdrop
storie:.. 1 an acaly:Jis of tho t,oapel I s langus.ge begina \lith the:, ntory ot
the tiazare~o:

\./hen tho langua3e ot the (]oapel is analyzed so as to reveal ita
logical meaning or function, the history ot Jeaua ot Nazareth proYea
to be indispensabl~ to it; it this histor1 ia pushed into the background, faith r:ay be a perspective, but it is either not g1storical
at all, or it iu arounded in soiae other piece ot hi~tory.

doea his ~entor, R. B. Braithwaite; (J) van .t3uren emphasizes atrongl.7 the
need to restrict "God"-1.anguage to man-language (p. 103), thereby ruling
out, to all appearances, any consideration o! the transoendent (or the
:a,yaterious) which is found almost without exception &llODg the ,~n considered
in Chapter v.

59illg_., PP• ll}-11'+• At this point van Buren• u debt to ffare, 3raithwaite,
and i<amsey b~co~es eepeoially evident.

60

Ibid. t PP• 98-99•

61~ . , P• 196. Van Bl.lren appears to attack !31.lltmann•s perspective
ot historicity at tllia point.
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It ie imposuible to opeak ot a "'sheer cliscerrament," for aonveraion to the
t,'hrist1an historical perspective " depends in part upon some acquaintance
with tho history of Jeaus. 1162 But van Duren giveH a itarning to avoid the
pitfall ot supernatur~l language:
With the parti cular empirical attitudes which are reflected in the
we have chosen to uae tho word ''history, '1 we can only apeak
histgsiaally of Je~us by using words with whic~w. speak of other
men.

WIA.1

Van Buren empbasizea t he "troadom0 ot Jesue of Nazareth as a cbaracteriatic which does .not break these strictures.

Jeou::1 vas "free" because

"He trusted in the Ood ot love." Thia atateraent 1a best related to stateenta such as "He loved men," and. ''He wt.a lllilliDJ to die."

The phrase

''appears to have • cash value• in the realm of human conduct. 11

In the

sense tbat "freedom" tor the Christi.an means that the Christian "trusted
in God, 11 or ''loved men'' and was ''willing to die,"

Tall

Buren concludes

that freedom is not the "consequence ot faith," but rather the "logical
meaning" of taith. 64

In another place van Buron showa how words used

about Jesus were essential~ words uaed ot other ..n.

The emplvssia ot

olaasioal Christology on the human ••uture" lies coatextuall.7 a the
sphere of "language appropriate to thQ histo17 of a tree man."65

In

aulllling up hi.a diac11a1.Jion of Jeaua ot Nazareth, the author argues that

62Ibid., P• 144.
63Ib1d., P• 124. Compare Harvey Cox, 'l'b.e Jecular Citz (New Yorks
Macmillan Company, c.1965), P• 255: "We apoak of God politioal.17 vhell•
eYer we gi-.e occasion to our n.e ighbors to become the respouible, adult
agent." Cox qu.otea Gerhard ~baling to th1B effect (p. 255): "worldl.7
talk ot God is godly talk ot the woi"ld. 11

6lt

ftD

Buren, PP• 12}-124.

65Ibid., P• 168.

-

the Chriatian fa i th was not and is not the dir~ct result ot seeing Joaua
aa a. h1dtor1cal figure.

i! baaed

The Geeming contradiction ia due to t htt intervening "aster

on history.
event."

On the other band, the Chriatian faith

"E'aith io not baaod simply on a picture of the historical Jeoua,

but the hiljtorioal Jesus is indisponsable for faith. 1166
Van Buren previously stated that the functions 01' theological statements include discernment, duty, and comudtment.

These !unctions should

not be mixed with atutementiS which purport to give "!actual" intormation;67 tho distinction is eapecially important in discuasing the "Baster
event•"

Peter's ata tement ree&rding tho Hisen One, "~le appeared to me,"

is a record of tha aftnaation ot appearance which s11ggeots the "objective"
character ot the image.

thia or siaailar statements ot aell!ie-content can-

not be verified by common-aense or empirical methods.

"Only 'I' can re-

cord what was •on the mirror of lll1' mind.'" The s tatement ot sense-oonteut
is verified by ascertaining whether the worda and actions ot the a~uerter

contorm to it:

"The teat is one o! consistency. 1168 :rom the senae-

content statement, a second assertion might conceivably follow:
ie risen. 0

"Jeaue

It through empirical verifioation the aecond assertion is

de110natrated !aloe, the di!ticulty lies not in the sense-content statement (the impression is atill real), but in drawing a conoluaion which
appeara empirioall1 verifiable.

66

1!!!2.•,

PP• 12.5-126.

. 67Ibid., P• 105.
68
P• 129.

~-.
69
-

Ibid., P• 130.

The improasion is not invalidated.

69

1.:,0
Actually, the diacipleB' use ot the stntoment "Jesus is risen" ruled
out any notion of empirical verification.

:then tho disciples asserted

1

"Jesus is risen," they atatod an exceedingly odd linguistic assertion:

The word "Jeeua" is a proper name, and we may assume that it tunctiona
ae any other proper name would !unction. 1ogicall7, it would be iaproper to use the word "is'' ot anyone who had died. • • • '?he word
"riaelJ" wa0 at home in the context ot such phrases as ''Kingdom of
God" ar.d "a now heaven and a new earth, '' which were used to point
to tho end and goal ot all existence. The assertion ''Jesus ia risen"
takea the t@me of a historical 111&11 and aa1s that he va:s ot the real.la

or

"tho end. ,,70

Van Bunn furthP.r contendu that words which point to the "end and goal ot
all exitStence 11 find their moaning in their use.

Their uae ia "to 1Dtor11

the hoarer of, or to oo,umend to him, a certain attitude of the speaker."
The attitude expressed is verifiable through an investigation ot the one
who spoke.71

In aum, the atater:.ent 11Jesus ia riaen" does not signify a

change troci t he aense-content statement, "He appeared to me," to an
empirical a ssertion.

"It ie a movement to an •end-word' statement, which

is voritiod by the conduct of the

llllll1

vho uses

it."72 In con~quence,

nn !3uren refuses to uee the word "'fact" for tile &uster event:

Aa hiatoriana, and ind6ed aa proper users of the i nglish language,
we would prefer not to speak ot the ~ster event as a 'fact• at
all, not in thG ordinary yse of the word • • • • All we can say is
that something happened.7~
Vau Buren interprets the function ot theological language to be the
artica.ilation of au h11Jtorical perspective, or conversely, the cleclaration

~Ibid., PP• 130-l}l.
71
~ . , P• 131.
72
Ibid., PP• 131-132.
?}Ibid., P• 128.
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of the intention to live a certain life. '£ his functional theor.Y manifeata
itself both in hia discuasion of the historical Joau.s a~d in his consideration of the 11.E:aator event. 11 A third area ia tl.J.e language or the k.erygma.
If the

11

~ster faith wa~ a 1,ow perspective upon life ariaing out

ot a

situation of discernment focuaed on th& history of Jel3u.s, 11?4 witnelia to
the new per~pective rnight well manifest a similar logi~l analyuis ot
language.

Van Buren equates a discuu~ion of the ker,gma with a cozwidera-

tion ot today's problematic underatar.ding of the Goepel. The problem ot
underatar,ding the Gospol ia the difficulty in findinfS v.ey meaningful va7

to speak of God:

-

nthe problem now is that the word

has only man's language:

1

God • is dead. 1175 ti.au

It uo family reuerAblancea -.1ere allowed bet'-'een the language ot thu
Gospel and t ha w11.1 in which wo upeak of biting loved by another human
being, we should ~veto abandon all hope of understanding what
the Uospel meaua.7

Contomporary a?JB.lyseo ot theological langllage have translated "<lodstatements" to "man-atate10enta11 1 this is no great loaa.
in a multitude of language-ganwa.

ti.an 1a involved

".;jtater3ente about h\lman existence" are

not on the same level throughout.

74Ibid., P• 132.
15Ibid., PP• 102-103. ~'ti.chard R. Caenuaerer, in 11Current Contributiou
to Cbri~n Preaching," Coc.oordia Theological r~ontb),,i, XXXVII (January

1966), 38-4'1, wreatleo indireoti, with the problem as he applies the ill•
oights of analysis to the task of preaching. In "Christian Education~
Mortem l.>ei," Religious ;:;ducation, ~X (Januar,-r'ebruaey 1965), 4-10, van
.Buren wir-avttl8 'the rami!icatiou of hia tbeais tor Christian education.
Ian uaaasey, Gordon Kaufman, David li\lllter, Frederick F.ir~, and Bernard Cooke
re'Yi.ew the article in turn. They agree that the article is provocatiTe,
but recognize the need !or further constructin restatement ot theological
foundation.a, a need not tilled b1 van Bu.ren's article.

?6

van Buren, P• 199.

132

To confine our:Jelvas to the languago developed by men (and what
other choice is available to us?) appears to confine our subject
to the realm which is at least in principle open to humo.n investigation, but that doea not exclude th~ richness and '9al'iety within
this human realm.77

In view of his re ...din~sa to trarlill.ate "God..statements" to "man-:statoments,"
van BIU'en•a discuss ion of prayer indicates the direction hia keryguatic

analysis will tuke:
'rhe r11eani11r.; of interceimoey prayer ia ita use: it begins 1n reflection upon tho situation in the ligb.t or the Christian perspective and leads to appropriate action.78

In cases where nothing can be done, as in an internatiom.il situation,
"holding the situation up to God11 is basically reflection vithin the
historicnl peropective of the Chrietian.79
Discus3in3 th~ langua3e of the kerygraa is discussing the contemporary
understanding ot the Gospel.

It ia unwinding the difficulty in .speaking

H '10od-atate,uents" aro to be translated into the language-

of God.

gamea ot man, there is no better place to enter the logic o! keryg,aatic

language than with Jesus ot Nazareth.

The exclusive, particular CMraoter

ot kerygmatic language is evident, says van Buren, 1n that ''it cl.aia the
univeraal significance ot a particular, hiatorical individual, Jesus of
Nazareth."

His .f'reedoci, when discussed, 1a the exclusiTe element.

Although no empirical grounda exiat to justify
11

tu

argument that a similar

freedom"-experience is not po~s1ble tr-011 any other "free man," it is

lopcall.z possible to aaake this exclusive olaia, tor by his £:Statement

7'Ib1d.,

P• 103.

?Sibid.,

P• 189.

-

79Ibid.

13}
the a~serter expresses t ho tirmne ,,:; of his conviction.Bo
'.t'he pa1~ticularit:, of kery~tic languo5e ia thus balanced by a
universality.

Kery()rr.atio lan~1:tge "clairas that in the history of Jeaus

of Hazareth something univeraal, etltr11al, absolute, something it calls

'God,' waa manifested. '1 '£ he univerool aapect includes a perop1tctive of

all that there ia, a certain understanding of oelt, man, history, ani the
world.

The universal perspective bau its norm in t he histo17 ot the

Nazarene and the 1::aater ovent. 81 The universal perspectiYe indicatea

that the perceiver waa ''taken hold ot," that ''something bas happened to
the believer, rather than that he has done aoraething."

rettporu;Q is tho act o! .a free man:
ing commitment to a way

But 111ore, the

"the new discernment and ita acoo11pa~-

ot life is ex1.ierienoed as a response." Properl7

speaking, the language of taith ia the "recommendation to his listener

J

to see Josuu, the world, and himl$elf in fihe uew perspective and to act

accordinglJ. 1182

Van Buren swna up thG uuiversalitJ and particul..arit7 ot

kerygmatic language with reference to the complex logic of "blik11 :

It ilS one tlting to say that Christians have al"aya taken the hist017
of Jeaus to be indiapentiable and de!initive for their faith, but it
is quite another to think that this "uniquenaljs" can somehow be
proTed•• •• Clain.a o! "!iiuility" are siaply the langua.ge appropriate to articulating a historical perspective. Tu• logic of these
claima c~u be illwainatad by aetting the• alonoside tho stateaent
"I'm I. 1~3

801bid.,

-

PP• 135-139.

81 Ibid.,

PP• 139-141.

82Ibi.i.,

J>• 141.

S}Ib1d., P• 155.
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Paul F. :icbaidt

Pa1.1l 14". Schmidt84 concludea that ethioal atatomeuts r~either specifically concern ~oligious beliefs nor exha1.1st th8 totality of raligious
assar,;iona.

In spite of this ooriclusinn, he counts th1;1 rela.tionahip be-

tween religious assertions and ethical concerns a~ important !actor in
any con3ideration of religious utterancea:
Our discussion indicatea that any adequate account ot the meaning
ot religious asuar-tions must do Juetioe to tblt lrequent connection
of ethics nnu religion.85

Cloeely approximating Braithwaite. Schmidt holds that the "primary pur-

ot religious language ia to produce certain attitudes ill ouedelt aud
in others. 1186 ~pelling out this axiom, Schmidt argues that the !unction
pose

ot CO$mological religious atatementa is to recol!llnend oertain attitudes
toward nature &nd man's 'behavior relative to nature.

Historical religious

ataterr.ents are r.1eans of ~xpreGsing attit~dea toward a;Hscial evarnts ancl
per6ona in historJ.

Theological otatements, in their religious rather than

their metaphysical function. express attitudes counected with Uod/god.
Sthical atatemants in their religious !unetion refer to behavioral diapositiona toward other people.

Finall1, devotional. 3t~ter.enta rocoQD18nd

oertain teelinga f"or a ·•way or life. 1187

84Paui Frederick ~chllidt has been associate proreaaor of philosopbJ
at Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, since 1958.
85Paul F. ::ichmidt, Religious Knowledp ( [a1enooe, Ill1110~: Free
Preas, c.1961), P• 71•
86
~ . , P• ??•

87 Ibid., PP• 91-94.
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Although ~ohmidt doea not otfer the suggestion, it ia possible to
conclude from his atud1 that tha logic ot religious stateo~nts, which
functions attitudinally, n,tcosaitatoa tllo verifiability ot tho statements
in an empirical testing ot tho stated intentiona and attitudeo.
l!'al3ifial>ilit1 and Heligioua Propositions
'.:Jilliam A. Christian a nd william T. Blackstone are one more step
reooTed from the atri~gent criterion of verifiability in their endoraeQent of fe.lsifiability.. Falsifiability eusanti&lly weakens the nritioation principle by a raothod of convoraion, but doau not di!fer mteriall7
from it.

88

•rhilo Braithwaite, ·.-;ilson, and van Buren endorsed talai!ia-

bility as an integral tool tor the appreherioion of moaning in religious
diacourse, thoy did not posit it as the aole criterion of meaning, as do
Christian and Blaokatone.

In their utilization o! ial~ifiab1lit7, both

Christian and Blacketone affirm the empirical placement o! religious language (at least in principle), butt.hey do so i,,ith less thooretical clari-

ty and co111mitment than tha nen thus far considered.
t"lillia11 A. Christian
William A. Christian89 sets out to demonstrate that, together with
the functions

or

contea8ion a~d injunction, religioua atatezcenta expreaa

geuuine "truth-claims." lli.s is an ex&J!lination of conditioiw under which
truth claims artt poGaiblo.90 Hio concern is with "propoaals for belief"

88

sue;:a,

PP• 31-.}4.

S9Chriatlan is professor of philosophy at Yule UniTersity.
90w1u1am A. Chri:stian, Meaui.y and. Truth in lleligion (Princeton,

Mew Jerae1: Princeton UDiTeraity t"'reaa, c.1964), P• 1.

l.}o

which appea r in the setting of oustaincd 1nquiry.9l Only in this setting
can genuine disagreeoonts a bout

11

propoGB.ls for bolief" arise.

Arise tbey-

must, for if no genuine disagr8aments are possible among thoao who offer
proposala for belief, ~ignificnut truth-claims

aN

imposs ible in reli-

giou~ language.92
In dis cussing t he poGsibility of disagreoment3 Chris tian distinguishes bet\'ie en ''doctrinal propoaula 11 and "basic proposalo. 11

~iorld religions

are ablo to disagre~ on a doctrinal propo~l if thG ~ubject, through
extrapolation, is broa d enough tor both parties to accept as C18an11J!tful,
and if the predicate i s untrue for one or the other.
1,ropo:w.l allows tor more ai gnific&nt disagreement.
di!!era from tho doctrinal proposal in logical form.

A second type ot
·r be "bl\sic proposal"
In tho case of the

ba6ic propoaul, the predicate is assigned by both participating groups,
but to di!! erent aubjects.93 Since his atudy ot tho cognitive uature of
religious diacourse is pri,narily concerned with basic propO$als, ChristiaD
seea fit to lis t th~ dis tinguishing ~rks ot a basic propoG&l: "its subject
term oxpre:;s es the centr-cll concept of some schenre"; and "ita predicate

expresses the basic concept of aome inguiq. 1194 He chooaea to di;Jcuse the

91 Ibid., pp. 12-13. Christian asaumea (p. 3) the posa1b1lit1 ot a
generi,l logic or inquir1 ''which becolll8s specified ill wrious wya when
apecitic interests (for example, scientific, 1:1oral, or religious intereate)
prompt ua to ask questiona of various sorta."
92

Ibid., P• 24.

93 Ib1a., pp. 15-19. Christian contends that a doctrinal proposal
preauppoeea ao~ basic proposals because the latter «1ve the point and
importance of cioctrine. The doctrinal proposal (p. 21) "depends on a basio
proposal tor explanation ot its context in experience and discourse."

94

Ibid., P• 21.
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basic ~ropoaal because it is an easier t ask to isolate disagreements in
the area of basic proposals than to locate common logical subjects to
which uoctrines of different religions give reference in doctrinal
proposals_95
Before discussing the predicates of basic proposals, Christian distinguishes four conditions which nominate a proposal a a a candidate
truth-claim.

These four conditions are here summarized:

a . The proposal must be capable of self-consistent formulation.

b. The proposal must be liable to significant disagreement, for if
something cannot be negated consistently (falsifiability), it
has no significant con~equences.
c. The proposal must pP.rmit a reference to its logical subject.
The term used as logical subject must mean something in acertain way. 11'l'his condition requires of the proposal 'mis F'
t hat t here should be additional information about m, beyond saying tha t it is F." '!'he proposer must find some fact or other as
a starting-point for his reference, e.nd then connect the fact
with the logical subj~ct of his proposal. It must be logically
possible to accept the fact without accepting the proposal.
d. The proposal mus t permit some support for the assignment of its
predica te t o its subject. "It must be p_o sei ble to give some
reason for saying t hat m is F." Giving a reason involves "bri.nging up aome fact or another according to some principle of judgment." Each proposal, with its o~ predicate, formulates its
rules of judgment in this matter.9b
In examining the construction of a basic proposal, Christian holds that
the predicate must be f ormula ted so that its applica tion is not restricted
to one lo~ical subject, although it may be true of not more than one.
Thia type of predicate is educible from a general theory of religion
borrowed by philosophy from the phenomenology of religion.

The general

theory muat fill the following conditions: it must yield a predicate
directly applicable to the religious object and not to the religious

9.5~ •• pp. 23-24.
96 Ibid., PP• 24-34.
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person experiencing the object; it must not. designate a lo8ical subject

tor basic religious proposals (thus r'-llilli, o\.lt "Religion

i:J ~orsbip

ot

God"); it must have e. reanonably wide ranGo of itpplicati on; it must per-

mit reaaonable inte1•pretations of the word

11

religion."9'i' After evaluating

several thoories o! religious predication, including ~ch.liermaoher's,
Kant's, and Otto's, Christien o!fors his own.

In brief, ..,. religious

1ntoreat io an intere~t in something 1noro important thein anything else
in the universe." Ghri atian contends that his formiuation allows tor the
creation of basic propoaala in that it is a auftici~ut predicate. 98
Christiania led by Braithwaite•s account ot religious language to
di~cw.s tha relation of rdligious injunctions and confessions to btlaic
propooala.

He challenges Braithwaite "1th a question taken !rom his

~eneral theory of religion:
i~port ?

"When does a moral policy have religious

Ordinarily, ve would say, only if it ie relatedrto something which

ia roligiouoly valued." Christian suggests that religious valuationa (in
Braithwaite's case the "storiea") not only tell w~ s011ething ia to be
t he religious valuation is an integral element ot that kind ot

done.

injunction, and diutinguiabes tho religious from the non-religious:
A religious inJunotion depends on a basic proposal for its aigniticance. !';o, it ''Qod i $ love" i s a religious utteruoce by virtue ot
some policy it enjoins, the policy is oonneoted with something•
to ~hich soQe basic religioua predicate is implicitly applied.~

91Ibid., PP• 57-58. Ninian Slll&rt, in Heasons and Faiths (London:

rtoutloclgeund ltagan .·aul, c.1958), p. 197, .:liscounta the auggeotion that
there can be any aingle definition of religion in terms ot content (e.g.,
11
man•3 relationship \llith the divine" ) such as ~hriatian here suggeata.
See intra, P• 174.

-

98Chriatian, p. 6o. Christian here follows .Luther's definitioa of"•
god" in the latt.er' ;, explanation ot the First Commandment in the larp
Catoohiu. t."hriatian's reliano• on 'l illich al.ao seems to ••rse at thia
point.

99Ibid., PP• 140-141.
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Religious utterancea that are "conteasions" also involve an element relative to a baaic propoaal.

"Religious atctoa in,;olve ra.'arentinl attitudeu, 11

for a roligiOUI:$ con!~ssion "include3 un implicit or explicit r '3ference to
something,!, other th11n t lld emotional state of t he apeaY.er, to which ha ie
related in a religious way."

In this way rali$ioaa Cvi.lfeasion also pre-

supposes a ~sic religious propo63.l for its aigr.i!icance. 100
Christ ian ia uov, in a. pos ition to exar11ino the

11

judg:aents 11 needed to

ovaluate tho ~ruth-claims of religious utterances, although he concedes
that r eligious Judsmenta may be only reasonably cert~in and atable. 101

lOOibid., PP• llt2-143.
101
~ . , P• llt6. In ri,gti.rd to "truth-olairna," r eference 3hould be
r!lado to a Roman Catholic writer, Hugo A. Meynell, wh":se ilonae, Normanse
and Chrintia nity ( London a nd New York: Sheed and •.Jard_, 1964) was unavailable to t hi s writer evon after a t horough tsearch which includod tha facilities o! t ho Pius XII Library of Jt. Loui s University und the Library ot
the Catholic Univeri,ity of America. Me;ynell grant:s a differttnce in degree,
but not in kind, bottieon analytic and aynthetic ataternenta. Nevertheless,
he is concerned to exumine t he verifiable nature of faith-statements, and
offer~ a diocusaion of "truth-conditions•r in his study. Ho contends that
hiato~ical statements or faith are at present verifiable and talsifiable-at lea.st in principle. Eschatological stateinents are only verifiable or
falsifiabl~ in the future. ~eacting to various torma of theological
"reductionism'' (hiu t erm), rlt1ynoll limits the importance of pro~ent
experience (and utterances) iu traditional Chriatian belief. 11.t~eductioni s tio" t ,le ologiea i nve1·t tho proportion a mong truth-conditions o! traditional fai th (where pa.at and futura !itots were tbe necessary conditioa.s)
anti present experiontial ! 1:.t ct.;3. 'l'hreo reviews 0£ :;enae 1 l~o113o ns e and
Chriatianity appoar in Appendix A. It the work could ba c·a retull.7 anaJ.¥zed, it u ppaaro to t i:1is writer that it would fall in the cunGiderations
ot the present chapter.
As far a.s the preuent writer could discover, use or disavowal of
liuguiatic analysia on the part of Roman Catholic writers h&a been rathe~
limited. Yaxwell J. Charl~sworth, a ~oi:iau Catholic, uas invedtigated the
_history ot aDalysis in Philoso h and Li
etic Anal aia (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University, c.1959, but has ! a iled to tnce tho theological iasu~s
squarely. Joseph M. Bochenski'& The Logic ot Heligion (New ~ork: Now York
Univeraity Press, 1965) was not available to this writer. C! tbia work
Theology Digest, XIV (dpring 1966), 65, says in a brief NTiev: 11A distinguished Domir,ican ochol(ll', the president ot the University ot Fribourg,
Switzerland, attempts •to u~ modern mathematical logio to establish a
general losic of religion applicable to all grE1at rsligiona.'"
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The first argument which enters a judgement o! religious truth-claill is
the arguatent of consistency and ooherence.

In tbia argumentation the

important matter· is that no aingle general theo17 of religion (and der1Ye4
trom it, a basic religious question to replace all others) can be sought.
"But it is fair to ask for some queations to be stated, ao ve could understand the point of the proposal and thus see more clearly how its various
parts contribute to making this point. ,.1°2
Dialectical arguments are the second type to be offered for or againat
a truth-proposnl.
truth-proposal.

This argument corresponds to the second condition of a
It investigates how well the proposal. compares and con-

trasts with rival propooals; it evaluatea the proposal's power to interpret alternatives.

i'ihile it is alwaya proper to ''try to show bow

SOll8

proposal conserves, and expresses in a more consistent and coherent va7,
the Yaluea of another," Christian urges an exhaustin oomparison between
each of the rival proposals.lO}
The third type of argument which enters the judgment of a truth-

proposal is argumentation concerning the adequacy of references permitted
b1 the stated truth-proposal.

ot predicates modified
following typea:

Christian suggests that logical aubjecta

by the references under diacuaision include the

qualities, relatioDS, particular natural entities,

particular hwaan individuals and groups, nature, mankind, pure forms,
pure being, and transcendent actin being. 104 It is in diacuoaing the

retcrenoea which modify these types of logical subjects tbat ChristiaA
102
Christian, PP• 148,153.

lOJibi.d., PP• 156, 160, 161.
l04Ibid., P• 169.
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examiuea the third type ot argwaentation involved 1ifith t~• judgment ot

• truth-propoaal.

Aa exRmplea of the queetiona 111h1cb. gin rise to dif-

ferent types ot references, Christian otters the following queries:
Will you give me an oxa01ple of it? i'ihat does it do? What are its
ettocts? Am I acquainted with a111 ot ita:partsor iaembers? Is it
related in some other way to anything in 'l1tY experience? It it is
beyond IJJY experienoe,. how is it beyond rq experience?l05
He liete tive r....tthods by which reference to logical subJeCtd ot basic
reUgioua proposals is possible.

(l) "OstellSivo reference" ia used only

in referring to particular natural entities, particular human indiTiduale,
and

groups ot logical eubjoct. ~he difficulties involved in isolating a

particular subject may be elillinated partially by adopting a a,mbol tor
the propoaed .iJubject.

(2) "(living examplea" beat provides referential

moditioation for qualities, reltttiona, and pure torllllS •

./bile the first

two types of logical subjects (qualities, relations) are susceptible to
exemplitica~ion 'becaude the1 involve qualities and not an "ideal," pure
lol'JIIS

are not referenced as easily by exemplification. They are better

exemplified in aaalogJ, or in the via negativa.

(}) "Aasigui.Dg regular

efteots" is an apt reference to uature and to a transcendent aatiTe being
when either of the:38 ia che logical subject. The ditficulty 1ifith thia
tn,e ot reference ia that, tor example, the farther the meaning ot "oause"
ia extended and t11e more aaalogical.11 it ia used, the more clittioult it _ia
to uae the concept "cause" to reter to :something particular.

(4) "Aaeip-

iog extraordiual'J eftecta'' does not neceadllril.J involve "miracle," but it

ay, expeciall.J in the oaae ot a private event. Thia type ot reterencemethod is very useful in mod1t1ing the transcendent actin being aa a

105
.Ibid., P•

-

198.
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logical subject.

Uttur transcendenoe need not be i•plied, !or it it i•

the ef!ect~ of the tra.n:scendent being are likely to be imperceptible to
historical judgment.

(5) "Interpretation" ia a deduotiTo reforence vhioh

demonstrates hQw the predicate is related in some way~to the logical subject.

It differs trom causal refol"ftnoe in that its goal of reterence

occu.pios a different ontological level.l06
Christian alao providea guidelines for the uae of theite fiTe 1111Jor
modes ot predicat·i ng reference.

In arriving at references to logical sub-

jects of religious proposals, it is best to remain aloof from superlative•
10
or CODlparatives. 7 Christian argues that it is "fair to make an isiterence
from the kind of reference a proposal uses to the nature of the logical
subject of the proposal, that which is bei11g proposed as the religious
object." He continues1
The reason ia that there are logical 11111.tatiooa on l'llAking reterenoea
in religion• • • • Jo if a proposer seriously meana to u.ee a certain
reference, then this can tell us aomethillg about the proposal he ia•
in effoct, making. ::Je can pose a dile1e'1111a; eitheir hi:s propooal ia ot
a type fQr which the mode of reference 1a admisitible, or the reterenoe
fails.loo
A reference can tail (a) if it ia baseleaa

arid

otters no tactual starting

point (tho difficulty with ouporlatives); (b) it it is misconatructed,
for it may use catogoriea inappropriate to its tactual :starting point;
(o) it the reference is insufficient, beoauee references in one mode of
reference r:Jll1 need the supplementation of another. 109 ~1th an emphasis

-

l06Ibid., PP• 185-198.

-

lO?Ibid., PP• 199.

PP• 205-2o6.
1091bid.. ,
l08Ibid ••

i>•

208.

on faots (a), Christian contends that hie theory ot meaning is, in a weak
aenae, empirical on two accounts:

roferencea to logical aubjeots begin

with facts ao their star ting point, both private and public fucts; second, !acts "can bo adduced in eupport ot a claim that a basic predi.cate
is true of aome logi~l aubject. 11110 He summarizes the procedures used
to support the predications of basic proposals 1n this way&
The general requirement is that it ia possible to formulate, in the
!ra1ne of the predicate in question, ruloo of relevanoe tor ~ppoals
to tacts, a procedure for judgment, and nol'tlls ot judgment. 11.l.
A1'ter this digreaaion, which dealt with different modes of predicative

referonce and different types of logical $~bjecta (allot which

concerned the t~ird type of argument involved in the judgment ot truthpropoaals), Chri~tian turns to the tourth major argument involved in the
judgmflnt ot truth-proposals.

Thia argument deals with the possibility or

ioposaibilit7 ot truth in religious propositions.

statement

or

It serYes as a SW1l!111lrJ

the book's thesis.

In the course of developing the fourth argument Christian exami1aea
three factors integral to the charge that there can be no possibility of
a true religious proposition.
is not possible in religion.

(1) The opponent contends that certainty
Christian agrees to the impossibility of

obtaining absolute cortainty both a priori and from experience.

He

counters witn the contontion that no human knowledge is certain in tbia
sense.

Nevertheless, sure knovlodge ot "augge•tions" (which illwainat•

one's lite) in religion is poasible, although thia does not assure absol~t•

llOibid., PP• 210-211.

llllbid., P•

236.
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certainty about propoBitioM derived !roa trur.tworthy suggestions.

"For

our fundamental orientation and baaic guidance in life we rely on experieRce
which cannot be funded into propositional meaning without relllliiinder."
Similarly at an even deepar level, one raay accept truoted "basic suppositions" without being religiouB in the

i:JellH

that a "suggestion" ia religious.

Proposi~ions derived from baaic 3Uppoaitions are reasonably certain, their
trustworthiness varying with availability of relevant tac~s and urgency
of decision.

(2) At

this point Christian's opponent counters with the

suggestion that religious questions are not decidable.

This argument

depends, says Christian, on thu assumption that judgment is not poeaible
in religion.

His whole book has demonstrated the oppoaite.

(J)

In the

third place the opponent charges that claill1ng tr.1th !or religion in'Yolwa
inaenaitive, intolerant, obsessive, or idolatrous exclusiveness.

Christian

eta.tea that in regarda to insensitivity, when one aaaerta a propoaition )?,
he ie not aeoerting that only R is true.
tolerance dooa not imply akepticiuw.

Christian further sl.lggeats tbat

And finally, in the light of Chriatian's

thttory of religion, the opponent's charge of idolatry permits tbe otating

ot no religious propo6ition. 112
In concluaion ~hristian at~tes that it has been ~s purpose to. ~throw
light on aome of the ways in which we do (and migbt) th1Dlc: and speak when
we are prompted by religious intereat." His examination of the problem

waa not restricted to the diac!.lssion of meaning and t ruth, and thl;l criteria

ot significance and tr~th, required only for religious diuoourse.

Bia

taak involved the generalization o! the3e concepts in order that th• theory

112 T1..~d.,
.u.,,,

~~Q26~
PP• '7J~·
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is "powerful enough to oxtond in an illuminating way beyond the domain of
its origin."ll}
Williaa T. Blackstone
~illiam T. Blackatonell4 approaohea the question of religioua diaoourae from the perspective ot religious knowledge.

He ~sawaea that an

investigation of relib"1ous language does not conui~t in describing its

uaea.

Correlatively, he deems it necessary to evaluate criteria of oog-

nitivity applicable to religious belief and language.

lie inai3ts that

prior to an investigation of reli~ious langWl3e one must ascertain what
religious hnguage ia, that is, what its limits are.

It ia his sugges-

tion that religious language concerna a belief which provides an object(s)

of devotion and presents a pervasive orientation-!rame.ll5
l'ho ana.l.yats huvtt done well, says filackstone, in drawing att@ntion
to meaning in use, but they have not re3olved the problem of religious
"oognition. 11

It ia ultimately nucesaary, in apite of all the "logic" of

religious language, to establiah criteria which delimit what ia and ~hat
is not cognitive language.

Simple description o! the me.ny wses ot reli•

sioua language ie no substitute tor an anal1sia of thu crit@ria ot its
cognitive aigni!icance.1 l 6 Blackstone reject• the conolusion of

30. .

llJibid., PP• 263-264.
114
BJ.ack3tone bas been asuociate professor of philodop~ at the
Universit7 ot Georgia since 1961.

l1SY1lliam T. Blacksto11e, The Problem of Religious Knovledp (~ngl•wood Cliffs, ~ew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, c.1963), PP• J8-J9.
ll6 Ibid., P• ,54. ln thi~ regard it is interostillg to compare an
editorial in Christianity Todaz, IX (July 1965), 107J, which dismisses
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analysts that it religi ous asaortions are non-cognitiTe they are autollllltically emotive.
tion.

He uraea the proposing ot apQcilic ~riteria tor oogoi-

The criterion offered by those who aee r~ligioua l.£lnguage as

emotive--a criterion of cognitive meaning which eliminates metaph1sics-Blackatone views as inaul!ioient. 117 Ho aubmita, in o:sdence, that the
falaitiability test ia a proper crit~rion ot cognitive aigniticance in
religious discourse. 118

:CC view of this protferad criterion, Blackatone

will not allow ''religious experience" to aorve aa a justifying ground tor
supposed objective i~port in religious sentences,
All religious aentences • • • which purport to have objectiTe import and which have as their justifying grounds merely "relii;ioua
experience" cannot be classified a3 knowledge. This includes not
only the claims that God exiata, but that Christ 13 his eon •• ••
And to the oxtent that any religious sentence based on th1o appeal
cannot be given aome olear m~ani.ng eo that tho speaker and tbe hearer can know or find out what tl..le sentence is about and the extent
ot the claim being tt1ade about it, the issue of the cognitivity of
these sentences ariae~ again.119
Blackstone includes in the category ot cognitiTe religious statements aasertions that are predictive, descriptive, historical, explanatory, and those which make autobiographical olaima. 120 All are

the "linguistic theologians," although they validate religious beliefs
aa working modola in the acientitic world, because the~ do not reoolve
the queation of "truth."
ll7•illi.D.m '!'. Blackstone, "Religious language, Emotivism, and Cognitivit1," Iliff Renew, XVIII (Jinter 1961), 41-44.

118
Bl4lck8tontt, Problem, ot Heligioua Knovleds,, P• 54• .Blackstone
somewhat imprecisely offers this suggeation, stating, e.g., on P• 55 that
the predictive stateiant achrist will return" ia eaaily testable and
falsifiable.
119

Ibid., P• 144.

120
~ . , P• ,56.
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falsifiable, at least in principle.

He notes that analogical religious

statements are aomotimes set forth ae cognitive, but are not to be interpreted lite~ally or treated as atraight!orward empirical hypotheses.

The..

analogical otateroenta cause no ond ot difficulty. 121 Religious sentences
which olnim to impart knowledgo, but to which no falsifying evidence
appliea, create a complex problem for one con9erned with the question,
"Is religious knowledge possible?"

Such statements are aupposed to bet

true analogically or aymbolioally.

}:Ven more disconcerting, it i3 often

this type of sentence, and not the "deacriptive, historical, or oxplanatory sentences,'' which fulfills tho appropriate functions of toouaing
attitudinal orientation and providing an object(s) of devotion.

Jince

Blackstone apportions t he degree ot ''attitude of ballef11 aocording to tho
criteria ot cognitivity, he holds that sentences which appeal to aoalogy

und ~ymboliam are not candidates fvr an attit~de of belief since they tail
to fulfill the criteria of cognitivity. 122
Blackstone argues that his conclusion (regarding cognitive criteria
and the necessity of cognitivity as a basis tor r~ligious bolief) does
not imply that analogical-symbolical statements have no value in the
lives of people.

His conclusion dose imply, however, t ha t the

11

cognitive

statue and knowledge status of a belief are at least partially independent of the pl:i;rch.ologioal and pragi:1&tic import ot a. boli•f. ''

121

123

· · ~ . , P• 62.
l22
.
Ibid., p. 167. ~mples of analogical or oym~olical utterances
include "God created the world," "God is a: .loving heaTonly tather, u and
"Christia th8 son of God," according to Blackstone.

l2jibid. • PP•. 167-168.
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l'roloptic Vorification and liellgioua Propositions

John Hick
124
John liick
ia the solo repreaentative ot proleptic veri£ioation W40a
this 3tudy will consider although others, including Ian Grombie, haTe endoraed the proposal with laa3 zeal.

Hick onliste the principle ot V'1ri-

fica t ion to deocribe the nature of religious diaoourse, but the veriti-

cation ia eachatological. lle straddles the border

bet1'1e&ll

thinkers of

this chapter, who adcireas the potiitivistic-analytio challenge, and thinkers
who attempt to deacribe the peculiar "logio11 of rt3ligio\1s di.scourae in
non-positivistic terms (Chapter V).
Hick

e1.S:iu111o1J

that religious faith (and religious language) share a

"common epistemological structure with cognition in other fielda. 11 Thia
atrl.lctl.U'e involves both a "aiguificance" and an "interpretation" which
are viable also in th0 theological reaim. 125
The epiatemological atructure which has worked with success in other
fields is verii'icational in nature, aays Hick.

He defines the "essence

of veri:Cication" as tho "<txcluaion of rational doubt. 11126 At another
place he contends that the core of vorification is nthe removal ot

124
n1ck, an ordained Presbyterian, was asaiatant professor of philosop~ at Cornell UaiTersity from 19!» to 1959. Since then he has been
Stuart Professor of ~hriatian Philosopby .t Princeton Theological ~eiaillllrJ.
12
5John Hiok, li'aith and Knovled a a Modern Introduction to the
Problem ot Religious Knovlede Ithaoa, Nov Yorlu Cornell Universit7
Preas, 0.19.57), p. 164. It is likely that tor Hick "significanoe"
denotes "meitning. 11
126

~ . , P• 161.
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ignorance or uncertainty concarning the truth ot aoma propoaition. 11121
Verification is o!ton related to predictioDJJ wni.ch are cond.itionai.128
Placing theological aasertiona in tho rea.lm ot cognition, Hick suggests
that a predictive, conditio?lB.l verification is applicable also to reli3ious u~sertions.

It is throufib eschatologic~l verification of religious

aseertion3 that the asaortion-atatus of religiou3 language is protected. 129
Hick treats the verification of t neological atatements as a ''logicopsyohological r~ther thD.u aa a purely logical concept. 11 Viewed thua,
a. propoeition caunot bo verified unles:, someone is preaent to verif7 it;

the verb "verify'' is act.ive rather than passive. 1 30
Hick uets out to protect his th&ory against the charge that since
it is not falsifiable, it fails to guarantee the meaning ot roligious
aosttrtions.

He argues that verifiability and falsifiability are not al-

ways symetrically related--aa two sides of a coin.

For example, the

proposition "There are three successive sevens in the decimal determination of 11," may one day be verified if it is true, but it c~n nevor be
falsified if it is false.

'L'hi3 argumentation applies, says Hick, to

127
John Hick, "Theology and Verification," '?he t.ixistence o! God,
edited by John Hick (New !ork: Macmillan Compan.1, .o.1964), P• 25}•
This chapter reprints an article firat published in Theology Today,
XVII (April 1960), 12-}l.
128

~ . , P• 259.
129Hick, Faith and Knowledge, P• 152. I. M. Crombie, in "'l'heolos,
llod 1''alaif'ication," New 1:;asaya, p. 126, offers a similar suggestion in
stating that for the .:;briatian, "the operation of getting into position
t~ decide" whether a given claim is true or falae "is called dying• • • •
~ this test, then, roligioua utterances can be called statements of
fact. • • • • "
l30!1ick, "Theology and '/eritication," ~stence of God, P•

254.
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eachatolo~ical verification ao well.

-

The hypothesi3 raay be false, but that

it is false can never be a fact which Qnyono experientially verities.131
A

second attack on e3chatological verification otfera a substitute

hypothesis.

To those who argue that present ux1lerionce is 61if'ficient

verification of the validity of religioua aasa1·tioua, Hick saya:

In other worda, our imagined objector has pointed out not that the
existence ol God .Dakes a difference within huraan experience, but
only that belief in the existence of God mak~s such a difference.
And to snow that belief in a proposition E baa certain causal eifecte
is not to show that l? itself makea some verifiable claim about the
nature of the univer3e. It appears, then, that wo caW1ot aubatitute
f.o r the concept of eachatological verificatiof~ reference to the
Chriatian's prese~t experience of a naw lite.
lliok snarpen9 his hypothesis of esohatologicu.l verification by examining in turn s upposed logical posaibilities which would invalidate eacbato-

logical. verification.

~hat if attar })h¥sical death one's conaciouanesa

persiats and crttates its own world, in a prooesa similar to dream- ·
construction? ~he traditional Christian under such circumsta.nceu ma1

experience ilopressive divine judgttent with subsequent aaiaery or bli.ea,
each according ·t o hie conscience or theology.

a universe with no Uod.
illusory.

All this might occur in

The aeem.ng verification in this can wow..d be

Another poosibilit1 is that thu !uture world will be essential•

17 a continuation ot the present, and raligiously no less atGbiguoua.
Suppose this naw world is capable of either

interpretation.

&

theistic or nontheistic

~uppoS4t there w~r• no conclusive experience either to

validate or invalidate thoislll.

How would the eacbatologi0'6l verification

l3llbid., p. 258. Mick is espeoiall1 concerned to anewer Anto~
Flew•a objection at this point. See supra, PP• 91-92.

132Hick, Faith and Knowledge, P• 154.
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ot Chriatian fait h fare in thoGe ciroumstancoa·l33
As answers to these logical diaclaimere Hiok' a e;:irlier \-lork ot!'ered
the .dQatific Vision and the l)ingdora.

or

the ltttter ho auys:

·./o huve no inforrnation that would enable us to visualize the Ringdom. But ita apprehended aignificance wiJ.l be the direot expression

ot tho divine purpose, so that: at every point the oitizena of the KingGiven this experience, &theis m and agnoaticisro, while rcr.iaining logical poaaibilitieu, will have bocorne dead option3, of no greater plausioilit7 than
is solipsiara now. l~e shnll have \that in ~ll other spheres we describe
as knowledge, P.amely r a tional certainty.13'+
dom are con3ciou:3 ot being in the divino µresence.

In a l at~r work Hick io mure explicit.

He isolates t ·,io developments in

t he Beatific 1/i:;Jion which would concluaivoly verity tho existence ot
'.rho f i rst ia ' 1an experience of the i'ulfillment of God' a purpose

God.

for our:Jctlve:i, as this has bEten di~cloaad in Christian revelation."

Thia

f'ul1'illciant is not ca.pa.ble of fabification, but noitlu,r n~ed t he !Jhriatian
know tho concreto f orm t h~ fulfillr:iant will asswae.

will 00 verified, second,

The exi Gtence of God

,.,ith an experience of collltllunion with God aa he

11

has reveulod hims elf in tho person of Chriat. 11 The stipulation "aa he
baa revealed himaelf in th~ person of Ghrist" provide~ a solution to the

problem of knowing bow or that one baa encountered

vod, for

experiencing

the reign of the ~on ~ill surely assure encounter with God.l35

133

Ibid., PP• 154-155•

134 Ibid., p. 162. IilaolcfiJtone (p. 114) sug39sts t..at Hick'a attempt
at falaitiibility in principle through eachatologioal veritication ia
argumentation inn circle. Hiok asau~os the assertion-status ot reli•
giouu beliefs (kingdvm of Ood, immortality) in order to prove th8 possibility of esohatological verification.

l}5Hiok, "Theology and Verification," ~iatence ot God, PP• 269-2?1.
r1. iiepburn, in Christianity aud Paradox (London: c. A. vtatts and
Compa~; 0.1958), p. ?9, opposes the position ot the "Christologiets''
who attempt to point to JedU$ (tbe man) aod aay, 11'.i'here you !ind God, it
you're looking," with this statement& "'Has not Chriatology fllllde it
a onald
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Hick clairas that esohatological verif'ication provides a cogllitive
dimension to theological assertions •

.Out r.1ore, the Christian's positing

ot a future experience rendero the present choice between tneinm and
atheism a real--not an e~pty or verbal--choioe. 136
Interweaving the Strands
'l'o avoid an impreauion that the matter diacuasod in thia chapter is
aa aiaplo as its four categories indicate, a aummary statemQnt ia attachod.
Each ot the ,aen considered i ::. a thinker in his own right.
categorization oan eliminate individuality.

lio amount of

Jtill, although the dtrands

of thought aro multiple, they interweave in a s urprioingly co~idtent
pattern.
Christian, 13raitll'.raite (in the "stories"), Blackstone, and Hick coa.t8nd that in some way religioua assertionu are ''cognitive," but cognition
ia variously defined.

Christian, Blockstone, and Hick provide for the

cognitive judgment of religious assertions.

Braithwaite, :;Uson, van

Buren, Christian, and Jlackstone look to fal5ifiability

a3

one lo~ical

tool through which r eligious 3tateraenta receive cognitive "cash value."

'fJhile Christian :3peaks o! a "factual" starting point for the r3ference of
· religious lan!)uage, and Kimpel assumes that stater.ient anJ !act correlate,
"dilson aeleota an e1.spirioal basis for metaphysical iltatement.s 'by endorsing

impossible for itaelf to aasort its moat important clai~--the claim that
the relation between God, men and Jeaue is what it says it is?' For i t
that claim is taken seriously, it implies that ~en are uot in a poaitioa
to kllow whether it is well founded or not." Hick examines Hepburn's book
in "A Philooopher Criticizeo l'hsolot31, 11 l.otAdon .,uarterJ.;, aod Holborn
.iutView,

1

CLXXXVII (April 1962), 103-110.

36uick,

·l 'heology and Verit'ioation," ;~ietenoe ot God, P• 261.

11
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"religious experionce:t as the seedbed of religious assertions.
agrees in paI-t wi·th ~·: ilson by referring to empirical hypotheaos.

Cox
Hick

and .Blackstone explicitly rule ou.t religious experience as tho ~antor
of religiouo cog~ition, bu.t both plaoe religiou3 language within thu total
realm ot human lanijUAJe, act do va n Buren, Christian, and Y
..impel.

Hi.ck

prefer6 to upeak of eachatological verific~~i~n (as opposed to falsifiability), while Kir.apel promotes tllo cause of testabi.lity.

Braitil11ai.te ~nd

van Burt1n choose to spek k o! tho "uao principlo" rat her than veri.f'i co.ti.011

as such, but Blackutone insists that a mere functional analyuiu of the
"uae" ot .religious l:ltatemente:i is ins11ff'icient.

Along with the genera l ompbasis on the verifiable-falsifiable nature
of r ~ligious laugua 0e ther~ i s a common t endency to relate roligiouG aaaertionu to the attitudinal-ethical sphere •

.Schmidt, ChriBUan, Braithwaite,

van Buren, and ,Jilaon relate religio11s adeertiona in somo way to the
aphere of ethic~.

jcruaidt and ilraithwaito assort that the purpo~ of

religioua atate~ents is to evince attitu~ea.

olacksto~e agreea that some

religious statementa serve to produce nttitudes, but contends that none
of theae lw.va cognitive valuo.

,fore speoif'icall.y, Braithw11.ite and van

Buren argue that r eligiou8 &asertions function to expreas allegia~cea
to aet moral principleB.

Inj ecting the verification principle, Braithwaite

and van Buren suggest that empirical toetiug of intuntioll8 is possible
and ueceaaary~

(P.~rbapa Schmidt doea the aa.me.)

Van ll1.1ren supports the

empirical touting ot intention.3 b~oause ho view~ roli~ioua ass ertions as
express ion~ of an historical per~pective ~ith tar-reaching empirical
consequences.

3raithwaite ~nd van 3\lren also agree in the need for

underlying backgrounli "storied," but their agr-ieaent i u som•wi111t
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superficial.

Chriotian argues that a religious injunction depends on a

ba1:1io raligioua proposal for Ha significance.

The

rnen oumml:U'izad iu

this chapter agreo in salooting verifiability-

fnlaifiability as t ho yoint from which to proceed .in a description of t he
nature of religious discourse.

,ihile some con·tend uorv ViGorou.,ly !or

the cognitive value of roligioua language in l;erms of ita verifiabilityfalsifiability than othara, all agree to the neo<l for an empirical placett:eut or anchorago of reliHiouo languag8 aG detormiuative of ita lo~ioal
n:ea1.1nc .

In thi:J roop~ct all the men uddress the first of the tuo major

challenge;,. of ltnguistio o.ualyaia, the challenge born of positivistio
parentage.

CHAl?J$U V

Tllii; "LOGICS" OF llll:LIGIOUJ L/JiGUAQE

Introduction
Linguistic anal;yois otters two major challenges to the philoaop~
of religion.

?he first challenge demo119trates the poaitiviatio parentage

ot analysio in ita demand for tha verifiability or falsifiability ot reli•
gioue language.
age."

'?he second challenge flows from an anal7ais "oome ot

It asks theologians and philosophers of religion to characterize,

it thoy can, the conceptual framework, the rulea of thought, the syntactics ot interrelation in the roligious langw;.ge game.
inquirea into the "logic" ot religious laDgLt~.

In short, it

The current chapter deals

with answers to tho aeoond challenge.
The thinkers represented in thio chapter address theauselves to the
question, "What ie the 'logic' ot religious language'l" Most--exoept the
analogista--endorae the illlplicit methodology of the second analytic challenge.

They dismiss philosophJ from the task of constructing a supportiTe

metapti,eics tor theology. The7 have read soae coapleted analyaea, and
ooapli..nted the responsible aiialyat.
the sharpened attacks

011

They have listened carefu~ to

traditional argu..nte tor God's existence.

And

each hao accepted the challenge to describe the "logio" ot religious
laDgUage.
What features other than the mutual enoounter with the second a11al1tio ohallenge characterize the thinkera represented here? Generally the7
endorse the notion ot a apeoitic "logic" of and !or religious language.

Some employ the "u0e principle" to validate a apeciticully religioua lan•
guage game.

The an.:i.logiate are not so quick to accept a sui doueri.s

language game in religion.

And yet, although they emphasize the uue of

ordinary language in religion, they endorse implicitl.1 some type ot reli•
gious "language game" in their insiatence that the a"1bject ot religious
languasc deten.:ineo and qualifies th~ use of analogy •

.Recognizing the

individual singularity o! the varioua acalogists, it may be &aid that the
men ot thin chapter listened 010.,.ely to the annlysts' challenge, and
responded with descriptioua of tho ''logic:" ot roligioua language.
A second teature which characterizes tbe majority (again excepting
the nnalogista) is a strong emphasis on individuality and personality.
,.'hile the men represented in Chapter IV re!erred to the meaning of reli-

gious lang,..iage in terms of contiguity, confirmability, verifiability, or
falsifiability in the il.'orlcl ot "external" realit1, the men of this chapter arguo, in ~neral. that .. any "verification"

place in the milieu of the homo loguens.

ot religious

lall6"'Wlge take11

Almost to a man thase illritera

propose that it ia the "blik, 11 the ''onlook, 11 the lite-orientation adopted.
by the speaker which v~lidates religious language.

1

A third feature which }lelps to identity t.heae men (except for the
analogi~ts) ia their apathy toward cognition in religioua language.
moat to a

ll'JaD

thoy dupreciate th~ cognitive element of relicJious languag~.

A correlative is the widospread acceptance ot radical relativiam.

1

Al-

Once

One geta the i11pre:ssion that lJJa'D:J of th1t 11onanalogiata in this
chapter have their roots in nineteenth century idealism, via exiatential•
ism. On the other hand, the men of ~hapter IV vere influenced. to a ~reater degree by the realistic empiricism ot the early tventieth ceotUl"J'•
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Cognition 1o no part ot roligioua language, the relativism o! belief
which aupporta 1•eligious language (or "blik') io virtually assured.
Thtt chapter bot5inis with the analogiilta.

In one sense they straddle

the two major challeugea ot uualyais as they rely on the logic ot authority to detSoribe the nature o! rdigious language.

In general they argue

that it io the ~ubject llla.tter Yhich properly qualifiea ordinary language
and moulds it into roligious la~uage.
the caption, "Logia of »ituation."

the second group is described with

Both men in this group olaim to !ind

the logic of religious language in its phenomenological context.
third group clei'inea thu logic of r~ligious discourse

a5

The

logically "odd"

1u that it parallels the logic of personal la~uage (as when the word
11

I 11 i a the aubj6ct o! n atat~nient).

or

the !ourth ~roup describes the logic

religiouo language in terlllS of the expressive charactor ot religious

language.

~he men ~naly~e the logic o! religious language with reference

to th~ lit.it-orientation which lieo behind. the language and which, in turn,
the language expre3aed.
the placing

or

At the uame tim9, great caution iG indicated, aud

men into groups is uot meant to erase the individuality ot

each, as thv conclu5ion of t he ctuipter dvmonstratea.
Logic ot Authority
Alasdair l-1 aolntyre, I.an i~cBattie Crombie, and ~io Lionel Maacall
de~cribe the logic ol relision discourse in tenrus ot the aubjoct it discusses, n&Qely God.

Natural theology proYidea at le&JJt the blutio rationale

tor talk about God.

&it more, as each ot th.t •11 WU'&Vela hia theology,

he o!!ttrs llis particular theor1 ot the a1athorizatio11 tor raligioua
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language: from Hac!ntyre's awe before the myater1 of worship, to Crombie'e

authorizing Christ, to Haacall's intelligible God apprehended in ICJ'Ster,.
nlasdair Haclntyre
2
Alasdair Viacintyre offers

<;1.

ot theological languuga propoaed

critical corament to the interpretation
by

Karl Barth's followera.

This school,

says Hacintyre, holds that religious language (including the .Bible) be•

cowea meaningful only with a apecial mir~cle ot grace1 in any other case
it i.s meaningless.

l-iaclnt;yre contends that since moat roligioua language

utilizes familiar words with fllcid.liar meanings (his buaic asswuptiou),
ito sense it. eque.lly appai:·ent to believer and unbeliever.3

In addition,

l·lacintyre disa:vp.c-oves of theologians who attempt to deflate the analyst's
case by udud.tting that tl1oological language is eoaentially 11nonsanoical,"

2

Ala.atlair A.lexaudt:r Chalmers MacIntyre was on the ataff of tll~ University of Manchester, bDgland, in 1955. In 19.59 he be~m• lecturer in philoaophy at thH University o! Ltteda. Although Maclntyre reckoned himaelf a
Christian in th~ editorial introduction (p. ix) of New Eaeaya in PhilosoJ2hical Th1tology (New York; f.!ao111illan J0111paey, c.19.5.5), James .i. "4'oeltel
not~a in '"?:on-Hetaphyaical' Ohriatian Philosophy and Linguistic Philosophy," How '-'h~olo;g :i,o. 2, edited 'o-:f Martip. E. Marty and Dean G. l'eerman
(New York: Macmillan Co1t1pa~, c.196.5), P• 61, n. 6, that MacIntyre is no
longer~ pro!osaed Chri.stian. liow thia change atfec~a his 3tahd theory
of religious langWige is not readilJ apparent.

3Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Logical .;tatua of !{eligous Belief,"~phyaical Bc,liefa, edited bJ' Alaud!lir Haolntyre (J.iOudon: .:>~t·: ?rttas, 1957),
PP• 175-176. ;iillia111 T. Blackatone, in ?he Problem of !~eligious KnowledfS! (~nglewood ~li!fa, ~ew Jersey, Prentice-:Iall, c.1963), P• 164,
argues that Macintyre 1.s reliance on authorit1 as the ultimate justification tor r~ligious lani~ge is the logical equivalent to Barthial'lism.
Ha0Int7N is led (says Blackotone) to the concluaion that religious beliefs
are untalsitiablo, find that it is logically improper to argue in their behalf, because for him r"ligion consists in unconditional belief and free
choice. By tili.s assumption MacIntyre indic~tes that if one were to cite
eTidence, he would be treating religion hypotheticalll, and not uncondit1onall)'. Basil f;ji,tchell exam.i.nea H&cintyre'a cited article in "Juat1lication
of Religious Belief," Philosophical ::W!J:terlz, XI (1961), 21,-226.

1.59
or that religion deals \11th ''what cannot be said." The difficulty ia
that these t heologians us e the phrase

11

nonaensicul" in a

'flo.y

ditferent

from the ai,alysts. 4

It iu Maclntyre' s claim that worship lies at the heart o! the discussion of theological diucourae:
In worship 1"e do not talk a!,out God, but to him. • • • In formulating doctrine we aro trying to say what we do when we pray. So the
lclncuago o! liturisY i Q ut the beurt ot the r!:atter.'
The lauguago o! wors hip is it3elf naystematicully unclear

iuiu

reticent

about the object of worship." Five featurea in tho lan6uage or liturgy
co_operate to creattt t hi~ effect:

(l) use o! the vocative i::, fre ,.1 uent; (2)

epitheto occ1.lr io the gerunaive, or hover between t oe gerundive ~nd the
uescriptive; (3) met~phora used in wor3hip expre~s our hopes from God,

our praise o! iiim, bl.lt not a doacription of Him; ( 4) God' a greatness is
suggested by using ,~etaphora of ihe worshippers, not of God; (5) the tact
that worship ia not limited. to auy particular .3it@tion 1J18kee the expressiona of worship impracise. 6
Macint1re 'a diucuaaion of God's "existence'' further clarifies hia

theory of thu self-justifying n,,.ture of religious discourse.

It i~ his

conviction that no nonruligious concept apvropriatel:, elucidates the
notion ot ~od.

Tiu.~ is especially tu~ oase with ,hd

nonreli0ious concept

"existence":

4
l4acintyre, "The Logical $tat\.ls of it-,ligious Belief," Metapbyoioal
Beliefs, p. 178. McPherson (supra, P• 49) may be a caae in point.
5

-

6

Ibid., P• 188.

~ . , PP• 188-189.
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~ither one speaks from ~ithin religious. language, as it verez in
which oase "God oxiats" would be a pointless oxpreaoi on; or om
speaks from outside; in which case "God exists'' has no determinate meaning.7
In aum, !'iaclntyre assorts that religious la11guag" has a selt-jurstitying

character.

His description o! religious language is inherently imprecise

bacause it can unfold only aa the language ia used.
Ian NacHattie Croinbie

Ian NacHattie Crombio8 attempts to use t hu paradoxical natlll'e ot

theological lan}~age to provido a rationale tor religious discourse.

The

paradoxical feat ure~ of thoological statements do not demonstrate the illpossibility of meaningful theological atatements.

Rath~r, these teaturee

contribute to a meaningful apprehension ot theological statements in their
"partial characterization of [th~ subject." The r.aradoxical teat urea
demonstrate that theological statelll8nta "are made about no object which
falls within our normal experience." Crombie sum:;lllrizes his argument
briefly:
the inquirer ma::, learn from the paradoxical !eatures of theological
state~ecto, that, it they are a~thing, they are about a myste17.
If he requires further specification • • • he must seek it from tvo
sources. Firstly from the attin1t1e6 and relationslu.ps ~hi ch exist
between theological statements and utterances of other kinda (tor

7Ibid., p. 203. William T. Blackstone, in ''il.acint7re'e Analyai.11 ot
Religion, " llitf RoYiev, XIX o ~all 1962), 27-'32, accuses Hacint71"e of pre•
scribing rather than daacribing the uaea of religious language, and con. tends that MacIntyre• a view doea not r amovel,dittioultb.3 which concern
the ta~tual meaningfulness ot religious assertioua.
8
crombi&, an Anglican, is a fellow of fiadham College, Oxford. His
worka include All Examination ot Plato's n."" .. :; ::.ne, Vol. I, l:'lato on Ha11
and Jocietz (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), and Vol. II, Plato on
Knowledge and Aoality (New York: Humanities Presa, l96J)a and Plato&
The Midvite•a Apprentice (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965).
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example moral judgments1 to do tho will of God io our supreme
duty);and secondly by oonaidering whether a aenae ot l!IJ'&te~ aeema t()
be the appropriate rosponse to any part of our experience.9
It is apparent that thv ''formal properties" ot theological otatemente

(the eyntaotical rules of their relationa to other statements ot other
kinda, and the hermeneutical rules ot their interpretation) must be in
some senoe Mutually contradictor;y it theological statements are to perform their task.lo For Crombie, the formal properties ot theological
atatelll8nta aod tba undergirding theology of the statements appear to be
one and the same.

It one wishes to apprehend a theolosical statement

together with it::s intended Jlleaning, ''it is e:Jsential to do equal Justice
to each of three propositiona. 11 He continues,
First that the theist believes in God as a transcondont being, and
therefore intends what he says about Him to be raterrod direct~ to
God and not obliquely to this ~orld; second that the theiat genuinely believes God to bo transcendent und therefore beyond our comprehension; and third, that since on the one hand God is a m;J'&tery,
and since, on the othor hand, if a me.n is to talk at all he musi
talk intelligibly, therefore he only talks about God in 1-.ges. 1
Crombie !inda no direct inference from the paradoxioality ot formal properties to the meaninglessness of theological statements.

While it is true

that t hu critic bas a probable inference to that effe~t, the theist also
has a probable case.

The theist contonds that he is under obligation to

use language governed by paradoxical rules tor the expression ot his belieta.

9I. M. Crombie, "The Possibilit1 of Theological ::itatements,.'! Faith
and l.ogic, edited by Basil Mitchell (Londona George A1.len and Unv1n,

1957), PP• 3}-34.
10
Ibid., P• 39.

u lbid.,
12

..

~

P• 73.
P• .50.

12
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Crombie divides a statement about God into two parts.
or whatever it ia called, is Uod.

The "subject,"

~his ~ord has no other uae; it ia

''playing, so to apealt, on its Home Ground.,.!} The "logical usother" ot the
~ubject,

"God," C.:rombie calls "undifferentiated theism." Religioua

belief

haa two parents in 1t3 logical structure: undifferentiated theism ia the
logical mother, and "theopbanic revelation" the logical tather. 14
,'\gainr:St th6 critic who charges that theological stator4enta cannot
be meaningtul bccauae thOy employ a proper name ("Ood") which seews to

be logically incapable ot pr~ciae reference, Crombie posits the sphere

ot natural theology.

He uaes the word

one!:!! mean inconceivables.

"God" to define a sense in which

"God" is used to denote the postulated,

though unir:1aginablo, absence ot limitation.ts or impdrtections which dog
mon•s steps.

la thia way "God" beoomea the touchstone of theological

atateir.ents for tho critio. 15 Undifferentiated theism is neoeeaariq the

l}I. M. Crombie, 11'. t'heolos, and Falsification, 11 New ~aaya in Philosophical Theology, edited by AntolJT G, N. new and Alasdair MacIntyre
(Hew Xork: Y.acmillan Co£1paey, c.1955), PP• 110•111.

14

~ . , p. 111. The "undifferentiated theism" appears to be ~rombie'a
retere~ce to natural. theology, for he discoUAts any diacua~ion of God without a thought of God. Crombie•s argwaent tinds a parallel in Gordon D.
Kaufman, "'l.'wo I'iouels of Transcendernce: Au I1~quir7 into the Problem of
Theological Heanins," ~he Horitage of Chriatian Thought, edited by Robert
E. Cushman and .i:gil <'xrii:slia (Nev York: Harper and Row, 0.1965), P• 1861
"~• shall have to ahov that the aaning of words like 'God' and •transcendence• is aimilar in some re::3pecta to certain types ot ordi'D&r1 meaning
vith returcnts in finite experience, and that theue latter types of meaning can aerve as analogues in terao of which the thttological meaniug cau
be apprehended• • • • Inasmuch as this ia a general philoaophical task
dealing with tho Yory foundations of theology and faith, it can be regarded
aa the legitimate heir of natural theology tor our tiae."
·
l.5crombie, "Poaaibility of 'l'heological .::itatementa," ~aith and Lo5io,
PP• .56-67. God is not, sa,ya Crombie, the "reference point" £or the
Christian, whose every thought of God. ie one of worship. ~illiam P. Alston,
in "Elucidation of Religious Statements," Process and l>i'dnity, edited by

logical mother of religious belief and theological statements in that
Without her we should not know whither statements ~oncerning the
word (God] were to be referred; the subject in theological utterances would be una ttached. All that we should }mow of them is that
they were not to be referred to anything with which we are or could
hope to be acquainted • • • •16
The second part of a statement about God is the predicate.

The pre-

dicate normally consists of ordinary words put to unordinary uses. 17
Crombie describes the character of theolgical predica tes by comparing
them to analogical transfers from one field to another in ordinary language.

~wo f actors are involved in daily analogical transfer: (1) there

is a certain "appropria teness" in transferred words; (2) one can isolate
particular circums tances in which a word is used or withheld in a transferred sense.

Crombie suggests that a similar

11

feel 11 is present with the

transference of par abolic predica tes in theological statecents. 18

William L. Reese and Eugene I!'reeman (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court PubliEhing Company, c.1964), pp. 430-431, disagrees with Crombie at this point.
He argues that it is incorrect to imagine that in a sentence about God one
can first attempt to explain the subject-term, and then the key predicateterms. Only if one could teach someone who God is other than through descriptive phrases would this be possible.
16
Crombie, "Theology and Falsification," New Essays, p. 116.

17Ibig., PP• 110-111,
18

Ibid., PP• 120-121. Crombie argues against Flew (supra, PP• 9192) that it is the "feel" which prevents Christians from "qualifying" a
theological assertion out of existence. Alston, Process and Divinity, P•
442, emphasizes the positive aspect of analogues rather than the necessity
of a restrictive "feel": "By drawing analogies we get a picture, with taboos against using it in familiar ways. \\'hat is needed is a positive des:::ription of th~ ways in which it is to be used." He includes the following among the uses to which the "theistic picture" is put: explanation of
facts in the natural world; for prediction of future course of events;
expression of feelings; imaginative presentation of moral ideals; reports
of perception in religious experienceJ guide to worship.
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Crombio ia not content to posit theological predicates as something
of a parallel to analo3iea in duily language.

He asaerta that no one lesa

than Jesus enabloo the Chriatian to use parabolic predication.

The predi-

cate of a theological statement 1a essentially a "parable" spoken on
Ohrist's authority.

Just aa ll~ spoke in hu111an language with parable,

"sowe t oo speak of uod in ;:,arable--authoritative
.
parable, authorized
parable; knowing that the truth ia not literally that which our parables

represent.1119
Eric Lionel Mascall
Eric Lion~l ~.ascall20 begins hia studl of religious diaoourse with
a critique of A. J. AJer'a criterion

or

meaning.

He sums up his argument

concisely:
It is, I would n.1&intain, clear to anyona ••• that the fundaciental
criterion ot meani11ofulnesa is not oenae-veritiability but intelligibility, tb&t i3 to say that in order to know whothor a otate~ent has
meuning you ahould see whether it is possible to understand it.
Tnis stateme~t ia of course a tautology, and tborein lies ita
strength. For meaningfulnesa is a prilla17 notion, which ca~not
be described in terms of anything else.21
In describing religious language Mascall endeavors to construct an alter-

native to both ideulism and atnpirici::sm.

At the aalile time, the altornatiTe

ia to be o.s empiric6ll aa Ayer's "in toe seuae that it ass~rta that all

19crombie, ''Theology and

!lalsitication," t~ew .t::~says, PP• 122-123. It
appeara that Crombie's appeal to the parable• of Jeaud as beatowiiig aignit1cance to theological discourse ia a type ot alllllogical approach ultimately
depe11dent 011 a strong incarnational theology. Also, <,;rombie __., bo ahowing his Platonic bias with this statement.

20Ma.acall vaa ordaiuttd an Anglican priest in 1932. From 1947-62, h•
vaa lecturer in philosophy ot Religion at Oxford. He bas been profeaaor
ot historical theologJ, London UniTersity, King's ~olloge, since 1962.
21

Eric Lionel Mascall, ~ords and Images: A Study in iheological
Diecouru (l~ev Iorka l<c>Dllld Presa Coapal:l1', 0.1957), P• l } .
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the knowledge that we can have of reality is baaed upon our personal experience," but "re!uaea to limit exporience to aense-9xparience or to

.

11!.Qit aenae-exnerience
to the mere awareness of ssnse-~henomena. 1.22
.
Mascall poeea his criticism or Ayer in terms of three propositions:
'l'he first criticism i.s that sense-experience itaolt ma:, consist ot
something moro than the oxperieuce of sense-objects. The second is
that experience rnuy consiat ot something more than ~ensa-experience.
~\nd thu third it> that there rtJay be experionce which is not expressible in sentences at alli or which is expressible only in sentences
of a very peculiar kind.2~
In the first criticiaw Hascall endorses what ho calls the ThomistAriatotalian tradition of apprehension.

Ilia 3econd aud third defend the

possibility of mystical kuO\~ledge. 24
The author views as erroneous the argument of modern philoaophera
that the

S8ll$8S

perform all apprehension while

th6

intellect merely reai.sona.

lt is his primary contontion that the intellect not onl1 reasons, but apprehends aa well.

"It h~s, af.S its object, not only truths but things.tt25

A discussion of the mind'a apprehension is .essential to clari!ic:ation

the religious apprehension reterenc•d in religious di~courae~
tion to a "sensatioaali$t" position derived tro11 De.scartes•

ot

In opposi-

uiaxilll

of "saf-

ety .t'irst"--a poaition obsessively seeking ol.arity and sterilizing itaelt

in glacial frigiditJ--Mascall form'-llatea a three-pronged theo17 of apprehensioni

22

(1) the esdeuoe ot perception is not senae-a.vareness, bl.It

.!!!!s!•,

P• 30.

-

23

Ibid., P• 31.

24

Ibid., pp. 39, 42. Maacall contends (p. 44) that it is possible to
deacribe ar.d diacusa mystical experience ~bile remaining intelligible.

25

Ibid., PP• 63, 66.
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intelloctuoJ. &pp1·ohenaion:

"the intellect uses the sensiblo pheno11enon

as an object um . <1,uo, through which it paasea to th& apprehonaion of the
objectum guod which is the intelligible trans-sensible being"1 (2) the
intelligible object i :3 grasped thro ugh isensibl~ phenomena, not deduced
from or conatr11ctad out of them; (3) an attitude of "involvelllent, contemplation, and penetration'' is a prerequisito tor penetra~ion boneE.Lth
senaiblo phenomena to the "real intelligible things'' ::Jupporting theaa. 26

The sense of mystery is important to the structure undergirding
Hascall' s description of Nligious discourse.

!•1)-stery ia an object

in-

viting contemplation, urging penetration in conte~plation; it i3 not a
question d~mar~ding an answer. 27 As mystery is contemplatad a background
of receding depth appears.
natos its 3urroundinga. 28

Remaining it3elt obacure, the mystery illumi•
In ew.i, the nature ot ma~ 1 .J appr<theusion o!

trana-sanuiol e autitie3 ie essentially obscure in ite contdmplativo penetration.

But through th~ method ot apt'rohensi.Jn, pby:,ical objectu, per-

sona, a~d supremely Jod-transceud~nt can bo gl"a.:iPQd. 29

~ita thia supportive apprehenaion-thoory ot sensation, Masoall
proceeds to examine analogy as ~he most appropriate method of religious
discourse.
process.

He is convinced that language i.s not a mere codinb-d•coding
It is a meano o! cowmuning by ~hich two minds enter a cor.imon

intellectual lifa.

The furm11las of language, tbon, are neithe: the

26Ibisl•, PP•

10-71.

27Ibid.,

76, ?8-79.

28

-

Ibid., P•

-

29

PP•

79•

Ibid., PP• 82, 87.
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objecta guae of corornuuication, nor are they more or leas accurate "atruotural replicas of t nought. !,30 l1E&call justifies the comuiunicative tech-

nique of ,>t. John

1Y!

i;he Cross, ""ith its particular descriptive method,

not by a "conformity to a predott1rmined criterion, but ita siClple c;,.~city
to get its stuti:' across ."

A

cur1·ent exaciple ia the frequent uGe, in dog-

niatic theology, of imat illB.l al.8.logioe to expound theological truth or
mystery.3l
Nascall hail.::J the use of analog_, atJ proper in the iuce of the cllarge
that one therebi ref er8 to an object outside the sphero o! aecsation.

It

ie of thtt uatience of theisia to udwit that Clod io infinite and supra.sensible.
1'leverthule3o 1 "God cau be knew and thought and de~cribed, however obdcurely and imp\!rfectly, on tho basis of our experience · of thi; ,iorld in which
we !ind our.:Jelvea, the world ot aenaory experience." The ultic:iate purpoae

ot the doctrine or aoa.logy is not to provide the podsibility ot theologica1
thou~t or discourue, "but to explain how such a priu:a tacie unlike~ activity is possible."

'l'hougnt a.nd kuowledge o! God precede discourse, !or

mania rulated to Him in creation.'2

If analogical. statements about God

are possible, using word&I -whose primary 6ipplication is to finite beings
apprehended throut,;h senses, "there 1nu.st be a certain atfinit;y between God

and finite beings ~hich ia not excluded by the radical ditf~reno• which we
have seeu to charii.oterize t ileir existeutial status ••,}} In sWD, Ma11C&ll

30Ibid., P• 92.
31

Ibid., P• 95.

-

J 2 I~ict.,

p~. 102-103.

3)lbid., P• 105.

-
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adds little to the traditional Thomis~ic doctrine ot analogy, 1! indeed
he adds anything at all.
~.a5call contends that images as well as words have an epistemologi•
cal character inexhaustible by descriptive coding-decoding•.;4 He argu~s
that
the image or the image-complex, like the word or the word-complex, is
an objootwn quo, by the entertainment and contemplation o! which the
mind i s able to enter into intiraate cognitive union with the reality
of which it i s a manifestation.35
Christian imagery, thought, and discourse are anchored in two realms, both
controlled by Gou:

t ha natural world and the Ghuroh.

it i s in the natural order, \#heroin th~ \.,,ord

or

'.rhua, ''rooted though

God is tha light that light-

uth every man, " imagery is understood only in ita fulfillment in Christ,
the

,foL·d

mo.de f'leah.

God gives the great ima,ses to thtt Ghu.rch, and

in our thought and speech about him a3 in all el~, God does not
des troy the powers or our r.ature but confirma t hem and validates
them, evan in the act ~1 which he makes them the rav material ot
3Upernature and gr ocG.}()
Logic of ~ituatioD
'~he two men hore considered claim to discover the logic or religious
language in its phenomenological cont~xt.

Thdy move back one step trom

self-validation of religiouo l.auguage in natural theology (as in the aDMlogiata) by centering coDcern on the phenomenological formulation ot
a~pportive religious beliefo.

-

,34lb1d., P• 112.

-

''1b1a. ·
36~ . , PP• 125-126.

~onveraely, they move one step closer to
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the "blik, 11 or religious "outlook," as the validating taotor tor religious language.

Both illen admit a unique logic in religious la115UB.6e.

Both contend that a contextual situation providej thd va lidation of r eligioua lant;Uage, or that it is at least in terraa of tho r eligious situation that one approaches the ques tion ot t he logic of r eligious

la.Db'"Wloe•

Nillian J mart

~illian j ma.rt3? attempts to describe, through linguistic analysis, the

ioiµc ot religioua discourses ot the world.' s major religiona.

AasWliag

that linguistic analysis p6rmita one to appro:1ch religiowt statement• with
greater neutrality than any other methodological approach to the history

ot religioM, ~ma1•t describes his work as "an investigation of rsligtous
concepts in a spirit of higher-order ·neutrality. 1138

"mart pretors th4t term "language frame" over ·,taiamann' s ''stratum"
or •,iittgvnatein' a "language game," and sots out "to exhibit the style ot
propooitiona in the spiritual traaae."39 He hesitates to call his a stucq

ot "religious language," for he conaid.ars the context of spiritual statements to be ot great importance.

As

a conaequence, be limits his study

principally to the conaid.eration of roligious act'i vitiea which surround

37Roderick

Ninian Smart was Lecturer in Hiator;y and Philoao~ of
lutligion at the Ul11:~ersity ot London, King's College, 19.56-61. He has
been the u. G. ~.ood Professor ot Theology in the University of i3irmiagbam since 1961•
.38l{inian Smart, Reasons and 1', aiths: an Inve11ti tion of lu.li ioua
Discourse, Christian and Non-Christan Loudon: lioutledge and Ke gan Paul,

c.1958), P• 4.

39~ . , P• 10.
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spiritual language.lto ~he variety ot religious activities in world reli•
giona indica te a situation of widely divergent discourses.

3mart viaualizes

not only "macroaoopic" di!ferer.cea between the language of s pirit and other
l .::.uguage-frumes; he 1.ilso diatinguishes "microscopic" divergencios ~ithin

tho former.

An investigation of the divergent 11atrands" within the

la~uage of spirit is ~s easentinl ns the acrutil:13 of various language
frar.iea. 41

In sum, the comparative ~tudy of religions appears to offer tho

moat appropriate methodology for isolating tlla logioe of religious discourses.

with this approach J Cllal't hopes to protect himself against the

supposition that any one faith provides the "correct" picture of religious
disoourse. 42
::imart concentratoa on three major religious strands: the "numinous,''
the "mystical, '' and the "incarnation." '.Cheae three strands do not exhaust .

the totality of roligious di6courae.

Uowever, they peraiit an inveatiga-

tion ot the: major s trands of impo.r tance.

'l.'he author examines Brahmanism

(which he call8 a nuniioous strand) to determine how proposition.s about
the Creator, the object of worship and praise, are established.

He aua-

ruarizea his study in this way:
holineas ia not a straightforward empirical property, for propositions
aboQt the divine express a bumble reaction to t h~ glories and mysteries
in the world, which 18 directed at a divine target said to lie beyoDd
tho worla, tor thereb1 its dread .tll1'steriousness is w~ll delineated.
This Power's nature i~ aaid to contain sentience, parti, bocause the
emergence of th~ world from tho dark Toid seems chosen. And Brahman
is not only boyond all this but far, !or herein is signalized the
great gl.ll.t fixed between the sinful worshipper and the pure ancl

lto101d., PP• l.}-14.

-

41.tbid., PP• 14-1,5.
42

Ibid., PP•

6-7.
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resplendent object of worship. 43

In t\lrn, Smart retleots on the fashion in which propositions of m:,atioal
clauw are confirmud.

Hinayana Buddhism, he claims, malliteata the mysti-

cal experience in iaolationi

we may say not too misleadingly that HiDayaua ia built round the
Ul1'Stical path, even thpµgh there are extraneous manifestatiou of
theism and polytheiem.'t'+
The prec~nditiona for attaining nirvana, and the type ot experience vhioh
culminatoo in the Fath, have their effect on religious discourse.
First, the intensity of the bliss is auoh that it is best, albeit
inadequately, expressed by tSaying that it ia "indescribable'',
"inettable", etc. ~econd, the mystical state does not involve
having i::iental images or perceptions (and th11s in the Upani¥-ds
ia compared to dreamless sl~ep), and ao there ia nothing about
it to du.scribe (and thus it is unlike clay-dreaming and visualization in general).45
The mystical experience is a transfiguration, and the man becomes a "holyt1
!llln, a "raau transfigured. 1146

At thia point ~mart indicates that language of doctrirual strands-such as the nwninous and myatical--is not precise.

Its imprecision is

•Vi.dent in the reluctanoe ot theologians to drnv definitiTe conceptual
lines unless forced by heresy.

Laxit7 in precision is the child of the

loose use of ·expressive language which accommodates varying spiritual
exproasiona.

I'- addition, n ''pretence of precision" say lead to the loaa

ot religious wonder1 faith without wonder has no essence.
4

'Ibid., P• 53.
44

,.,~ . , PP• 57, 59•
Ibid.,. P• 71.

46
~ . , P•

76.

I n ~ case, it

1?2
ia preci~ely the lack of precision ~hich allows the int&rweaYiDg ot diTer..
strande to occur. 47 ~mart contends that

the atrand or discouroe abo11t Brahman, express1Te ot a reaction
to the mysteries ot reality, ia related to the 1,~~uage about the
Atman, expreasive ot inner ~stioal achievement.'tt:S
'?he similarities between Atman atid Brahman, between that realized in
m;yistical experience and the reality behind phenomena, Smart collates under three pointa:

(l) with roference to formal oharacteriatics of the

tll,1Stical experience (timoleosnesa, imperceptibility, the tran.eoendence
of nirv~na)1 (2) with reteronce to the type o! doctrine prominently associated with niysticiom; (}) with referonce to certain conaequenoes ot 1111sti•
cal attainment. 49 He concludes that
The identification of Brahman with the Atman serves, then, aa a
prominent exau:ple ot the kind of veaving tog~ther of different
stranda of discourse in a doctrinal scheme • .50
Having discussed the lQJ&tical and 11Uld.Doua strands ot spiritual dis-

course, .adlClrt turns to thtt ''incarnation" strand. Thia strand includes,
among others, the Christian faith.
of an extra-,aundane deity.

Incarnation preauppo:aes the e.xiatence

The ostabli8h11ent ot a claill ot divinity inter-

locks propositiona about a holy Teacher with propooitiona about an object

ot worship.

i'!odes by whioh this propositional union ia effected area

Ca) a formal resemblance (as manifeated in ~iraclea) ia posited between
the incarnate deity and the object ot worship, as for exaaple, an analogieal
.
~

47Ib1d.,
PP• 79-80.
48Ibid.,
P• 77.
49Ib1d.,
l'• 82.
.50
~
P• 107.

-

-

..
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similarity in purity and holiness; (b) a verbal displa~, of the Te~cher•a
omniscience demonstrates hia power to save, and this brings hill close to
Ood on the principle that the holy constitutes a eource ot ealvation1 (c)

"his lite includes some gesture or gestures which ba"te the effect ot 'bring-

ing salvation to mankind: tor this to happen he must either 'be God's..,.~
special instrument or God himself";

(d) Messianic prophecies

are coutrued

as foreshadowing the union of Teacher and object or woreb1p.5l
Smart•s diacusaion ot doctrinal priorities and his consideration ot
epistemolog-l~al queations are ot little concern here, but his examination

ot moral beliefs ia illuminating. He regarda moral beliefs as representing an independent strand of diacourse subsequently combined with other
spiritual etrands.52 He puto his case concisel1:
it seems not inappropriate to treat moral propositions as logica~
independent of religious ones, except in the sense that by becoming
incorporated into doctrinal schemes they acquire th• status also of
being religious propositions. Renee, from our point ot view, they
may be conaidered as oonetituting a separate strand ot discourse.
within doctrinal achemes.5}

The numinous strand incorporates the ~oral strand through superimpoaitioDJ
the whole ot life becomes worship of God.54 The relationahip between the
~atical and the moral stran~s ia more oomplex.

In the ~atical, the

prized goal of human behavior is union with the dirine. ,\ttaiuent of
this goal generall1 requires at least moderate aaceticiam, and !!IOral rules
appear to be valuable training in selt-oontrol.

..

.5l

~

~-.

.52

PP• 12.5-126.
P• 179.

53Ibid.,

P• 182.

~

P• 18}.

54

..

On the other hand, the

1?4
quietiatic ideal of the moral judgments engendered within tho mystical
strand leans toward such principles as ahimsa, or .non-injury.55 The relation between the incarnation strand and the moral strand presupposes an

extra-mundane God.

The incarnate deit1 is likely considered to be the

supreme example tor daily lite. The incarnation strand shows not merely
how well moral conduct meahes with religious actiY1t1, but alao what makea

ooaleeoenco possible, namel1 the merciful goodneas o!

~od.56

From this study of the religious activities which surround religioua
discourse of the three spiritual strands, S111&rt concludes that no single

analysis o! relisious language eraerges.

iioligioua language is "logicall1'

variegated. 1157 'l'he rationale !or examining separately the divergent

strands of religious discourse is to be found primarily in the diYerging
doctrinal schemes which underlie the propositions •.58

Unwilling to make a theoretical statement about all religious diaoourse, in the and Smart does not hesitate to suggeot that one can isolate
types of grounds through which the olaim.e made in different strands of
religious diacour~ are validated.

He concludes that there a.re four wa7s

throli.gh which the claims of the nwd.nous, m:atioal, and incarnation atl'&llda

of religioua discourse validate themaelves.

-

(1) BIi.sic justi!ioatiou

appeal directly to some supportive aspect ot the discourse itsel!.

In

the nwdnoua strand, for exa14ple, appeal is iraade to the l!llll"Velouo ucl

55.Ibi~., P• 192.
,56lbid., PP• 192-194.

57Ibid., P• 197•
.58Ibid., P• 179.
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•..,•-in.spiring features ot the world through which the Hol1 Being reveala
Himaelt.

(2) The formal ground parallels the correspondence theory ot

truth, or rationality.

In the mystical strand, tor example, a formal

appeal for confirmation is made to the 1117stic's behavior and utterances,

to

his lite, and to the lucidity of hie spirituality.

kgain, the sillplic-

ity of monotheism is a formal advantage over the multiplicity of pol.7- ·
thoiom.

(3) Organic ju5tificatio11 appeals to analogies and aimilaritiea.

This type is especially active in the incarnation strand.

(4) Finally,

aupport for tbe doctrinal utrand is claimed through priority decision,
that ia, through "preterentinl" juatifiaa.tion.

In this aathod (a varia-

tion ot formal justi!ioation), different doctrinal schemes are supported
by

varying the strength o! b~sic ingredients because of pragmatic consider-

ations and nuctuating base strengths.

This mode ia used espeoi.all7 in

inter~eaving the strands.59
These four types o! claim-validation, evident in the preceding examination of religioua discourses, make it apparent that blind acceptance

of religious thinking d.oea not agree even with r~ligioua practice.

5x-

treme revelationista, insistent on separating reason and taith, are d.iatantly removed from the practices of religion:
For this reason, proponents of extreme revelationism are unthinkingly allied to those who would assert that religious propositio:u
are, because unverifiable, meaningless. But it should ot course be
remembered that the type of reasoning emplo7ecl on behalf of religioue
clsiu is of a spacial nature, and is ot courseJuite unlike that
which ia exemplified in mathematics or p~aios.

Smart Vindicates tbe title ot his book, Reasons and Faiths, in co11olucling

59
Ibid., PP• 198-199, 12?.
6o
Ibid., P• 200.
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that each spiritual strand of religiows practice, inseparable from an

attendant religious discourse, provides a validation tor ita own proposi•
tions.

Form this persp@otive, r$ason(s) and faith(a) are complementary,

not antithetical.
Peter Munz
61
Peter Munz
locMtea his study ot religious statemen·t s between two
antitheses, naturalism and too traditional interpretation of religious
utterances.

Hi.a attempt to validate the status of theological discourae

bas a double purpoae:

Firatly, it serves to tree religioue knowledg~ from tha clutches ot
the naturalists who would r~duce it to something else •• ••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Secondly, it becomes a criticism of the traditioaa.l juetiticatioDS
ot religious knowledge • • • • The old accowits accord a priTileged
position to some religious statements, and the naturalistic treatments deny statue to all religious statetAenta. As againat these two
approaches, tho philosophy of religion should show how and why religioua otatements are acceptable; and that no religious ~tatement can
claim a privilepd position in regard to its meaning and truth other
than thtt one accorded to it by general reasonablenesa and pl.&uai•
bility.62

Munz argues that the relatiouhip between belief and behari.or is the
direct opposite of common interpretation. He contends that the emergence
of myth and ritual is explicable without explicit reference to prior
belief.

Re posits thtt symbol as the direct, immediate consequence of a

"feeling-state." Once the dependent relat1011abip between belief and be•
havior is eatablishecl, "the road is open tor an explanation ot belief aa

61 In 19.59 Munz vaa ~enior Leoturer in Hiatol'J at Victoria Ulliftrait7,
Wellington, New .:Aaland.
~eter Munz, .Probleu of ~ligious Knowledp (London& ~CM
c.19.59), P• 29.
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a belief or a theory about ritual and SD¥th•"63
I1unz seoks to ascertain what the theologian,' s role is if the nature
of the relationship between myth and belief is as be baa doscribed it.
Traditionally, behavior
The theologia.n's

lu>.a

been viewed

aa

action subsequent

taak wao on&- of deduction.

liut

to

belief.

now the tables are turned&

According to the argume~t of the present book, the function of theology is to give a description ot the symbol picture in the same Y&:¥
in which the physicist deacribea another picture of the world we are
living in. '1.'he theologian is to treat the symbol picture as his
subject-matter. He has to think about~ and oboerve certain rulea
of thought, just as the ph7siciet does.
In conoiduring the place of symbolism in the theologian's new task,
J.iunz concludes that the theologian may evo.de both anthropomorphism and
agnoaticiam if he remembers that aymbols represent nothing trans~endent:
they ure enda which describe the world or worlds in which r.w.n finda uiaThia approach to symbolism delllOnstrates the invalidity of analogy

selt.

as we11. 65 The theologian must remain convinced that the only element of
certainty in religious thought resides in the picture symbol.

Through-

out the procees of "theologizing, 11 the symbol must alwa:,a remain open to
hypothetical interpretation, dogmatic hardening o! interpretation 13 not

to be al.lowed. 66

In sum, theology- io a theor, about the symbol picture.

The truth of theology can be tested only against the s1111bol picture.

~'hen

thore ie no symbol picture, the theologian oaJlllot ofter the invitation

63Ibid.,

-

64

P• 6.5.

~-,

P• 8.5.

65Ibid.,

P• 99.

-

66

Ibid., P• 17.5.
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to bel:i.eve in the truth of theological statements. 6?

In this "new" theo-

logy propositional symbols are not "first principles" from which theology
can be deduced.

Propositional symbols themselves are the "subject matter"

of theological thought.68
Munz interjects one material qualification for the work of the theologian.

The theologian, by the very nature of his vocation, must utilize

the concept of eternity in his analysis of symbol •
.He assumes that the concept of eternity has a defiuite meaning and
then proceeds to the elucidation and interpretation of the symbol
picture with the help of that concept.69
The theologian chooses to uae the concept of eternity under the knowledge
that detection of eternity is the "only proper therapy for man. 1170
~'here remains for Munz to discuss the environment within which the
symbol picture is best cultivated.

The most healthy environment is one

in which the symbol picture contributes to an eternal therapy for man:
"This is the sense in whi.ch I would say that the maxim extra ecclesiam
nulla salus is true.

Without the cultivation of the symbol picture we

cannot see eternity • • • • 1171 Munz emphasizes the importance of the
worship situation as a atiroulua for the symbol picture:
A Church is a community of people who have decided to cultivate
a certain symbol picture. Hence the basic principle that lex orandi
is the lex credendi • • • • For the lex credendi is merely an interpretation of and a speculation about the lex orandi.?2

6

.?Ibid., P• 175.

68Ibid.,
69

p. 124.

Ibid., P• 128.

?Oibid., P• 129.
71Ibid.,
P• 130-131.
72Ibid., p.
1?6.
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Logic of Particularity in ftoligious Language
The third group ot men describe the logic of religious lalliJU8.{5e aa
"odd "--Ian

•.r.

~<amse:,' s term--in its own special way.

l'hey !eel that the

particularity o! roli~ious language parallels tho logic of "personal"
language, that ia, language which discusses peraons.

rihile those

1:1e11

favorably compare the peculiarity of the logic of religious language with
the peculiarity of peraonal language, they disagree on the elements ot
personal lancuage which moot acc_u rately parallol the logic of reli&'ious
language.

Ramsey contenda that the moY~ment of language from eopirical

anchorage to a situation of discernment-commitment (the religious situation)
ie best described in terms of. the logic manifested in the uae of the word
"I."

}'rank H. Cleobury merely refers to "per1:1onal" language.

,iilliaJI

Rordern isolates eeveral aspects of the "personal language game" which are
par.allel with the logic of religious language.

Donald D. ~vans emphasizes

the aelf-i~volv1ng and ~er!ormative factors of personal language as the
fi&rallel to the logic of religioua language.

As a voup, all cont and that

the special character o! religioua lariJUage re.sidea in th~ particularity
of its logic, a particularity which in some ways parallel3 the logic ol
personal atatemonta.

ls.n Thomas RB.mae173 endeavors to demonstrate what follows "from

73aamsey was ordain9d an Anglican priest in 1941. He has been Canoa
Theologian o! Leicester Cathedral since 1944, and Nolloth Professor ot the
Philosophy ot the Christian R~ligion in tha Uni•ersity o! Oxford, as well
as Fellow of Uriel Oollege, since 1951. Th• writer did not haYO aoceas
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grounding th~ological words and phrases in what I have called a oharaoteriatically roligious ait11ation. ,,74 l~maey acts with the oonri.ction that
contemporary analysis provides a novel insight into proble11a and controversies of theology, "illuminating its claim and ro!orming ito apoloptic.n75
Utilizing an analytic approach, Ramsey moves the empirical anchorage
of theological words to "discernment," that is, to a religious :situation
through which men are aware that they are more than their public behavior.76
As meaningful parallelo to the aituatio11 of "religious discernment," he
.:lirocta attention to situations in which phrases are UIMd in a peculiarl7
unusual way.

He

refers to situations characterized by such phrases as

"the ice breaka," or "the light dawns."77 The religious empiricist is
sure to !ind features which parallel· "diacerDlll8nt" in situations described

by existentialiats as "authentic existence," or "involvement."78

On

the

other hand, the characteristically religious situation is not merely
"emotional.," that ia, subjeotive.

A religious situation has u

''object1n"

reterenoe in its occurrence1 it is "aubjeot-objeot" in structure.

There

to liamse7's latest work, Christian Discourse& Some Lo cal E.lx oratiou
(Oxford: University Presa, c.19 5.

74ran

'I:. Hamsey, Religious Layuap: An liapirioal Placing ot l'heolopcal Phrases (London: SCH Preas, 1957), P• 10.

1,Ibid., P• ll..

76~ . , p. 1.5. Ramsey appeals to Joseph Butler's 'l'he Aualop: ot

Reli ion 1'atural and Hevealed to the Constitutioa and CourlM ot NatUN
1 th century- in selecting "discernment" as the aharaater1atio situation.

'l1Ba.maey, 1leligioua Langwas,, P• 17.
18

.ill!!• '

P• 22.
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ia an objective "depth" which emergea.79 Raaiae1 ie set

Oil

describiq

"discerwuont" br,causa it ia his conviction that

when theological phraaes ••• are seen a:s spooaoring Buch a situation, they oan tllon be given such a logical atruoture as by-paaaea
many traditiow:il ccnt1.1siona and controversies which are in tact
trom thia s tandpoint mere brawling.HO
Ramsey is not content to describe the empirical anohorage

language with mere reference to discerDlll8nt.
comitant

ot 'r eligious

In addition there ia a con-

11

collll1itment" involved in the religious situations

Uow it is such a total commitment, appropriate to a "queatioD ot
great col158quenoe," a commitment which is baaed upon but goes beyoDd
ratiollB.l considerations which are "matters of specu.l.atioD"I a commit•
••nt which ~eed ill a situation all that the understanding can give
ua an~ more; a commitment which is Afemplified oy conscientious acticn
building on "probabilities" • • • •
The Commitmvnt is a situation upon which diacornment focuses; man discel"D8
the situation as 111ak1ng a claim on hia. 82 Iu,ligioua coJlllllitmttnt is tied

to key wordd.

Their logic baa tho peculiar nature of r-c:aembling words

which cha.raottsrize peraoual loyf4lty as well as words ot mathecstical
axiom.s.

The co'41ilit111Unt•worcla helve a logic which combines teaturvs of

both, for they are "key-word.a suited to tho whole job of living--'apex'
worc1a.118)
If religioua language haa o.a ita purpoae to speak about situations
of di1.1oernme11t and cOlllllli.tment, religious language will be "object laiaguap

79Ibid.,
8o

..

~

PP• 27-28.
P• 26.

81
Ibid., PP• 17-18.
82
Ibid., P• 29.
83Ibid.,
P• 37.

-
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.
84
which exhibits logical peculiarities, logical impropriet~. 11
fheological
lau~~e will uae words which are rocognizablf "straight-forward," but
''strained" in some

way

to tell the tale of discernment and commitment. 85

In addition, theoloeical lan1uage will include certain tautologies whose
function it will be to commend thl;l "key words,'' the "ultimates ot explanation. 086
'l'heoloUY is concorned to uae aud qualifJ obaervational language so
that it ia suitable currency tor religious lausuago--tor what in part extends beyond observational language • .Ramsey- selects the word "I" as a
word whoae characteristics are not exhausted 111 "object" language.

He

aum~esta the.t it is enlightening to par,i.llel this word with "God" in con-

sidering the religious situation, tor 110od 11 too participates in a aphero
apart from the "object;," "87 More torcefuU,,
our conclusion is that for the religious man "God." is a ke1 word, an
irreducible posit, an ultimate of explanation expreaeiTe ot the kind
ot commitment he profeasee. It is to be talked about in terma of
the object-language oTer whioh it presides, but oJU.1 vhen this objeotlQu~-uago iu qual~tied1 in which case this qualified object-language
booomae also currency for that odd diaoerllll8nt with vhioh religious
commitment, when it is not bigotry or fanaticism, will necesaril1
·b e associated. 88

In sum, religious language tal.ke of disceZ'DJINtDt with which a total colllllitment 11:l associated by way ot responoe, but it speaks ot tbia disoermaentcolZlllitment in ter ms ot a qualified objact-laneuage preaided oTer b1 the

84

Ibid., P• 38.

85Ibid•., P• 39.
86
P• 4o.

~-.

87Ibid.,
88Ibid.,

P•

38.

P•

47.
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key word "God."
Ramsey next turnu to tho se-,·eral ways in which object-language is
qualified for religious use.

He investigatos three methods ot transter-

once through which word$ with empirical mooringa become descriptive ot
tbe roligioua situation.

The firat ia the Mthod o! negatiYe theoloQ•

'l'he use or lan5uage in t1egat:ive theology is the attempt to describe God
at the cost of emphasizing Hie diatauce from certain elomenta of percep-

tual languuge.

The merit of negative statements is that they are primari-

lf evocative, and provide a technique tor meditation. 89 In the second
method, tho "method of contras ts, 11 puzzlement over certain words uaed in
r~ligioua diacourse (unity, aimplioity, perfection) is graduall1 elilllinated by poaiting opposite wordo, and then contrasting the two.

The con-

traating comparison is E!.!!!: halted so long as one can go on striving to
remove thu diveroo element (that is, until tho experience ot disoernmont).

With tho method of contrasts, one always begina with a situation ot empirical anchorage.90 Ramsey's third moiie ot dbtinguiahing the logiQal
behavior o! religious language is the

Hodel~uali!ier." '!'he qualifier

11

prescribes tha apecitic mode by which the model is to be deToloped.

Thia

process encourages movement in aocordance with the qualifier's nature.
"First Cause" is an example of the Model-~ualitier method.

The qualifier

S9Ibid. , P• 5 ~.
90
Ibid., p. 5.5 . Vladimir Losslq, in The Mystical Theolop ot the
Eastern Church (London: James Clarke and Company, 195?}, PP• 25, 37, 39, speaks
ot "apophatioism'' (the method ot negations) and "oat&pbaticim" (the method of attirnlationa) as two modes used to reduce mystery when an attempt
is made to comprehend God. The former is Eastern, the latter Kestern (in
the Church). They present something of a parallel to the ..thoda Bamae7
has thus tar considered.
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(in this case "First") pursues the model until it confronts commitment.

At commitment there is the ultimate of explanation.

At commitment the

Qualifier-Model may indeed have a grammatical similarity with the point
of its inception, but no logical parallel is present. 91 These three
methods of qualifica tion--from empirical anchorage to discernment and
commitment--provide Ramsey the conclusion that all words, if suitably
qualified, can lead to the religious situation. Put another way, this
is the claim that God can be seen in all the words of His oreation.92
At this point it seems wise to interrupt, temporarily, our swnmary
of Ramsey's Religious Language in order to doraonstrate from others of his
works that all words, if suitably qualified, can lead to the religious
situation.

In Freedom and Immortality, Ramsey shows the empirical anchorage

of two metaphysical ideas (and words) which are related to theology.

He

~osits as a basic linguistic aa6Wllption that "no situation at any given
time will ever be exhaustively covered by object language. 1193 For example, when ordinary language refers to a "decision" in complex terr.us-as it often doea--it demonstrates a diversity which allows that some human

91
Ramsey, Religious Language, pp. 62-65. In "Towards the Relevant
in Theological Language," Modern Churchman, VIII (October 1964), 46-58,
Ramoey examines the process of choosing relevant phrases from empirical
situations which may be properly qualified.

9~sey, Religious Language, p. 80. After discussing two contemporary approaches to the Scripture itself, the historical-critical and the
Bultmannian-existential schools, Ramsey concludes (p. 1o6) that both demonstrate the validity of his arguments concerning theological language, even
biblical language. The Bible cannot be made to conform to public language.
It speaks of the same discernment-commitment situations which are the baees
of contemporary religious language.

93Ian T. Ramsey, Freedom and Immortalitl (London: SCM Press, c.1960),
P• 93.

behavior in "decision" eludes complete deaoription in aciantitic terms.
'L'he oornpl exity iuvolved in th-, word "decision" provides Rn argunient tor

the existence of free ·.~ ill. 94
Hamsey argues in a 3imilar pattern in his consideration ot scientitic
landuago.

~cientific evento give rise, in discloaurea, to all kinds of

invariants. 95 From invariants the scientist deduces empirically verifiable

faotors.

The scientific words which doscriba invariants ditler in logical

character from theological wordo.

There ia a vast logical difference

between t he bohavior of theological and scientific I.fords.

"From theo-

logical aa:;ertions no verifiable dechtctiona can bo 1:ia~le; from acionti!ic
onos they can anu

1l1ust

be. 1196

?here is a point, however, at whioh the acienti!ic and the personal
interlock--at the poio.t ot tho word "I. 11 The aosertion "I exiat" g!.vea
no opportunity, through a proceas o! rigorous deduction, tor a detailed
Ou the other band, all sorta ot acienti!ic asaertion.e

aasortion about r.;e.
entail

11

I ~xist."

For example,

~/hen tha t".athemtician sayo of r.ie, "He is executing circular motions

with such and auch angular velocit1 and with a centrifugal force
on his partner which raises her feet 45° to the wrtical"-hia
e.saertion will entail (i:l I am on the dnnce tloor) "I exist. 119?
From this one can argue that the diversely logical areao ot aciance and

94
Ibid., P• 149. Rl.111887 adda "duty'' and "obligation" as additional
situations not w~olly deducible into object-lan5uage, and as arguments
for tree wiJ.l.
951.an :-g. Hamsey, lutli ion and Jcioncea Conflict and .i nthesi.s Jo•
Philosophica~!lectious London; s. P. c. K. Presa, c.l
, P• 7}.

96 Ibid., P• 75.
97Ibid., P• 74.
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theology ''can be unitod together on tho basis ot lo~oal clues :supplied b)'
behavior ot the word 'l. ',.98 Th.- oaae ot God is parallol.

i:'rom "God

exists" nothin~ verif iable can be deduced logicali,, tor the ·- orld is
not neceauary to God .

But ''God exists" iu a preauppouition ot all sc1en..

tific, verifiable agaertiona.99 In fina.l -analysis,
religious languugft i ::l g.rouncl~d in the pe:r:Jonal ••• the persoaal
:'.s not only a categ,,z·y which ia never wholly reducible to aoientitic
terms, but • • • interlocks with all the diverse languages ot acience
to unite them ao a conit.1on presuppoaition.100

Hal!I.Sey attempts to discover how the thoological aasertion "uod. exists"
sorves aa t ha preuuppoaition of all scientific empirical assertiona.

C~ithout explicit statement he is demonstrating how all words suitabl7

qualified can lead to the religious situation.)
llent.

In sum, this is his argu-

The scientist needs, in work and theories, "invariants" (such aa

· particle ar1d maas) which are neither men jingles nor descriptive labels.
't he inTaria~ts arise in one wa.y or another from-and witness to-a disclosure or insight.

The acientist is careful not to construe hi• invari-

ants as descriptions, although b.e may neglect Qiomentarily the cliaclooure..
bacJia of bia central concepts.

Ue 1& torced b7 his scientific objeotiTe

to participat ·e in ded.uctive Terifia1:1.tio11 which is ruled. out in ·t heolos:,
(for language about th@ cosmic disclosure, t1God exists," is 110 less capable

of empirical veritioation than the phraae "I exist"). Hove-.er, the Tery
particularity and peculiarity which attaches to the logical character

98Ibid.,

P• 75. Ramse1 discuases in greater detail the queBtion ot
the "I," or self-identit;y and per.toaalit7, in ''Peraou aud Funeralaz
What Uo Person \•iorcis Mean?" Hibbert Journal, LIV (Ma7 1956), :,30-338.
9
9Bamae7, .iwligion and ~cieno•, P• ?4.

lOOibid., P• 76.
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of "God exista" permits thies phrase, without generating the "nonaense ot
category-confusion," to b~ linkod with all empi:'ioal as3ertiona as a prew
euppoeition of aaid aaaertiona.

''Here thc,n, 11 Ramsey ea7s,

is a synthetic vent~re which tries to do justice both to the diTeraity
and to the ultimate interlockiDfS of aciontifio und tneological diacourao; both to the experimental method in ac:f.eucf: 1 and the grounding of ec~entific invariants in disoloaurea tha~ aro ultimately
theoloc;ioal.101
·
"God" in thia persiJOctive names that invariant "which is anohor~d objectivew
l;y in a disclosure situation, \-then that situation involves tho whole uDiverse.11102
At the point of coomio disclosure we return to tha aumr.w.ry o! Ramae7's
f<eli:5iouo Lan1:~U/:l.f$8•

The three methods of qualification have as their goal

tho situa~ion of discernment-commitment.

\faother the "light breaks" or

not is a matter 1-1hich man himself cannot control. l03 There ia the poasi.bility that if man conj~ctureo himself to bC3 in control of n discenuaentproducinG power, ho would oon3truo hima"l! maator ot the myateriou3.
I<ar.1sey warns that while an era1pirical nppruach to rell~ioua language
ascertains what logical placement the truditional pbrasea ot Christianity
have, the ei:i1>irical ap proach never imagines lan5U8-ge to be ar.i exact "Teroal
photograph" of what it talko about.

There is the mysterious dioclosed ill

101
Ihi~., PP• 8l -82, 83•
~

102
~ . , P• 73. In Freedom and Immortality, PP• 99-lCX>, Ramsey criticizes the idealists, especially Bradle1, tor remoTing tue objectivity present in cases ot "disclosure." In the awareness that one is ''tr&nsoendiDg"
Pllblic behavior, one is also aware of acme "transcendent," tor no experience can be 1.tttorly subjective; nit ever there were afll purely su.bjeotift
expitrience it would be be1ond our keu ud beyond our lallglMlge to talk ot
it." To eoe how Hau.aey visualizes a situation of disceroment-commit•nt
in th.- ieourrection, an ''odd" situation of more than purely au.bjeot1ft
experience, see his "Logical Character of llesurrection•bctliet," Theology,
LX (May 1957), 186-192.
103

.Haause:,, Religious Iapguap, P• 79•
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the discernment-comr.iitment situation, and it is neTer fully exhausted in
the empirical placins of :oligious languag-1.l04 Ultimately it is to the
worship situation that one must r~tire tor [5Uidanoe 1n plotting and
mapping theological phrases:
Here then ia a method by which not on.ly al"e pt'oblttrlUJ overuome, but
where at every point we plot &nd map our theological pbra13es with
roterence to a characteristir.ally relibioua eitUH.tion--one o! wor3hip
,,onder, awe, ,Jithout such an ecipirical anchorage all our theological
thinking ia iu vain, and where there is controveray and argument we
nre to look for their ro...olution where they are fulfilled: in
worship.10.5
.Fr!lnk Harold Gleobu~

Frank Harold Gleobury106 proposes in Christian i<ationaliam and Philo5ophical , nalysis to refute 13raithwaite's thesis:

"'t he contral argu.ment

of this book is in effect a refutation of Braithwaite'a thesis. 11107
Gleobury, an idenliot, is un~illing to capitulate to tlhl realist which he

claims to find behind the facade o! philosophical aDalyeis.

iio addresses

himself to the queetion of language in idealistic philoaopby b;r dividing
language into ''personal" and "impersonal."

Impersonal languase cunaista

in sentences whose ~ra11m1atical subjects are material-object or scientificobject nouns. 108 3entencos of pe~sonal lao.:,"'Wlge have a direct relation

l04Ibid., P• 171.

l05Ibid., P• 89.
l06Cleobury was ordained an Anglican priest in 1951. He hka been
rector ot llerti~!ordbury, Uiocese of :.;t. Albans, since 195.5.
l07Flran!il li ~old] Cleobury, Qhriatian Rationalie!Jl and Philoaophiaal

Aualysia Uondon: Jamaa Clarke 1tud Compazq, c.19.59), P• 17.
l08Ibid., P• 66.
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to an obJectiye aituation not claimed in sentenceacof illperaoaal language.
Correlative~, personal nouns can be 11reitied," but impersonal nouu oan11.ot.109
Cleobury assorts that sentences with "God"
t _ion intermediate between the two extremes.

As

&3

subject occupy a poa1-

reg..:rds their grammatical

subJect, the word "God," th" sentences more nearly approximate personal
la~ge.

But aa reg,Jrds their predicates, "the1 arust ••• be interproted

as elliptical references to our own experience.,,llO
Through idealistic argumentation Cleobur, Yindicates man's right to
"roity'' the word "God" by hits abilit1 to distinguish between perception
and imagination.

'l'he thought of Goel is essential to da.11.y perceptual

experience becau3e it is lie who can guarantee the "World-tor-the-Standard•

Obsener. 11 Thus r1hile the total subject of a theological statement can
be "reitied, '' the predicate must be interpreted ai:ialogicall7, and Justified

with re!erenaea to human oxperiences. 111
William Hordern
William liordern112 proposes to examine theological communication as
he converses with analytic ph1loaop1>¥. 11' It ia hi.a contention that

l09Ib1d., P• 101.
llOibid., PP• 101-102.
111
Ib1d., PP• 102-1031 see alao PP• 39-lt<>.
~ordern was proteasor ot religion at .Swarthmore College, 1949-5?•
He beca~e proteasor ot theology at Garret Theological deaaiDAr7, ~"'YaDaton,
Illinoia, in 1957. Hord81'11 ia president-elect of J.,uther Theological
Seid.nary, Saokatoon, &iak.
ll3William Iiordern., 3
logical Languap (New York,

ot Theo, P• '9•
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theological languago tor/AB

Q

distinguishable language game. 114 aeeding

VittgeD&tein'a awnmou to thlj stu~ ot context, llordern insists that "to

analyze a language is always to analyse a co111111U.Dit1" because enry lan•
guage hels a communal context.

Acoor'1ingly, tha paradigm oase ot theo-

logical a£firUW1tiono is !ound in their ud J..11 the Church.ll5
liordern viaualizea ~ convictioWtl eleaent in moat language games.
In each bP8.me the riipea.ker witn.taaea to his conviotur in such a '4aJ that

the hearer apprehends th~ oonvictor tor himseit. 116 B11t it mu.ut be remembered that in the de8podt auuee one does nvt choose hia convictora arbitrarily, or in any other way:

"we are chosen by our oonviotora. 11117

Within thio convictional argwnentation liord•rn equates religious and

conviction.al stato~ents,
B~t, logically apeaking, ultimate religious sta tements can be claaaified with other statements where man can olll.7 refer to the evidence,
trusting that tho evidence caD. Juatit1 itself. They are convi.ctional
atateuients that point to their convictor.118
It is self-evident that an appeal to reason c1UULot neutralize oontlictin.g

oonvictional claims because the evidenoe allowed by reason depends on
prior conviction to begin with.l~9

114
~ . , PP• 81-84. Rordorn cites aa rarks which distinguish language sames: use, different vocabularies, untraualatability .of basic
terms, ditf8ring methods of nrification, and differing "connctional"
toundatio~. T:1.ological language is a game because its uae relates to
religious life, esoteric voaabul.ar7 is untranslatable, and its .erification depends on conviction, SIJ.38 liordern.
115Ibid.,

PP• 9.3-94.

116Ibid.,

PP• 102-103.

ll?

..

~

P• 100.

uaibid.,

P• 10.5.

9Ibid.,

P• 107.

u
-
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Theological language points to a convict or known as myeteq. 120 The
chief characteristic of mystery is its numinous transcendence:
The principal mark of a mystery is not that it tills us with a sense
of ignorance; on the contrary it tills ua with awe, wonder anc:l
reverence which quite frequently increase as knowledge grova.121
Since theological language deals with a transcendent, revealing God,
analogies which are proffered are "eroded" b7 qualiticatioua.

This pro-

ceaa is no occasion tor lament, especially among those who know the struc-

ture of a language game.

Thus even paradox is legitilllatel;y use.d to re-

mind one of the encounter with mystery. 122 In aJQ' event, the use ot
analogy in Christian language is guaranteed in God's revelation of Himaelt.123

Since theological language is convictional and somewhat mysterious,
one cannot hope to understand it without apprehending its roots in mystery.

"~uite literally, the man who has not worshipped cannot know what theological lunguage i3 about • • • • 11124 The question,

"WhJ

is there some-

thing, and not nothing?" ia not a logical queation because it does not
formulate a problem soluble by knowledge alone.

On the other hand, it is

the beginning of worship in that it expresses "a sense of awe, wonder,
and reverence before the mystery of existence."125

120
Ibid. • P• 113.

-

l21Ibid •• P• 115.
122
Ibid., PP• 125, 127.

-

l23Ibid., P• 131.
124
Ib1d., P• l.Z8.
125Ibid. p. 119. Hordern argues (p. 122) that Hutchinson's dia1
tinction 'between "roligious" and "theological'' language must not be pressed.
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Hordorn deems it necessary to examine in greater detail tho game ot
personal lan13uage.

lie contends that theological language has more in

comt110u with the personal language game than with any other language game. 126
He discusaes first tho ooncept "person" in ordor to clarif'7 the meaning of

the peraonnl language same. Awareness and knowledge of' self as .self tlov
from the n\led to make dl!ciaions.

I.a.nguage about "I," the know self, is

''odd," tor tha ordinary aubjeot-object division ot other language is
Following knowledge o! salt there arises the neoeaait7 of reveal-

absent.

ing tho self to othera, and with the revelation, the distinction between
authentic and inauthentic actions.

Knowledge of other persona ia otton

not scientific knowledge, but it remains "verif'iable" in ito own game.
To be

known as a person, a man must reveal himself through words and

actiona.

In addition, the listening man must reapond in rapport to the

apokon ''word" if tho speaker is to be know.

Knowledge of another selt

implies trust and love, because to know another person is to know a

uuique individual. 127 The gaae of peroonal anguage tito the ache1111 ot
the "peraon. 11 The meaning ot a personal statement is never wholly under-

stood without a full description of the context.

1D personal language,

intention and purpose, not causation, are uaed in explanation, persona

are agents with motiTes, intentions, and purpoae.

1D swa, ''The vords ot

peraot1al language will not haTe the preoieioD of the technical words ot
science, but the7 will be more expreadiTe.,-128

126
Ibid

P• 132.
-··
~-, Pr• 136-147.

12.?n..•d

~-.

128

PP• 149, 151, 148.
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In a detailed dis cussion of the overlap between peraonal language

and thool ogical language, 11ordorn u.rgea Christiana to "reinatate the
reality of pereonal knowledge and lan~uage" within theological lauguage.129
Just as it w~s not impossible to analyze tb~ context or personal lan~wige,
so it 1 ~ not impossible to a nalyze the logic ot tho faith which ia the
context of theological languago. 130 Go~ demonstrated in revelation that
the key to s peaking about Hi~ resides in the sphere ot porsonal language. 131

All pers onal. rola ~ions re4uire aomo sort of revelation.

~ven so knowledge

ot God, tho mys tery, dapencis upon revelation. He revaala lii1nsel! through
historica l situations in the rev~latory biblical events.

The Bible's

concern is not the reportin6 of history, but the mani!estat ion ot the
per~on ot God throu3h histor,r. 132 Tho particularity of biblical revela-

tion i ~ a stumbting-block only to those who approach it thinking in terga
of :scientific knowledge.

If God is a person offering a per s on-to-person

rolatioD..Ghip, He can work only iu particularitJ o! revelation.

Conaequent-

~ • moaningtul ata cements about God can be made by the believer onl.7 when

129

Ibid., pp. 158-1.59. i~ooald J . :iopburD, in Christianity a.ncl ~aro.dox (London.: c. ,\. i·Jatts, c.19.58), PP• 56-57, oontenda that thu "men ot
encounteru try to r etain at all oost~ tho I-Thou encounter with Go<l without distortion. This pushes thom towards tho dXOluaion ot Jescriptive
elements in the word ",1od." Hepburn argues that they are giTing a.n illusion of immediacy 111 oaaillating between "deecriptive and. proper-name uuea
ot the word ' God•." He continues: 11..io evvn if one grants that you haTe
encountered a Thou in prayer, we shall still hD.vo to turn to reflection,
perhaps to p..'iilo.:iophi2l t heology, to set about eatablishing the truth
or !alsit7 ot the statements that this is Ood the ~reator, the Int!nit•,
S!ter-nal Ground ot &lin0 • 11

130Hordorn, p. 98.
131 n.id

~ · , P• l 34•

132
~ - . fl• 161.
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he bogina with particular events of special revelation, and not with the
whole

or

hiatory.133

The personal relntionship between God and man iapliea a similarity

between t he theological language game and the personal language gar.ie.
By oxarnininl!

the personal relationship between God and man, Hordern ad-

vances his theai~ ru~ardincr tho personal character of theological etatementa.

v/hen God offers e. personal relat ionship with man, a response is

derr.andttd.

134

In confrontation with God, a true Person, a man's distorted

persollhood attnina wholenass. 135 In wholeness l'lltln responds with prayer,
Conf'escsion ot !.lins, v1orahip, and n life ot obedienoe. 136
;,;tate,::enta in tho ga:ne of peraonal l.Anguage are "verified'' onl~ upou
entering a par 3onal relationship with the person referred to in the statement, aaya llordern.

::;i r:!tilarly, a personal relation is nocesaa17 in the

case ot God-statementa, although thia doee not rule out the necessity of
history in the Goapel'a proclamation.

A persoaal relation9hip vi.th God

presupposes a prior revelation in certain concrete historical eventa. 1-'7
Veriticatiou of theological statements proceeds r..arallel to a veri.tioation

ot peraonal statements:
To verity a peraonal statement I must introduce you to the person
involved and believe that in your relationship with the peraoR 7ou
will find the statement Teritied • .:;imilarlJ, to nrif7 a theological
statement, the (;hurch oan do no more tban introduce a man to God in

133Ibid., P• 164. It appears that !tordern baa rellloffd
of natural theology.
134
Ibid., P• 167.

135
~ . , P• 169.
136

.tbid., P• 170.

lJ?Ibid., P• 175•

any posaibilit7
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the faith God can verify himself in the rtlationahip that will
then be formed. As convictional langu.ge th'3olc,SY has t o have the
confidenoe that ita convictor has the power to convict.138
fo avoid the argunhlnt oonc~rning a cognitive element in tho verilioa.tiou

ot theological statements , liordern ohooi,es to speak of "knowing" God iD
te.rms ot Barth's definition of knowledge.

Knowledge is "that oontirma-

t1on ot human a cquaintance with an object whereby ito trueness beco11es a
<letermin5 factor in thtJ existence of the man 1tho knowa. 11139
Donald D. ;..'vans
140
DoD,tild D. ~vans
accepts many of tho m~tho<lological procedures of

138
~ . , P• 176.
139
lbid., PP• 180-182• .t:arlier

(pp. 155, 157) llordern distinguish••
his position from Buber's: nbecause man doeo have personal relations ancl
knowa othera aa .persons, be can speak about these relations in the appropriate language iltithout slippi~g into I-it language." He concludes that
ther@ ia a legitimate way, in peraonal language, to apeak "obj-,otivelJ"
about God, tor personal language describes events that occur indepenclezitl7
ol tho dell.

l4oDou.ald D. Ev,.a,.; W.UdJ.1 iuruishod thia writ•r with his ourriow.wa
vitae. He was born 21 septem~er 1927 at Ft. ~illiam, Ontario. After
reoeiYing a B. A. in 19.50 from the UrdYerait1 of Toronto, he worked under
Gilbert Ryle at Balliol Colleg~, Oxford, and received the B. Phil. 1D
1953. theological studies were pursued at Balliol College, Oxford, 195152, and McGill University, 1953-55, under Dr. o. B. Caird. He receiTecl
hia :a. u. at McGill in 19.5.5. h'vall.8 min.isteNd to fl co~re~tion of the
United Church ot Canada, 1955-.58. He conducted reeearch in philosop~
at Balliol College, Oxford, under J • .1.,. Audtin awl J. o. Urmaon, 1958-6o.
His doctoral thesis in philosophy was accepted by Oxford in 1962, and he
noei·Yed the o• .Phil. degree that year. I. '.r. Namaey and A. M. ~toll
were the examinora. From 1960 to t h~ summer ot 1964 Evans served as aaaiet&Dt professor o! Philosophy of Religion 1a the .1t"acult7 of JJiTinity, MoGill
University. Since 1964 he haa been asaociate protedsor of l"hiloso~ at
the Univeraity of f oronto, teaching episteaologr, etbioa, and philoaopq
o! religion. His current interest is in. the area ot agnosticia allCi
faith, ua book, 11 aa .r..'vana describes it, "on tbs ratioaal• of faith1 thi•
will be a new philosophical theology which makes use of insights 1D both

•Dal.Jti.cal. awl existential philoso}ml." i.wu • boolca illOlude The Logio
ot .S.lt-InYolveraent (infra), and Communist Faith nnd Christian Faith
~Toronto, l<;yerson, 1964).
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Philosophical nnalysio.

But ho explicitly, raJects th~ aaouaption that

the .''1osic" of u.ny lanetuage gamo guarantees that
mere fact that poople opaak in a. certain way.

ol(ID& 'u

validity by the

To adopt the latter view

in reference to "talk about God" is to eliminate the GrguU10nt that there
1 19 no God boca11ae . p:r·oponr.rnts

ot

t ho Gou-talk language game neither open

it to outside attack nor deem it in neo~ of outside justification.

Says

Evans, ''I reject the philosophical view of language aa something to be

divided up into language-gamea which are each selt-juatitying and
autonomous. 11141
~vans posits aud ex~mines three usoo of language:
cauual, and expressive.

pertormative,

In discussing t he par!ormat1Ye uoe be notes his

indebtednea i to John Austin's How to Do Thinga with tfordG and 1:hilosop~142
cal Papers.
After discussing r,erforniative and causal uees of lan~age,
.,
143
~vans
draws t hia "language-map":
Performative language
which uy be
~xplicit or non-explicit

~elf-labeling or uttered
in Yerb other than first
pers~u indicative proseng

pure or autobiographical
(j>urely pertorlllltive, or
referring to self and
reporting on mental stat~

141
Donald D. ;:.'\rans, ·rho Logic of' .:ielt-Involvemont: A 1'h1losophioal
$tu of h'yer da La
with $ cial tleterence to the Chriatian UH
ot Lanf,uage about God aa Creator \London: J ~M Press, c.19 3, PP• 22-24.
In view of this approe.oh, it is not aurprieing that ETana insists (p. 17)

that biblical lazieuage i s the inceptive point from which aey ana~aia ot
Christian language must proceed.

~upra. P• 77 , n. 6o•
1 3
~ I have supplied bracketed intormation with material troa other
part3 of the book in order to provide an adequate sw1m1u7 of the material.
Up to this point Evans ba11 diacuaaed pertormatiTe lauguage, iruplioatiou
and commitments , conditions for entailment, and uses or languaga. Th•
ateriala not bracketed are taken direotq troa PP• 71+-75.
142,.
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f'all pure porforaiatives aro explicit, but. not all explicit
perfort1£Ltivee are pure, for aome are autobiographical, 11
P• 45)

can be classifiad ~a:
Constntive

[class i!lclud.es state1J1enta, e.g. "I
warn 7ou that Brown ia daagero11e 1!)

Verdictive

@lass includes Y3rdioto~e.g. "I

Exercitive

value your ring at i ,;oo•!J
(!.n exeroise of a~thority, e.g. ''I
appoint you governor ot Kenya•!)

Commissive ••
li,oGlmieaive ia more-than-verbal
comlllitment, e .g.• 11 I ])lodge ra,
loyult;y and auuporttiJ
r.:
• jj4thabitive • •
l!lebabitive concerns social behavior, e.g. ''I apologize tor Df1
behavior'!)

J

•• self-involving {i..e. the
speaker implies mental states
other than or in addition to
beliet, and/or oomints hias&l! to future patterns ot
behavior; aomathiug more
than mere tactual content
is involved)

Implica tions

Comm.tmunta

&ays in which apoaker :nay
i mply inter.tion~, attitude!}

{Eertormativee aa oommitment!J

Indefeasible (!i1 com,nend .;n:ith
tor being submissive~

Indefeasible (2ornmitroenta
where it is impossible to
deny a commitment ,~ di)

Prima-tacie:
(a) .:ip~aker-independent E amith

h1.ma-tacie
(possible to de~ commitment
to oonduotJ

ia loyal

a nd

honest.!!)

(b) .Speaker-dependent ~that_ia
a vory valuable picture~

Contextual

Contextul

(a) Occasional (3peuker s1tt:J
impliaationa asidiJ
(b) ·rraditional C°'Biuith is sub-

(a) Occasional
(b) 'i'raditional

misaive and reatrained11 (in
a eulogy]]

Conditions tor ~ntail.Jlent
ertormative foroe
,;ntailments depend on
Abatractable oontent
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Uses

ot

Language

Pertormative tp.rtormative use of language
gives meaning1 "Jones is treacherous" said in order to van)
Causal
loauoal use ot language is no
part ot meaning; utterance~
as a means to a particular end1
e.g., "Jones ia treacheroua" vhen
said in order to •l.arlO
After diacuaaing performatiYe and causal language, Evans turns to
expreasive lan~uago, the third use. He distinguishes between expreasioJUI

ot feeling, and expressions of opinion (Colllliasive)/expressions ot intention (Behabitive).

He notes that language is self-involving in BehabitiTe

and Commissive performativea and when used to expres3 teolings. 144 Although
there is an intimate interrelation among all three, Comrd.aaive and Be~bitive expresaiono differ from expressions ot feeling in tbat they reside

in the sphere ot pertormative language.

Evans oorruaente,

An expression ot feeling differs from a report of feeling, but it
can be uaed as a report ot feeling; that ia, it can be used as an
alternative to a verbal report, as a code-aign.lJt~
Expressiol18 of feeling are the third major use ot language, but

separation ot language into "uses" doos not signify the mutual exclusion.

ot usea.
ance:

Consequently, one may ask three distinct questions of any utter-

Ca) What is its performatiYe force? (b) ~bat teeling doea it ex-

preaa? (c) ,'ih.at et:tecti, does it havd in people? 'l'he so-called "emotiTe"

theories ot religious language fail to aohieTe clarity if the three distinct uses of language are ignored.146

144
Ibid., P• 78.
145Ibid., P• 91.

-

llt6Ibid., P•

uo.
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In hie conaidertition of oxpreaai'H language,, ,;i;vau cliacoyers a dis-

tinction which is o! great importance for him.
language.

It is so-called "rapportive"

Happortive language is language resulting from one's underat«Dcl-

ing ot the words or actions of another. When an utterance with re!erence
to another'a aotion is underatvod onl7 in the degree that one baa rappm.•t
and affinity with th0 agent of the action , it is termed "rapportiYe."
!'Actions typically call !or 'rapportive' utterances when they are expressive or when t heir rationale is profound." ~ rapportive utterance ia

clu~aed according to understanding, uot according to uae; the three u3es
of language reat1ain.

HapportiYe utterances are usually self-revelatory;

they may or may not be aelt-involving. 147
thia point .i::vans has concluded that Behabitive-perforiative,

'to

Co11111iasivo-perror~tive, expressive, and soQe rapportiYe language is self•
involving.

By s elt-involveUJent he means that the speaker implies mental

atatoa othor than or in addition to belief, and/or oollllli.ta hi muelt to
future patterns ot behaVior; something more than mere fc1ctual content 1a
involved.

148 Uow ~vans exo.ad.nes in detail the situation which givea

genesis to self-involving language •
.:>el!-ir.volving lunguage is the case where one "looks on x as Y•"
£Taus coins the word ''onlook" to suggest what it ia to "look on x as

1 • • • • 11149
147

148

11

An olllook 111 not merely :speculatiYe, eubjootiYe, or

Ibid., pp. lll-lllt.

Italics are Evans'.

Ib1d., PP• ?4-75, 258.

1 9
~ Ib1'1. , PP• 124-125. .e.'vallS auggeats that "Yiew•• 1a misleading ill
its proximity to "opinion"1 "conception" is too intellectual, and like
"outlook" a ud "per s pective," it lacks t he ctloment of ooiamitment.
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fancitl.ll.."

Rather, onlooks are "practical, putatinl.y-objeotive and .

sorioua." The combination 0£ Comz:iiseive and Verdiot1Te aspects in the
expression of an onlook is important.

Both committal to polio~ ot be-

havior and registry of a proper and appropriate description are presenti
the utt~rance of onlook combines under8tanding with judgrnent. 150
Ma~

onlooka are literal.

ae a brother").

Oth.irs are 11011-literal ("I look on Renry

r;ome non-literal onlooks are "~rabollo''; the7 indicate

a aimilarity (look on x as y) in terms of an appropriate attitude.

On

the other hand, somo non-literal onlook.s are "analogical"; they aeaert
a a1m1l.arity bet~~•n x and y independent of any oimila.rity ot appropriate
a.ttitude. 151
Evans suggests that hia study of performative language baa significance both for the biblical language of creation and tor wan'o responaiYe
language in t he "onlook" of creation.

The word of God in creation had

an Exorcitive force in eutablishing the subordinate status and role ot

the creature, a Verdictive torce 1n. determil11.Dg the value of the creature,
and a Couuaistsive force as a word ot prolli.ae in which God comid.tted Hiaselt

to pre3erving the created order.

In 3WI, God's vord in the uorld's crea-

tion waa no less pertorcsative than was His word in th8 creation ot the

laraalito nation. 1.52 Man replies to the performativ~ word ot God in
creation with selt-inv~lving per!ormativea correlated with hia aoknO\illeclgement of Qod'a action, that is, trom vithin an onlook ot non-literal. 9

150

Ibid•• PP• 12?-128.

151Ibid•• PP• 129-130.
152

Ibid., PP• 145-1.51, 157.
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parabolic signiticance. 153
Evans next considers the impressive and expressive element of the

action of divine world-creation, utilizing the concepts o! holiness and
divine glory as typoiogical models.

He seeks to appl.J his diacuaaion of

expressive languaae to the biblical atatoiuents which correlate holineaeglory with creation.

lie concludes that divine glory and holined8 are

"impresaive'' in that they evoke a correlative bwnan !ealiDg and rapportive
acknowledgement, but they are "expressive" in that they are "c®nected
with the inner divine quality in somevhat the swne sort ot way that an
observable expression of feeling ia connected with the feeling which it
expresaes."154

Continuing hie discussion of expressive langu.age as related to orea~ion, .Evana views a t1an•u utterance that "God ia the Crvator ot the world'1

as rapportive because tho
world-Creation has aa its profound rationale the 11new creation" of
man in the likeness of God, sba.:.··ir.g in the divine love and unit7
~nd glory• • • • 5eooud,'world-Creation is an impreoa1Ye-expreas1ve
action which re~uires an affinity witb the Agent it it is to be

understood.15.5
Man•e rapportive utterance regarding God aa Creator ariaea from the onlook

153

.!R!s!•, PP• 1.58-160.

l54Ibid., PP• 1?4-175• In another plaoe (pp. 209-2ll) .t'vana relates
impressive and expr•asive glory to QQd's self-revelation in Jeous Christ.
It one underatanda God'a gloey as expressive self-revealing behart.or, he
can understand the meaning o! three claims which Christians make about
Jesus, (a) Jeaua is irnplaceable, tor no mere report ot glor1 oaii. replace Him; (b) Jesus ia unique bocauae He is the criterion ot expreaaion
ot divine glory; (o) J•aua is divine. God's glory in Jeaua is understood
in its impresoive eigni!ioance in5ofar as one is impressed; one IBU6t 'beooae
like Jesua in ord~r to appreciate iepreaaivelJ the glor1 He reveala.

-

155Ib1d., P•

aa·.
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which is his, an orilook ot "profound rationale" and "affinity with the
Agent." The rapportive stntement is conoluaivel1 selt-reveal1ng and

self-involving, and its meaning is clear only from within the "onlook,"
~'vans alao discusses the third uae of language, the causal use, as
it relatea to creation.

Causal language in cra~tiou does not serve the

same purpoae as it does in dail1 lite, vhere it notes and r~porta onl7

causal action in an utterance neither selt-involviD8 nor rapportive.
Evans holda that

"causal'' language conoeruing Creation can be interpreted in terms of
parabolic onlooks, so that this language too is selt-inYolving and
rapportive. Compariaon.s which seem at first to be straight-torward
analogies between hwaan and divine causality turn outj to be compariaons of attitudes, expresaed in par.bolio onlooks.156
For example, the causal language of th8 potter in creat ioD i s obviousl7

parabolic. 157
In his J.a3t chapter, .::vans raises iDtriguiag questioua about the
interrelution botwuon self-involving language and the aelt-involvoaent
of r<tl1g1ouo corArllitment.

He suggests that the method of applying the

logic of selt-1nvolve1118Dt oould pro!itabl7 be used in areas ot Chrieti.an
1
concern other thun the language ot creation. 58
&cpreasive Logic of .r..ite-Direation

Thomas Hile3, li'z'ederick l!"'err~, John A. Hutciu.D3on, and t1ille11 F.
Zuurdeog duscribe the logic of religious languag.t in teraa of the expressive

l.56Ibid., P• 219.

l57Ibi.d., P• 228.

158~ . , PP• 253-268.
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character of the language, that id, in terms~! tha underlying litediroction to which the language gi~es expresaion in ~aligiows utterance. 1~9
The 1118n especially stress the dynamic character ot the operutive mind aa
it moulds a religious perapective which validates religious language.
Miles posita "qualified silence'' aa the supportive perspective1 Forre,
conceptual activity and metaphysical synthesis; Hutchinuon, an oxistential
life-orientation; and Zuurdeeg, the homo loguons.

For all, the logic ot

religious l anguage ia anchored to a base which expresaea life-direction.
Thomaa ilichard Miles
Thomas ,d ohard Hiles16o utters the "uae principle" as a crucial modification of the v~rification principle, a modification which is very
helpful in distinguishing e~pirica.l assertions from other asaertiollS. 161
The verification tool, modified through a large-ecale abandonment ot the
word "meaningless " and tempered with the admission that past metaphysiciana
were not ~riting nonsense, is a valuable philosophical asset:
It3 value, I would suggest, is threefold. (l) In the first place,
it forces us to make a distinction between those a~sertions which
are factually significant and thoae which ars not. (2) $econdly,
it serves to expose assertions whioh appear at tirat glance to be
factually signitic:ant but which can be seen on examination to be
meaningless. (3) Thirdly ••• it belpa to recogniae a widespread

159It i~ to be admitted that the difference between thia group and
the "odd-logic" group (supra, PP• 179-203) is one of .degree~ An inte~
change of persoUDel between the groupa ia entire~ feasible.

l6C>When Miles wrote the work under oouideration in 195? (!!£),
he was in the Department ot PhilosophJ, UniTersity College of North wales,
Bangor.
161
T (homasj Ji (icbarc!) Mi.lea, Reli on and the Soiantitio Outloo
(London: George Allen and UnwiD, c.1959, PP• 2 -29.
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mistake which hae arisen over the usage o! the words "exist", "true",

and "f'acts.nl62

Hiles ~l ecta to use tne phrase "factuaU, eignificant" in his explanation of the use principle.

But he counters the charge that his eelection

ot this phrase disguiaGs a motaphysical assumption ot empiricism with the
contention that the modified verification principle would haTe achieTe4
little in its attack on metaphysics if this were the case.

He holds that

his analysis of such terms as "exist," "t~e," and ''facto" demonstrates the
effectiveness of the attaok. 163
Miles admits that an objector can lodge another complaint against hill:

"To say that the only assertions which refer to what reall1 exists are
empirical ones ia a thinly disguised form of atheistic materiAlism."164
Mi.lea argues that some idea of "absolute existenoe11 underlies this objection.

The objoctor errs in thi1lking that existing things form a class

distinguishable by special characteristics trom things that do not exist.
What methods, Miles asks, can be constructed to give judgments about ultimate conatituents of the ulliverae? Statements or asaertioua abo~t ultimate
oonatituents are o~t of place when one attempts classification.

~bile it

is true that sometimes metap~sical questions can be rephraaed as "aecondor<ler" questions of "thing-worda," the:, remain meaningless it asked according to "firat order." To inquire about "absolute existence" ia to ask a

162~ · • P• 32. Miles sees (p. 25) his book either as an attack on
early logical positivism, or ao a defense of an extromoly modified verai.on
of the same.

163Ibid.., PP• 36-}8.
164
Ibid., P• 39.

-
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question independently o! tho context that gives it meaning. 165

In anaver

to the objector, Miles ookoa no excuoe tor equating "factually significant"
with "empirical."

rt he ia accused of begging the r,1uestion (that is, of

assuming that the empirical is what "really is"), he insists that he has
beg3ed no question since tho question ia a meaningless one.

He challen~a

the objector, in turn, to say what he means by ''raally exist. 11166

Mi.lea

concludes hie introductory diacusaion with the statement that "the main
arguments of thi~ book will be based on the a3aumption that sentences
involving reference to 'abaolute exiatenco' are moaningles.3. !,l67
In quick sucoeasion the author deals with literal matorialism, behavioriar.1, und deterrd.nisra aa examples of the "absolute" error.

Claims ot

literal matorialism are claima about what "exists" in the "absol"1te" sense;
those claims, as demonatrated above, ar~ to be dismias~d as meaningless.168
Similarly, behavioriora and determinism pose no threat to traditional. religion because they participate in an "abaolute" mistake.

On t he other band,

neither does psychical research serve as a detensiva apologetics !or reli-

gion.169

165Ibid., pp. 39.43. Niles says (p. 44) that analysis of "true''and
"fautual"rlll show the same with these terlll8.

,166rbid., P• 44.

Mil.es of!era no commitaent to e111piricism in the sense
of aoco~ding privileged atatus to empirical trutha, for ho claims (p. 45)
that no aosertion is more important than another.

167Ibid., P• 46.

-

lGSibid., P• 67.

1,,>

169Ibid., p. 102. Miles' co11ment regarding pa1ohoana.lyais (p.
is enlighteniug: "aa tar as the central religious notio1111 ot repentance,
forgiYeness, commitment, and dedication are concerned, there is nothing
in ps,cho-analytic theory-an, moN than in 6113 othfrr taotu.al inYeatiga•
tion-..to prove or even r:mke plausible the 'liev that such ideas are

2o6
In the fashion or Hraithvaite, Miles diacuasee moral assertions prior
to analysis or theological discourse.

He distinguishes no grounds tor the

outright diemisool o! moral assertions in viev of tho uae principle.

Moral

aasortiona have a "per!ectlJ legitimate !unction," although it is not tor
the analyst to prescribe morals.l?O The truth or !alaity ot moral asser-

tions is in last resort a matter of personal oonYiction rather than a conclusion of rational argumentation.

Most emphatically, Milon contends,

moral assertions are not validated by deducing a set of "'ought'-aentencea"
from a set of "'is'-eentenoes. 111?1
Hiles limits himself to a consideration of sentences which contain the
word "God'' in hio disousaion of theological discourse and religious language.
Here ao in other realms of human discourae, the modified Terifioation principle is a valuable tool.

It serves to expose sentences which appear to

be factually significant, but which are in principle unfalsifiable and
unverifiable. 172 The use principle aida in -answering modern philoeophy'a
question of theology, ''To what list does the word 'God' belong?" Milee
seeks out a trame ot reference tor the astjertion ''There is a

God,"

dis-

missing in turn the "mathematical," ''moral," and "empirical" frames.

Aasu14ing that "God" cannot exist in an "absolute" sense independent of
a reference-frame, Miles argues that the man making assertions about God

unimportant, or that a lite which gives expression to these ideas ia the
wrong sort ot lit• to live."
l?Oibid., P• 53. Miles demonstrates a reliance on Braithwaite both
in his preparatoey discussion of moral assertions and in the use principle.
l7libid., PP• 60, 57•
172Ibid., PP• l,S, 141.
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needs to isolate the valid trame and indicate what methods are employed

in the frame's argumentation. 17'
Betore preaenting his own poCJition regarding the "theistic" referenceframe Miles sets about to examine and dismiss other suggestions.

He re-

jects "theism without teare," a view which anchors theological diacourae
emotively. 1 74 ·l'he second rejected interpretation is the language of
"simple literal theiam."

It language about God is taken literally, it

involves empirically verifiable assertions about a n.aible and tangible
god.

The language of ''simple literal theism," though meaningful, is
obviously talse. 1 75 Third, "qualified literal" theological language ia
meaningless.

It i~ a masquerade appearing to be genuine, but unfalsifiable

and unverifiable upon examination.

~hen the assertion "purports to gift

tactual information," there is eTeey right to expect Terifioation or
falaification. 1'76 The d1fticult1 inTolved ia the "absolute" mistake,
If we agree that the word ''God" indicates something invisible and
intangible, there are just no criteria tor deciding whether God
intervened [at Dunkirk) I and in the absence ot such criteria it
ia as pointless to aaoert that he did interTen• as to assert that
he did not.1'77

Miles rejects as meaningless, for example, the assertion "God answers
fretitionaryJ prayer," and construea it as an assertion ot qualified

l?}Ibid., P• 144.
l74 Ibid., PP• 1.52-153. Miles says that the title "theism without
tears" deacribea the inability to abed tears oTer the problem of the "cau.
value" of theological language.

17.5~ . , P• 146.

176Ibid., PP• 147-148.
l'7'7lbid., P• 149.
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theism.

·i he stntement augaeeta the activity of an "extra ent1t1," but one

is at a looa to list ompirical criteria by whioh the statement could be
verified or falsified even though it has the appearance ot an empirical
aaeertion.

178 Miles otters to campaign against the language of "qualified

literal theism, '' especially when it detinea God in terms ot ao• ''para.physical" entity. 179 But he ia not prepared to diam.as religious language,
or treat it diaparagingly, or auppoae it leso important than the language
of scientific investigation, when it concerns itself with the question,
"How ought I to live'1"l80
In his theory of thoological lan(sUage Miles admits the inautticiency
of merely attributing "cash-value" to theological statements.

To do .s o io

to remove all mystery from talk about God. 181 He prefers instead to discuss the ''way of silence," silence qualified by parables.

He selects th•

way of aileuce deliberately:
A person who insists on linguistic grounds that sentences containing
the word "God" eannot be understood literally is not committed to
accepting the theistic parable; but he is not committed to rejecting
it either. It he accepts, ae I do, he oan no longer adopt • • •
a ''prosaic" silence; he 111uat accept what I call "the way of silence"-& phrase which I have deliberately chosen on account of its religious

l7Slbid., PP• 181-184. Miles turthor contends (pp. 185-186) that "it
'God sends rain in answer to prayer• is a pointleaa form of words, then
•o God, please send some rain' is po1ntles3 also," and calls for an abandonment of this "pseudo-oau.sal" prayer language • .By contrast, sa1s Miles, the
so-called "pertormatoey" pro:Jer rr.r1q will be done" is a commitment and a
dedication, and thuo a valid prayer.

l'19Ibid., P• 163.
l8olbid., P• !)4.
181lbid., p. 1.58. While Miles does not com~ent exactly to the point.
to attribute "caah-value" apparently is the ''absolute" mistake.
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overtones, audits affinitiea with traditional religious thinking. 182
He contra3ts nis interpretation of qualified silence with the theologian'a
assortion that God i a a rnyateryi
God, to you, is u mystery; to me even the word "mystery" has an empirical t a int, and is misleading. You say "l do not known and tq
to talk; I say "I do not know" and remain ailent. You admit that your
talk ia not literal; I qualify my silence b;y telling parables. Ia
thore really all that difference between us?l83
Having int·r oduced the "parable" as a taciturn qualification. essential

to theism, liilea diaouaaas the parable in greater detail.

He lists three

characteristice of 3oriptural parables which are alao oharacteristioe of
theistic language when it qualifies silence.
truth or falsity ie unimportant in a parable.

(1) The question of literal
rhuo, in conuidering the

theiotic statement, "In the bctginning God created the heaven and the earth,"
whether the account ia literally true is unimportant.

Literal talk about

"creation by God 11 is meaningless because man has no experience again.at
which to meas ure "creation" by God.

(2) "Parables contain, for th• most

part, assertions that are empirical; and we know pertectly well what states
of atf'airs would constitute the •cash-value, ot these assertions."
Similnrly, the literal meaning of words in the creation account are perfectly clear.

(.}) :Parables convey a aieusage, give a new "slant" or

orientation to lite.

Similarly, the doctrine of creat ion !orcea the recog-

nition that eveey event is part of God's purpoae; the whole of lite ie

182Ibid., P• 162. Miles retera (p. 169) to the "dootr1ne ot creation
by an al'woving God" as the "theistic parable," and suggests that inatead
of' the question "lJo :,ou beli<tve in the existence ot God?" the question "Do
you accept the theistic parable?" should be asked.
lS3Ibid., P• 163. In discussing mystery (p. 164), the connraiDg theologian aaki,Milea i t puables are true in the sense ot having objeotin
validity-." Milea replies that it makes no diffctrenoe one vay or another.
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affected by a message taken seriously. 184

Miles considers methods by which parabolic languege is identified.
In the case of aom6 theological aasertioll8, only the QOJe ot expression and
the speaker's attitude determine whethor words are parabolic, or the language of qualified theism.

"God intervened at Dunkirk, 11 or "God made the

world," may or may not be paro.bolic.

The ruore closely the language in

question relates to <hlily life, the higher the probability that it i .s language of qualified theism.

In addition, language used about God is gener-

ally parabolic in nature when it is not ordinarilf used in retere~ce to
people. 185
Inevitably the question of ultimates arises.

Miles doea not avoid

consideration of the sort of arguments used to support ono parable against
another.

He rejects thll suggestion t?lat &tJ1 one parable is "objectiveq

valid" or "true" with two arguments (which aro really- one):

either one

can say that it makes no aenae to aak whethttr a theistic parable is valid
(the "absolute" mistake)1 or one can '38.'J that it makes sense to ask the
question, but one is at a loss to know what conatit11tes th.e answer.

The

second alternative i:J to moTe from not sa1ing anything to saying"! do
not know."

Neither argument is a radical departure from the "way of si-

lence." On the other hand, neither ansver allows tho selection ot parables
to become a matter of personal preference.

The conclusion that one parable

is better·;;than another is protected, tor it ia possible to refer to parables aa "good," "appropriate," "important," and ''plausible."

In final

184

Ibid., PP• 166-169.

185Ibid., PP• 173-174. Hiles cautions tbat neither criteria is iD•
fallibly reliable.
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anal1sia, not rational argument, but personal conTiotion detormines the
evaluation of a particular parable; argument nev~r settles the matter oonoluaively.186

It ia true that consideration o! ~opix1cal tact influences

the choice of lW,rable.

'f here ia alwayo the possibility that

those who are impressed by the advances or a particular ocience may
come to r egard a particular religioua parable aa unnecessary or inappropriate, and that those who are concerned with preserving traditiorial religious parablts a,ay I'Oi~ard the gi"owth of a particular
ocience with suepicion.lij?
In addition, parables aro open to influence on moral grounds.

People may

choose a parable because it 111akes aonae of their exiatiua mora-1 beliefs.

But in final analysia, the decision about the vortb o! a parabla ia a peroonal deciaion. 188
The fact that decision ia involved in th~ selection of parable indicateo t he presence oi conversion and change of outlook.

There is no spoci-

fic factual know~edgc available to believers and uDB.vailable to unbelievers.
It thore were, the aelection or parables would be "empirical. 11

Just as

the acceptance of the theistic parable involveo the believer in action
and commitment, ao also the parabolic acceptance o! a purposoless, indif•
ferent world involvea commitment to lite thus interpreted.

186

"It follows,

Ibid., PP• 1?0-171.

187Ibid., P• 219. Thia statement ia to be balz:u1ced by another (pp.
218-219)--rii'°which Miles remarks, ''To inaiet that auch language is para.bl•
and not literal truth is to ascribe a recognizable and legitiC1ate function
to a group ot basio religious assertions, and the result is to supply a
permanent guarantee that theae assertions cannot be refuted by the finciings of science."
188
Ib1d., PP• 172-173• Earlier in the ~ork (p.
Miles delineates
between moral atieortions and parable.assortiona: "In gen•ral we ma, say
that no moral aaeortion n8ceasarilJ entails a parabl•-a~aertion, but moral
a~sertiono cnn be tho col18equence ot parable-assertions, and parableaasortio11S can therefore be cited as the reason for particular behavior.''

,,>
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in our present use of the word •parable', that the question is not whether
to tell parables but \that parables to tell. 11189
"'red erick
.i!

lferre,

Frederick Pond Ferr~l90 endoraes contecporary analysis in his search
for the meaning of language in its contextual use:

"Shorn o! its social

matrix, as Wittgenstein baa ohown, language ceases to~ and ot necessity
loses its intelligibility. 11191 Ferre finds the most compact and important selections of theological discourse in the worahip situation.

The

utterances of the worship aituation aim to formulate and maintain an attitude of adorntion.

The utterances of faith lead tha worshipper to adora-

tion because the utterances ot worship, by their evocative nature, bring

about the attitudes which support adoration. 192 But Ferret cautions
against over-reliance on analysis of worship discourse.

If' theological

189Ibid., PP• 176-1?9•
190Fer~ iu the son of Nels Ferre. He was assistant profosaor of
religio11 at Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mases., 1959-62, and associate profeaaor of philosophy at Dickinson College, Carli.ale, Pa., 1962-63.
Currently he is professor and chairman of tlle department of philosophy
and religion at Dickinson College. In "Paul M. van Buren's A-Theology of
Christian Education," Religious .&lucation, LX (Januar,-Februa.J7 1965), 21 1
Ferre says regarding his religious situation: 11 I aQ bJ practically a~
standards a pretty thoroughly secularized man: I proadntly belong to no
church and I find tho dogmas of' Christianity, if propoaed tor literal
acceptance, oo tar beyond belief that there really is no inclination on
my part to discuss the reasons tor my rejection."

l9~~rederick Ferre and Kent Bendall, Exploring the Logic ot Faith:
Dialo • on the Relation ot Modern Philoso
to Christian Faith
New York: Association Preas, o.l 2, P• 7. In thi~ chapter the references taken from r:.«~oring the Logic of Faith vill deriYe froa seotiODS
ot the book uhioh Fer baa written.

A

192

~ . , PP• 54-55.
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statements serve a ''worshipful" function, it is noceasary to ullderatand
what it is to worship in order to approhond the logic of r.:ligious language.193
The ~tudy of language proceeds on three fronts:

(1) the atudy of

relationships among verbal signs ( 11syntactics11 )1 (2) the study ot the re-

lation:Jhip between language and u3er•interpreter (''interpretics''); (3)
the atud;y of the relationship between la~--uage an:i its referent ( 11seantica'') •

Con!uaion in the study of theological language has resulted in

part because of tho failure to distinguish these three dimensions of the
"si3ni!ication-situation." J. L. Mackie interprets theological discourse
solely in torm~ of the fir.a·t relationship, B. ll. Braithwaite and ~nald \:I.
Hepburn in terma of "interprotica," and those ~ho emphasize falsifiabilitJ
in torm~ of the third relationslu.p. 194
In con:sidering "syntactics" Ferre divides theological discourse into
"systematic language of aoademic theology'.' and "religious language of liv-

ing faith."

Syntactic adequacy in the religious language of' faith is eval-

uated with reference to "internal language-norta:3, '' namely Scripture,
church traditions, creeds, aud other authoritative stateraents.

l?eligioua

lanlSuage is coherent in ao far as it repeats, in its faith-utters.noes, the
"faith ot our fathers, living atill."

Canons of tormal logic do not apply

between 1·1uttarances which are the protocol-atatemeuts' of raligion.~9.5

l93Frederick Ferro, Language. !.ogic and God (First ~dition; New York:
c.1961), P• 137•

Harper and Brothers,

4
l9 Ibid~ • PP• 1'+8-149. In bis latt1r work, .alxploriy the Lod.o ot
l!aith, p-:--$5, Ferro diatinguiahes three "dimensions" within which the
language ot Christian taith oper&tes: the dimension of emotion, couation,
and cognition.

l95Ferre, 1angu.age1 Logic and God, P• 151.
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1'he syntactics or systematic theological discourse, the "aystea:at1o lan-

guage ot academic theology," are not based necessarily and exclusively ou
der.iandf3

for "ayate1natic coherence," tor systeilllltic pronouncements may be

mirrored "in the vary creeds which judge the language ot living faith,"
religious language. 196

l'he language of syatematic theology exemplifies syntactics of both
formal and "informal" logic.

The formal ruleiS of syntax have a descrip-

tive content with no ''c2sh-value"; syntax is composed of logical connectives
such as "and, 11 "not," "if • • • then."

The informal rules of syntax, on

the othor h~nd, are not distinct from and independent of the contentmatter being diacus:ied (~s in tne case of the rules of formal logic), ''but
are ope~ly dependent upon the definitions that oatablish inference~~in the language of a given subject matter," in this caae theology.

As

Gilbert Ryle says, "Not all strict inferences pivot on tho recognized logical constanta. 11197 Although at times the rules of inioruw.l. logic oppose
tuoae o! formal logic, they may serve as an "incentive to increased
conceptual procision. ''

"She's i,ret ty and she's not, 11 ''He's likable and

he's not,'' are statements that require further refineClent ot the conoepta
"pretty" and "likable" before an adequate non-paradoxical atatement is
possible.

In a similar way, a paradoxical statement about God indicates

196Ibid., PP• 154-155•
l97Ibid., PP• 1.51-152. Italics are.his. Arthur Carl Piepkorri, in
"what Does • Inerranc;y' Mean?~;,, C)ncordia 'I'heologioal Monthly, XXXVI (Jeptember 1965), 5'77-.593, examines some ot tho ditticultiea involved when a
term (inerranc1) ia loaded with connotatioDS from outside ito tield. His
suggestion that "inerranc1" is 'ln "eccleaiaetioal term ~bJeot to detim.tion by usage" ('j'77) is something o! a parallel to Ferro a suggustioD tbat
informal synt&Ut ia determined by the subject-matter being dieouesed.
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that ita concepts are due tor turther investigation even though they are
related through informal logic. 198 Ferr: agreos with proponents ot informal logic when they suggest that before a word is taken into the exac-

titude of formal lo&'ic, it must be refined:
Judgment, imagination--even intuition--muat go into the determination of the syntactic powers of every central theological concept
before formal logical operations with it become profitable; it is
precisely in this preliminary determination that t he living iesuee
lie.199
Discussing "interpretics," tile relationship between language and

,

the user-interpreter, J!'e rre distinguishes between a "passive" and a
"reapon:Jive" significance.

The "passive" concerns the affect of the lan-

guage in t he interpreter.

In this realm the emotions are active, and the

langu@ge can be termed "emotive" by conventional association.

This lan-

guage also has a "reactive" signif'icance. 200 The ''responsive" significance
of' interpretics refers to things and events "which are theuelves the symbols demanding our response.'' In interpretica, to speak of' a res ponsive
significance is to speak of' worda which deal with e7mbola of "grea.t
potoncy. 11 Not the words or phrases, but their content is of the greates~
"much of what is most characteristic of theological. meaning ia

concern:

best un<lorstood in these terms. 0201

In reference to tbe reaponaive-a.otiTe

198Ferre,
, Language, Logic and God, P• 153.
199

~ . , P•

154.

200
,
Ibid., PP• 15.5-1.56. In J<~ plorigg the Logic of Faith, PP• 57-.58,
Ferre suggests that the emotive "dimension" of language includes the
"reassuring" function ot religious language in that it produces and expreeaea an attitude. A "judging" function is also found 111 the eraotiondimension, tor utterancea of' faith may evoke and express emotions of
humility, guilt, and unworthiness.
201
F•"°'• 1..anguap, Lope and God, PP• 156-157• In the schema of

216

,

significance or interpretica, Ferre reminds hie reader that man is the
moulder and master ot discourse.

Pre-linguistic oocial interests and

activities give birth to language.

But even after birth language is not

independent; le.nguage-torms are oren to gro~h and transformation because

ot man's moulding.

Word, thought, and purpose abide, 88.'1& Ferre, but the

greatest of theae is purpose.

So also theological language ia a child of

human purpose, and it is within the Christian community that the syntactics
of Christian discourse are tormed. 202
·. rurning to "semantics, 11 Ferr; is able to consider the role of cognition in theological diacourse.

In the relationship between language and

its referent (semantics), tho "facts" to which theological statements make
reference are not the aame as those referred to and discussed in the empirical sciences.

And still, "there seem& no escape from the conclusion that

the intended semantic reference of theological discourse is to •metaphysical fact• o! some kind." The metap~aical "tacts" which serve as referents
are not given independently of the creative powers of intelligence, but
are dependent on the "conceptual activity of the mind." .from this premise
Ferre concludos that "the nature of metaphysics • • • is conceptual synthesis." Since a metaphyaical system providos coherence tor all "the
tacts," a metaphysical fact playo a key role in the tsystem.

203

Ferri

refers to the "cognitive dimension" ot theological diaoourae as the metaphysical function of theological language, that is, that function of

Exploriy the Logic ot Faith, P• 6o, the "challenging" function ot emotiondimension (where 11oalling" or "mission" ia embedded in the language of
Christian ta1th) seems to be the parallel teraa.
202-

,

·

-i,~erre, !.anguap 1 Logic and God, P• 158.

203~ . , PP• 16o-161.
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theological language which has metaphysical !acts aa referents and concepeo
tual synthesis as ita goal.

Metaphysical statements in thoological dis-

course ··tare not scientific in function, but their intended roterence, like
scientific atatements, is to reality," reality aa a whole. 2o4

The conceptual synthesie ~ctuated by theological speech is bound up
with man's personality:
Theological speech projects a model of immense responsive signiticanoe, drawn from "the tacts," as the key to its conceptual syntheaili.
Thia model, for theism, ia ma.de up of the "spiritual" cbaracteristice
of personalitys will, purpose, wisdom, love, and the lik•t.205
It indeed t heological discourse is in some wa1 concerned with "the facts,"

then to seek the relationship between theological language and its reterenta (the task of semantics) is to aearch tor a 'better understanding of
the \'iorld under the light of one's own theological discourse.

In &DJ

case, a cnan cannot avoid the decision to choose one or the other meta-

phy::>ical view, and ilith it, the l anguage of decision • 2o6

.~erre
,
,

contenda that tho conceptWll synthesis created by theological

diocourse needa aome aort of modified verification.

The comprehensive con-

ceptual synthesis allows for verification by cseaauring the power ot the
synthesis to integrate and illuminate:

204Ferr:, Exploring the Logic ot Faith, P• 73• Ferre attirnia (p.
9?) the close relation of cognitive to tho "emotive-conative'' climensioii
of theological language so as to avoid the impression that ~anChriatiaD
can, ~ithout losing anything essential, abandon all claims to (or even
interest in) truth or falsity." Italics are bis.
205Ferre, Language. Logic and God, P• 164. Ill "Happing the Logic
of Models in Science and Theology," Christian 3cholar, XLVI ($pring 196J)
9-39, Ferre examines in greater detail the proceaa of arriving at what
appear to b& synthetic-,etaphysical models.
2

~erre', Language. Logic and God, PP• 165-166.
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In thio process of (!oditie~ verification, at last, the complicated
connection botween empirical (e.g. scientific) assertions und nonempirical state,:.ents is evident. All properly warranted empirical
statements themselves become data tor synthesis and intolligible
organization within the framework provided by the theological
conceptual scheme. The propositional elements of the latter do
not logically entail or imply any of the former propositiona, and
in conaequence the latter • • • cannot b8 simply refuted by <liaoovering the falsity of the former; but a theological syntheeia
which cannot bring intelligibility to the propooitions ot science,
history, and all human knowledge is to that extent a ~eak synthesis
and--as a vhole--faila, to that degree, in its verification.207

Jlerre ur(Ses theologians to use the altered verification principle to
full adva~tage.

Theologians are prepared, with the modified principle, to

isolate tho lo1~'ic ot specific utterances and cot11pare the ditforent logics.
'l'\,o expressions with different logical types ot meaning

11

cannot in azcy

oimple way contradict or support one another... The ver ifi cation principle
certifies that some aaaertions are empirical, and thua removea them from
the realm ot theological logic.

The coJ111ectio11 cannot be "unidimensional."

A corollary o! thio et11ployment of the verification principle is that it a
theologi~n rnakea statements which concern any empirical state of affairs,
his statements are open to proof or' diaproot ewpirically.

Conversel.3', "the

acceptance or rejection ot nonempirical elements in theologr cannot hang
on the acceptance or rejection of associated empirical elementa.,.208
John A. Hutchinson
John Alexander Hutchinson209 distinguishes sign, symbol, and image.
&

207Frederick Ferre,
' "Veri!icatio11, Faith, and Uredulity," Religion
in Lite, XXXII (Hinter 1962-6.}), 57.
208
1bid•• 50-51.

-

209liutohinaon was professor of religi~n at ColWAbia University, 195.56o. Since 1960 he has been professor of philosoph7 and religion at Claremont Graduate School in California.
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A

sib"ll ia a term, and ita primary purpode ia referential.

term, and its significant purpoae is expressive.

A s111bol is a

~ymbols aro Kpprohended

with iwmediacy becauoe they are emotively-charged terms.

They participat•

in the reality they symb~lize and pos~ss a wido variet7 of meanings. In
the symbol-situation, contextual meaning proponderatos. 210 An image, on
the other hand, ia any "immediate datum o! human awarenesa. 11211

In reference to images Hutchinaon chooses to describe the "objective
imagination," the peculiar c14pacity ot the hucian mind for imaps.

Rely-

ing heavily on Kroner, a neo-Kantian, Hutchinson develops a theory which
definea the objective imagination as the mind exploripg and encountering
outside its own borders. 212 The inatrwaent of motaphor ia the basic tool
of the mind as it lays hold ot the world'a manifold character.

Metaphor

is "a kind of growing point of the mind's life in its responses to the
ever-changing and new character ot the world. 11213 1'he m1Dd also deals
vith ideas.

The distinct feature o! an image is its immediacy ot appre-

henoion, but an idea conaiats in tho ob~erved similarity between two or
214
more images, a similarity which the mind abstracts.

In consideration ot the stated definitions of sign, S)'mbol, and image

Hutchinson views his theory ot language to be in essential disagreement

210John A. Hutchinson, La ua and Faith• Studies in Si
and Meaning (Philadelphia: ~estmineter Presa, c.19 3, PP• 37,
211
Ibid., P• 74.
212
Ibid., PP• 76, 8.5-86.

-

-

Zl}Ib1d., P• 91.

214 Ibid., p. 87. Hutohill8oD ar8Ues (p. 89) that "we think in terms
ot ideas'iaiid we act by means of imagea."
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with much of modern ~nulysis:
To approach language first of all as an activity is admittedly a BWll"Ply different view from that of muoh analytic or selll8.ntic philosophy.
And to regard it as a kind o! activity that expres~es or articu.lAltea
a human self• or aignifioant aspects of aolfhood. is to be doub~
controver8ial. Yet this iu precisely what is propoSt!d.215
Be denies that his approach rules out all test of authenticity in language.

?wo standards, or cognitive ruleu, of utterance roll.l&.i.u:

(l) conformity ot

the ut·t ereci statement to attitudes of ti1e whole selt'; (2) confor1111t7 of
utterance to the real self in its encounter with the world. 216
Having conatructod a gonflral theory ot lapguage, Hutchinson moves
to draw tho consequences !or religious language in specifics.
religion as total lito-orientation.

011

He vieva

The eaaence of"total lite-orientation"

includes the noeds of man: identification, purpose, and meaning in life.
Drawing on phenomenological resoaroh, Uutchinaon aaaortu that the lwaia.ous and powerful imagus of religion provide the precise lite-orientation
which man needa.

Man ..eceives a "convincing and o.uthorite.tive statement

of who he is and what he is living tor." lie receives a set of values
that provicio goals, that engage and fulfill his pewers.
"faith and ito symbolic expreasiona may be regarded

111.a

Put another va1,
expreaaions of the

human will to live."217 Religion is total life-orientation, and accordingly, religiouo or faith stc.:tements are "orientation stateaenta. ,.2lS

215Ioid., p. 47. f!utohinaon claims (p. 48) that aelfhood is illposaible
without self-articulation, but he denies that this approach equate~ self•
articulation with selthood. aegarding .bis contention that ~ s i s seldo111
Yiews language as an activity, see supra, PP• 76-71.

216

Ibid., p • .51.

2l?lbid., PP• 101, 122, 124.
218

Ibid., P• 101.

221

Hutchinson choos es to speak phenomenologicall1 r a ther than theologicall7
in offering a rntionale for religious discourse:

Hy theaia is that religious language, or, as l would prefer to saz,
faith language, may be characterized ae symbolic or exfreosive language used !or the purpose of total life orientation.29
The author deals phenomenologically with the poaaibilit7 ot cognitive
religious experience and statement.

He records a wide variet1 of usage

in the so-called cognitive words (including "true," "false," "meaning"), 220
ancf. propos es t o extrapolate the ideas of truth and knowledge from the
sphere of propositionail. and ref'erontial knowledge to the fields of "expreasive statement," including religious statements.

He contends that the

"language" and "statements" of tho expressive !ield (art, science, philosophy, religion) provide parallels with the language of propositional and
referential knowledge which are not easilJ dismissed:

the1 have the intent

to communicate; they have a sort ot "consistency" and coherence similar
to the propositional; the degree to which the expreesive stategents claia
to deal with reterentG determines the degree to which the criterion ot
221
adequacy appl ies in the detormination of the otatement•a credibility.
The nature of truth and knowledge ia connected to the lite ot actioa.
Hutchinson argues that in the lite of action tho duality ot essence and
existence, self and world, is disaolved.

2l9Ibid., p. 13.

Actioa is a logically primitive

D. ll. MaoKinnon, in "Death," New Essays in Philo-

sophical"Thoology (New York: Macmillan CompaDJ, 0.1955), PP• 261-266,
aeensa to argue that the logic of religious language _is existential in
nature; he urges that especially language about death and i111111ortalit7
must be traced to ite human source.
220
Hutchineon, PP• 127•132.

221

~ . , PP• 142-145.
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idea not susceptible to dissection; it is the "widest oategory ot human
aelthood." Accordingly, "existential truth may be defined as the adequacy

ot esaenoe to existence; and existential D1eaning 'fIJb.Y be detinod as possible
exi atential truth."222 Within this oxiatential context religious statement•
are no leas cognitive than tho

statements of other experiential realms.

In three successive chapters Hutchinson examines the expressive language

ot science, art, and philosopbl, emphasizing that each discipline is related
to the common life and to the common existential problem. 223
·1n a ·:more precise examination ot religious discourse, Hutchinson uaea
the metaphor o! a "religious-theological spectrum" to isolate the distinguishing features of two forms of religious dioouurse, "faith statements"
and 'a,;heological statements. n 224 The primary terms in tirat-order faith
statements are images.

Images are expreasiTe in torm; their purpose and

function ia the straightforward expression of religious experience.
Hutchinson lista seven recurrent foru through whioh

112 n

22

5

traditionallJ

communicate their ultimate concern:· (1) confesoion or witness (which
expresses the meaning of exiotence for the speaker); (2) prayer (direct
and personal appeal to ?ower in expressive language); (3) ritual

222

~ . , PP• 152-154.

223Ibid., PP• 158-226. Hutchinson differentiates (p. 65) betvee11
primary language and derivative languages (including art, aoience, philosophy and religion) • .Each derivatiTe language has a certain coramon experience and common language as its basis, but deTelopa apeoifio cate' goriea tor the communication ot particular aspects of bwan experience
about which·it is particularly concerned. It appears that little is left
for the primary language other than- the "life of action."
224

~ . , p. 2.36.

Hutchinson carries through his earlier suggestion

(p. 91) that metaphor ia the basic tool of the mind in hie use of the
spectrum-metaphor at this place.
225Ibid., P• 2.2?.

223
(configuration ot expressive image i~ word, aot, or other media, repeated
at sat times), (~) myth or sacred stor7 (expression of values by which
a man lives and declares life meaningful); (5) commandment (moral imperative which consists ot presoriptioaa tor human aotion)1 (6) homily or
sermon (communication of direct experience from person to person); (7)

scripture or aaored writing. 226 While direct religious experience may
contain a rational structure, the cognition therein contained ia apprehended and e~pressed in terms ot image& rather than ideas. 227

On the other end of the spectrum are second-order religious atatelllente,
or "theological" statements;
Second-order religious statements, or theological statements, are
conoeptual rather than expressiTe or symbolic in tor&lj their main
tar.ms are not images but concepts, and their purpose is not direct
expression but the understanding of religion • • • • theological
statements are the linguistic vehicle tor the study and understandingot religion.228
l'he clear emergence and predominance of "conceptual terms in the J.ansuage''

distinguish first-order religious language from explicit theological.
utterance.

Theological statements are osaentiall1 a teol111i.cal language,

a "linguistic vehicle for the study of religion. ,,229

On the aetaphorical

spect~a between the two polea of first and aeoond-order religious stateMllta there are overlapping areas.

Creeds, tor eX&llple, are partq faith

language and partq theological language. 230

226

228-236.
-Ibid., PP•2,9.

227Ibid.,

-

P•

228Ibid., P•
229Ib1d.,

-

230Ibid.,

w.

P• 2lf<>.

P• 241.

In hie final chapters (pp. 248-29}), Butchinaoa

224
Willem F. Zuurdeeg
Willem Frederick Zuurdeeg231 ia convinced that the analytic method
is the appropriu.ta rnethodology in the philosophy ot roligion.

It providea

both a conception o! the philoaoph7 of religion as analysis ot language
and a disqualification of at0taphyaics and ontology. 232

lie sete out to

analyze the lanbruage of theology, hoping thereby to conatruct a philosopn1

of religion ~hich takes proper cognizance of pbilosophic~l analysis.
~uurdeeg andoraes analysis' classification ot indicative, analytical,
and tautological discourse.

Indicative language appears in crude form in

daily language, and in purified form· in the language o! empirical science.
Analytic language ia the language o! philosophl, a language "not interest-

ed in tacts but in moaning3." Tautological language is the language of
logic and mathematics. 2J3
But Zuurdeeg takes exception with the ana.l1tic philosopher as be ·

uaes his concluGions as an hypothesis to array the world religions, particularly Christianity, along tha metaphorical spectrum. But Hild.an
jmart, in Reasorui aDd Faiths (London: aoutledge a nd Kegan Paul, c.19.58),
P• 1.5, opposes the suggeation that there is &'fJ.1 one inclusive language
frame for the multitude of spiritual discouraea in the world (e.g.,
Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity).
231 zuurdeeg was ordained in a Dutch-Presbyterian church, the .aemonotrant Brethren, in 1934. Sau.grating from Holland to America, he taught
briefl1 at i:;lmhurst College near Chicago, and then in 1948 joined the
faculty of McGort:1ick 3eminary in Chicago. In May, 196o, he was elevated
to professo1• ot philosophy of religion. His .first major vork vaa L!!search tor tho Consequences of the Vienna Circle tor Llthica (Utrecht:
Kenirik, 1946), Zuurdees diei .December 3, 1963.
2~il:i..t.m F. Zuurdeeg, AD Analytical PhilosopbY of Religion (Hew Yorks
Abingdon Pr&ss, c.1958), p~ 17.
233

-

Ibid., P• 44.
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describes him.

Ho contends that "convictional" language deals with "reali-

ty" no leas than does indicative language.

'lhese two types ot language

view reality dit'forently; it is the task of the a nalytic philoaophcr to
prescribe what is "real" and what ia not when it co111es to references of
these lan,;uages. 234 'l he philosophy

or

analysis errs in that it !ails to

recognize t he existing unity between tho man who speak.a and the lansuage
he speaka.

t uurd~eg commits hiraaelt to an investigation ot this convic-

tional unity aa it concerns theological discourse,

His primary aasumptioM

isolate what are for him tha vulnerable a.speots of current analysis.
a.

b.

c.

the general [analyti<:"J position omits a language which is not a
specific language but the language which underlies both the language of common life and t he specific languages, namely convictiorial language.
Convictional language i a not given full justice by terms such as
"use" and "function"; it shows a unity of word, thou5nt, and person; it ia t he person in his relationships to himself, to others,
and to the '!world. 11
.le are analyzing not jua~ ~ords or sentences but J.anguage in t he
aenae o! man-who-speaks.~3~

Theological language is not a direct parallel to convictional language.

'1'he language of thaology is neither "is-language" (convictional)

nor ,:use-lc:mg..iaga" (indicfttive).

However, the lan3uage ot theology is

akin to t he former in its attempt to express the "personality center'' in
mattera of "ultimate i11porto.noe. 11 At the same time, it is aJd.n to the
latter in that it "implies an element of distance, of reflection."
Zuurdeeg chooses to call theological language

emplo7-language":

11

It makea some sense to ll8.Y that is-language is spontaneous, and useEmplo7-language cannot be easily characterized

language artificial.

234

Ibid., P• 45.

235Ibid., P• 19.
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in this way. The laborious work ot a thoologian is neither the apontaneoua approval of an aot ot generoaity; nor 1B t neological language
artificial in the wa7 in whioh chemical terminology de3ervea tnat
name. The "giving aooount ot" which oharaotetlzea employ-language
can be called "rofloctive," or "meditative. 112:,0
Employ-language differs from is-language in its retleotiv• ele14ent; it
differe from u:se-language in that it does not operate "according to strict
rules" preucribed by !!Specific purposes.
Because the employ-language of theology is somewhat akin to conYictional language, Zuurdeeg discuasos in greater detail the structure of
oonvictional language.
lan1.;-uage

While indicative, analytical, and tautological

each has a "logical structure" ot aorta, thore is no parallel

in convictional language:
~le should t1.dmit that co11victional language d04tu not poaaea3 this
''logical 1' structure, and that therefore logic cannd.t serve as its

metalanguage. That ia to say that the metala~ge of oonvictional
laU{~age must possess a nonlogical atructure.2}7

Because convictional language baa no specitio logical structure, Zuurdeeg
prefers to speak of "situational analysis" rath~r than "logical analysis"

ot convictional language. 238 If it is accepted that "a man!! his conTictions, hie word," and if "when we speak of 1 language' we mean man hiuelt,
man-who-speaks, homo loquena, 11239 the only analytic poasibilit1 is''aituational analysis." A philosophy ot religion which uses the aual)?tio
approach to language must be qualified
by an account of the language situation, to which belong: a) the

-

a,6lbid., P• 59.
2Y1Ibid.,
P• 63.•
2:,8Ibid.,

P• 64.

a39 Ibid., P• 59.

-

2.2.7

person who communioatea1 b) the collllllUnit7 within which the language
functions; c) tbe (subjectively) objective references of the language(sJ; d) the '\torlde" within which th.tse elem11pts are related;
e) the historical backgroundo ot tho3e elements.2't0
Unity in Uiversit1
The men conaidered in this chapter t ake up the second major challenge
of analysia, the challenge which demands an explanation of the apecitic
"logic" o! rBligious language.

'l'his brief reoW'il8 is appended to show both

tho collective unity and tho individual diversity of the views here brought
together.

But in no sonae is this recapitulation a substitute for the

expanded expositions.
t he oecond challenge of analysis assumes implioitl.¥ that there is a
specific logic of r eligious language.

The men who address the second

challenge accept the assumption as valid.

The analogiats locate the spe-

cial character of t he logic of religious language in tho justification for
the uae of analogy.
in worship.

fliacintyre arguee that the use

or analoo- is

validated

Crombie augg&ata that the paradoxical nature of theological

language qualifies t he use o! ordinary language tor religious o.nalogJ.
He adds tha t the ultimate authority of parable-analog)' is Christ Himaelt.
Mascall anchors the peculiar character ot the logic o! religious language
in the mind's apprehenoion o! mystery.

Tbe non-analogists are les a con-

cerned with authorization for specific logic than with the particulal"ity
of religious logic.

:.imart speaks in terms of a "spiritual frame," and

within the frame, different strands o! religious aotivity which contribute
to the logic of religious discourse phenomenologically.

Munz plaoea the

228
concern with "eternit1" at the core ot roligiouo syabol.

Ile argue8 that

the only element ot oertainty in religioua thought resides in tho picture
symbol.

In this way he looates the logic of religious lan3uage in. the

sphore 0£ picture 3ymbol.

!<aruuey ref@rs to the "odd'' logic of religious

language., a logic which parallels the logic of "!''-language.

Cleobury

placoa Ood-aantences midway between parson.al and impersonal language--in
a unique logical status.

Hordern contondu that roligioua language is a

distinguishable language game which parallels the pergonal language game
and evidences a convictiorial element in its logic.

Evans does not propose

an autonomous language go.me for religion, but argues that religi.oua lang~ge contain.s aspects of per!ormative, causal, and expressive language
insofar

as

these aspects are validated in the speaker's "onlook. 11

Hutchinson refera to tho special logic of religious utterances in terms
of th1tir use as "orientation statements." Zuurdeeg locates the peculiarit1 ot religious language iu ita .function:..,as "•mplo1-language. 11

Hi.lea

and Ferr• both poeit a modified use prinoipl~ as th~ logical tool vhich

isolates t he spocitic logic of religious atatttments.

Miles proposes that

the modified principle brings to light the "absolute mistakes" pre:ient
in pseudo-religious utterances.

He definea religious language as silence

qualified b;y theistic parables.

Ferre suggests that the modified prin-

ciple permits one to distinguish the logic of religious utterances froa
the logic of acienti!io utterances.
With the e~ception of the analogista, the men str@ss the importance
of the individu~l persoWllity in the formulation and use ot the logic ot
religious lnn(51.lage.
analogists.

'?his characteristic receives alight emphasis amoq the

Jmart, on the other band, endorses the importance of the ill-

dividual in tho question of the logic o! religio1.1s langua~e by implication

229

when he contends that the strancl's religious activities, carried on b7
Kunz acGapts the idea 117

individuals, support the logic of a utrand.

implication when he argueo that religious symbols do not deal vith the
transcendent, but describe the world of man.

uamaey etresses the impor-

tance of peraonal commitment and discerJU11ent.

In addition, he uses the

logic of "!"-language as n basis for describing the logic of religious
la~uago.

Cloobury'a underlying idealism endorses th~ importance of the

human personage in the formulation and use of religious language.

ilorden

takes note of the convictional element of religious language, and the
aimilarities between the theological language game and the game ot personal
language.

Evans'; "onlook" and his emphases on self-involvement and rap-

portive elementa in religious language are essentially the marks ot a
personaliat.

Mil6s 1 endeavor to avoid the "absolute mistake" is the obverse

ot a streso on tho peroonal. He states that ultil!llltel7 peroonal conv1ot1on
determines the worth ot one or another particular parable.

,

Ferre allova

tor the creative powers ot the intelligence and the conceptual povers ot
the Dind as important factors in religious language.

Hutchi118on contends

that the individual's active mind constructs expressive, 11eaningful imagee
in the orientation statements ot religion.
loguens, man.-who-speaka, as he who

UNS

Zllurdeeg stres3Gs the

!!2!2

convictional language.

The general apathJ ot the men toward a cognitiYe element 1n religious

language (ao "cognitive" is traditionally defined) is bound up with the
endorse,aent of a particular logic tor religious langu••
er effort than others to retain or explain cognition.

Some make great-

Two ot the ana~ogillta,

Crombie and Hascall, deal ~t least obliquel7 "1th the problem.

Crombie

touches on the queation ot cognition 1n his discussion of 11unclifteiaentiated

2.30
Mascall allows tor cognition (as he defines it) in tho argument

theism."

concerning rational apprehension.

~mart attempts to retain aome semblance

ot cognition in hia contention that reason(a) and taitb(s) are not at
odds--although the underlying religious activitiea ceed not involve cognitive eleruents.

,

Ferre aeeka to retain COIJZlition of aorta in his eMphasis

on metaphysical synthesis, but he refers to "metaphysical'' facts in religion as different from empirical facts.

Ramsey allows tor no verifiable

deductions from theological a~sertions, but his covert idealism
religious statements no lesa cognitive than others.
ia in essential agreement with Ramsey.

lllflkea

In this matter Cleobury

Evans contends that aometb.ing more

than factual content ia involved in selt-performative language, but he
does not dismiss the importance of factual content.
uralistic interpretation o! religious language.

Munz opposes the nat-

He suggeats instead that

the task of the theologian io not deductive, and that the truth of theology
1a to be taste~ onll against the aymbol picture.

Hiles states that the

parable is not concerned with literal truth or falsity; pttr6ocal dttcision
determinea tho worth of a parable.

Hordern defines "to know"--a cognitive

ter111--in Bartllian sty.le in order to avoid the problem of traditional cognition.

Hutchinson offers a phenomenological definition of cognition, and

contends that the nature of truth and knowledge is connected with the lite

ot action.

Finally, Zuurdeeg stresses the unity ot the man-who-speaks and

the language h~ speaks, anct apparently rules out a strong cognitive eleme11t.
The strands ot thinking are diverse and complex, and it is unfair to
sWDmarize the thoughts out of context.

All the men address tLe second

major analytic challenge, but each in his own way--independently and

2}l

cohere?tly.

Rigid olaosification has little appreciable value.

Perhaps

the moat appropriate conclusion is a directive to the ~ritings themoelveo.

CHJ\Pl'ER VI

AN EXAM iliNl' ION OF THE LOGIC OF l~ LIGIOUS DI.3COIJ16E \1rrH A VIt.."'W
'.l.'O ASCEltl.'AINING 1'illi IMPACT OF LINGUL1TIC ANALYS IS UPOfi
Coh~r EMPOHARY PHILOSOPHY UF RELIGION

Chapter I
'r hia study examines how linguistic analysis, together with its pre-

cursor logical poaitivism, has provoked a reassessment of the nature of
religious discourse.
two questions:

The problem is accurately stated in the form ot

(l) What are the challenges which analysis addresses to

the philooophers of religion in the area ot religious language?

(2) In

what way do the answers ot the philoaophers ot religion illuminate and
relate to thoae challenges?

Chapter II
Logical positivism ia the ideational precursor ot contemporary linguistic analysis.

The evolution of logical positivism in the environment

of British idealism, and the role of new logic in the development ot
logical positivism, are curoorily reviewed.

The study assesses the im-

portance of logical atomism in the eraergence o! logical positiviaa, and
then measures the intelloctual currents running in the scientiticallyorientated Vienna Circle.

Logical positivism appears to haYe relied

heavily on Kant and Comte, but it pushed beyond both in its concern tor
proposition rather than knowledge.

The verification principle moYed

through five developmental stages as the positivists attempted to erase
its impreci sion.

In spite of continued reformulation, the principle

,
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contained inherent di!ficultie~.
Positivism unleauhad an attack on metaph7aical and theological atate•
ments wUh its dichotomy of analytic and synthetic propositions.

:Che

chapter revi ews the sta tus of t heological statements under positivistic
scrutiny.

While t ?gicul positivism agreed to the possibility o! mystical

experience, it counted theological statements

as

meaninglessly emotive.

The chapter concludes with an examination of logical positivism in

the larger philoaophical context.

While logical positivism was in s9me

ways t he precur$or o! linguiotic analysis, positivism was also an irruption
in the development of an analysis which chronologically preceded it.

Chapter III
'l'he third chapter studies contemporary linguistic analysis aud the
challenges it hurls at theology.

Analysis and logical positivism are

related through two bridge characters,

o. z.

Moore and Altrod J. Ayer

(and Ludwig Wittgenstein, aa explained below).
a descriptive definition o! linguistic analysis.

The study seeks to offer
The logical-positivistic

parentage of analysis, the e1111)hesis of analysis on "use" of .lallb"Uage, and
the psychological approach-avoidance set of many analysts are used as
characteristic elaments in three attempts to define analysis descriptivel)'.
Although each !actor contributes to an understanding ot aiial.ysis, it is
apparent that the ,aathodology ot philosophical analyais provided the most
appropriate entree for an adequate descriptive description of the movement.
On that account the chapter turns to the metap.o,aical therap1 o! Cambridge
analysis as a concrete historical manifestation of anal7tic aethodologJ.
The Cambridge analysts judged metaphysical state..nts importaut tor their
therapeutic value.

The chapter moves from (;ambridge to Oxtor4 aa it .~ ··

2}4

reviews t he trer1chant work of Ludwig J ittgeustein, the man who led Oxford

philooophy to anal ytic conaideratione.
logics of l anguage.

The Oxford school studies the

It a ssumes an organic view of lan~uage, and !orQulatea

a mt,thodology to dis sect t he organism.

The notion of. language games, the

paradigm case technique, the sisnificant comparison, and the emphasis on
contextual relations are all important ole1nenta of analytic methodology.

In turn the chupter examines the challonges of analyai5 to the world
of t heology.

Two primary challengoa eraerge.

The first derives from ana-

lysts who openly evidence t heir losical-positiviatic parentage.

,\lthougb

they endors e in principle the notion of "logics" in langua6e, in practice
t hose analy<>tu bracket tbe "logics" of ·1anguage with one "logic"--the
"logic" of e111pirical anchorage.
a sharpened stuturnent of

·r he r esultant challenge to theology is

the logical-positivistic d.e,:iand for t.he verifiable

or falsifiable e l emeut in religious utterance.

In sum, the firat challenge

requires either t he verifiability or the falsifiability of religious language aa a prerequisite for admittctnce to the .realm of meaning.
ond aualytic clu:1llenge coucerna its elf with wethodolo{SY more

110

Tho secthan the

f i rat, and in that reapdct it more accurately mirrora the core of analysis.
The lack of a supportive metaphysics, the appeal to the results of analyses,

the refusal to accopt as valid the self-justifying nature of revelatory
religious langunge, aud sharpened attacku on traditional arguments for
the existe11ce of tiod--these four eleaenta contribute to the cethodological

challenge of analysis.

~'ho second major challenge of analysis demands

the "logic" of religious lant.,"U&ge.

If it is granted (as it iu in thia

challenge) that the "logic" of religious language does not piYOt on its
verifiability or fala ifiabilit1, the question reuinsz

What sort

ot
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syntactical, ideation.al, contextual interrelation--wbat sort

or '1logic"-

ia the caae when a meaningful religious statement is uttered?
Chapter r.v
Chapter IV exa1aines verifiability and falsifiability in propoeed
theories of religious language.

It investigates the works ot men who take

up the first maJor c i·1allenge of anal1sis.

In dealing with that challenge

the men encounter the aegment of analysis which evidences a strong positivistic parentage.
Three charaoteriatics of t he first positiviatic-aoalytic challenge
are affirmed, in general, by tho men who address it.

(1) Tho men evidence

a general disinclination to identify more than one language game in human
language.

(2)

statements.

They admit to tho empirical anchorage of all meaningful

(3) They accept verifiability-falsifiability as the appropri-

ate logical tool for the apprehension of ~eaning in religious language.
The chapter moves from a point of "strong(er)" poaitiviam to a point
of "weak,(er)" positivism as it summarizes the views of men who meet, collectively and individually, the !irat major analytic challenge on its own
grounds.

The works of John B. wilson and David Cox are reviewed under the

title "Verifiability and Religious ~perienco. 11

Beu F. Kimpel, Richard

B. Braithwaite, Paul van Buron, and Paul F. Schmidt come under inYestigation in "Verit'iability and Religious Propositions." The eection titled
''Falsifiability and Religious Propositions" summarizes the nows ot
William A. Christian and William T. Blackstone.

John Hick's eschatologi-

cal veri!ication i o considered under ''Proleptic Verification and Religious Propositions."

The chapter concludes with a brief

re8Ull8.

Chapter V
The fifth chapter deals with the second analytic challenge, the demand for an explication of the particular "logic" of religious language.
It summarizes the worka ot men who isolate and describe the opecial logic
of religious languago.

The thinking of these Men coalesces in three areas.

The men recognize the particular character of the logic ot religious language as distinct from other "logics" in hwnan language. !lecond, they
tend to omphuaize the role of individuality a~d personality in the formulation and uao of that logic of religious languagec

Third, they evidence

some degree of apathy toward the elernent of cognition in religioua language,
as might be expected.
The chapter exacineo in detail the writings of thirteen men.

''The

Logic of Authorityn reviews tho works of Alaadair MacIntyre, Ian MacHattie
Crombie, and Eric Lionel Mascall--all three analogists o! a sort.

The

studies o! Ninian Smart and Peter Munz suggest the propriety o! the subtitle "Logic of ,3ituation. 11 'l'he personal nature o! the logic of religious
language, endorsed by Ian Hamaey, Frank Harold Gleobur:, irilliam Hordern,
and Donald D. ~vans, comes under invoatigation in "Logic of Farticularity
in Religious Language."

b'inally, "~pressive Logic of Lite-Uirection"

bringa togetber the thought of Thomas Miles, Frederick Ferre, John A.
Hutchinaon, and 'dillem F. Zuurdeeg.
capitulation.

The chapter closes with a brief re-

APPENDIX A

Here follow three reViews ot Hugo Meynell 'o denae 1 Monsenae and
Christianiti (London: Sheed and W
ard, 1964). The first rev~ew, by Ian
!Ulmsey, a.ppea~ed in Journal o! Theological !>tudiea, XVI (April 1965),
270-271.

The aocond, by A. H. Armstrong, appeared in Downside Review,

LXXXII (July 1964), 256-258.

The t t1ird, by George Vass, appeared in

Heythrop Journal, VI (April 1965), 201-20}.
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a metaphysical personalism whose attractions are at least as evident as
any dangers, then or now.
But, these queries aside, undoubtedly in this book Dr. Luce shows us
where to set our sights so as to gain a better perspective on Berkeley, and
one of the great merits of Dr. Luce's exposition is for example that, pace
Hume, it gives Berkeley's attack on abstract general ideas the duly
subordinate, and not primary, place it had in his thinking. Dr. Luce
further notes and rightly that his account confirms broadly the interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy reached independently by T,. E. Jessop
and himself, and reflected in their edition of the Works.
If some of us can still discern a few dark fish swimming in the stream,
at least we can also delight in what Dr. Luce has displayed for us on the
bank, and if the Boswells and Johnsons chance to come along with their
sticks, they may yet be convinced 'that Berkeley teaches common sense'
(p. 17). But Dr. Luce has no easy optimism. It is 'not easy to convince
folk' of this, and therein 'lies the difficulty and the importance' of the
present study (p. 17). All I can say is that if Dr. Luce does not convince
the reader, no one will-though on this point and despite my heretical
queries, I speak with the affection and gratitude of an old convert.

I. T.

RAMSEY

Sense, Nonsense and Christianity: An essay on the logical analysis
of religious statements. By Huco A. MEYNELL. Pp. vi+281.
London and New York: Sheed & Ward, 1964. 12S. 6d.
IN this essay on the logical analysis of religious statements which still
bears some marks of its origin as a research thesis, the author approaches
religious statements by first considering statements in general and their
relation to 'facts', and next value statements, where he notes especially
the bearing of religious beliefs on them. He then turns to statements of
traditional Christianity which, as he significantly emphasizes, have a
necessary 'commitment to matters of fact', so that any account of them
which views them as 'merely or principally evincing present moral dispositions or an expression of present religious experience' is, as he rightly
says, radically inadequate. In a chapter on 'Religion and Ontology' he
argues that the statements of Christianity are allegations, whether true
or false, of 'objective fact' though this phrase becomes a little slippery
when we hear that belief in God can mean not only belief in 'that which
will render to every man according to his works' (p. 161) but also belief
'that cosmic justice will ultimately be secured' (p. 163). A concluding
chapter contains a perceptive and helpful analysis of the truth-conditions
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of certain 'mysteries': (a) the inspiration of Scripture, (b) miracles,
(c) visions, (d) Christology, (e) the Real Presence.
This is an enterprising book which raises the right kind of questions,
and points the way to profitable discussion. But in its legitimate and
laudable desire to eschew all reductionisms, and to give an account of
Christian statements which makes clear their factual' reference and their
claim to be about 'objective fact', it only shows how very much more
attention needs giving, in the first place, to talk about fact. Further,
while Mr. Meynell clearly disclaims any present concern with truth or
falsity, is he himself likely to have given an adequate account even of
the meaning of Christian assertions, if it makes the 'traditional' kind
of apologetic virtually impossible? For as Mr. Meynell points out on
pp. 164-5, it follows on his view that in 'the establishment or refutation
of the statement that Christ is Lord in the traditional sense, centrality
of the truth-conditions is in inverse proportion to their availability as
evidence'. Which comes near to saying that the most central doctrines
are also the most incredible: which admittedly some believers and even
some believing philosophers have liked to think. But fortunately not alI.
Mr. Meynell is right to be concerned about questions of fact, objectivity, and reference, but does not he himself take too prosaic a view of
facts and objectivity ?-a suspicion which is fortified by what he says alI
too briefly, for example, about Otto. Reductionism is no less reductionism when it is reductionism in a ·good cause.
I. T. ~SEY

~
The Christian Beliej in God. By DANIEL
London: Faber & Faber, 1964. 25s.

JENKINS.

Pp. 226.

ALmoucH 'it is possible •• . to present the Christian faith in ways
which drain it of all mystery', Mr. Jenkins wishes to reaffirm .the place
of mystery in any study of the case for belief in God, and he censures
excessively rationalistic and academic treatments. Where the traditional
rational 'proofs' of God's existence are persuasive, they are so usually
'only for those who have been led to believe in God on other grounds'.
To learn reliably what God is like, 'philosophical speculation' must be
'checked and controlled at every point by what God has said about
Himself in Christ'. Study must focus upon 'the knowledge of God
possessed by Jesus himself and the prophets and apostles': upon the
testimony (of reliable witnesses) that the events recorded 'are explicable
only on the basis of Someone not themselves, who stands over against
them, (and] who controls all things': upon the character of the expe_rience of believers who are enabled thereby to 'see the meaning of
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and it seems arguable that there is no meaning in speaking of what a
man would do freely, when in fact he will never do it. Again, the argument
is discussed that no man could avoid all sin throughout his life. What
does not appear sufficiently allowed for is that, just in so far as some
action or inaction is unavoidable, it cannot possibly be due to free choice.
Again, a distinction is made between secondary liberty and autonomous
liberty, apparently meaning liberty controlled by God and not wholly
so controlled. But surely the very meaning of free choice is that the
action is not wholly controlled by any power other than that of the
chooser. And the baffiing problems connected with eternal punishment
are left aside, though perhaps this may be explained as not essential to
the subject under discussion.
A review of this book might be prolonged indefinitely; it must be
enough to repeat that it is indispensable for future study of the problem.
MARK PONTIF.EX
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[It must oe added that the theory here recommended was put forward
by Dom Mark Pontifex twenty-five years ago in this REVIEW ('Predestination', January 1939), and developed by him in his recent contribution
to the Faith and Fact series Providence and Freedom, to which Fr Most
makes suitable acknowledgements.-Eo.]
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Sense, Nonsense and Christianity by Hugo Meyell. Pp. vi
281 ($heed
and Ward: Stagbooks) 12s. 6d.
IT will be ~teresting to see what professional philosophers, especially
unbelieving ones, will make of this book: it is to be hoped that they will
read it carefully, and that it will help to clarify their minds about religious
statements. The present reviewer, who is not a professional philosopher,
certainly found it helpful, enlighten~g and encouraging. It is not a book
of apologetics or theology, but, according to its sub-title 'an essay on
the logical analysis of religious statements'. This means, as Mr Meyncll
makes clear in his Introduction, that it is not concerned with determining
whether particular religious statements are true or false, or with that
deepening of our understanding of a revelation, already accepted as true,
which is the business of dogmatic theology. It is a preliminary attempt
to show what religious statements are really trying to say, what makes
them consistent or inconsistent, sense or nonsense, and by what means.
if any, they can be verified or falsified. This does seem to be indispensable.
Neglect of it, as Mr Meynell suggests, does a good deal to make much
religious apologetic and anti-religious polemic so very wide of the mark.
and to account for the rather disconcerting fact that, after serious and
inlelligent discussions on the philosophy of religion between persons of
opposing views, the participants are usually found to hold exactly the
same. opinions with which they started: there has been no real contact
ofmmds.
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Mr Mcynell begins with two general chapters on 'Statements and
facts' and 'The Nature of Value-Statements' which seem to a nonprofessional refreshingly clear and sensible. His rejection of the dogma
that statements imply either strictly or not at all and his remarks on 'loose
• implication' (which plays an important part in his later discussions of
religious statements) are particularly welcome (pp. 32-35). The main enquiry into the logic of religious statements begins with chapter 3. A
j particularly valuable feature of it is the clarity with which Mr Meynell
establishes the distinction between traditional Christianity and
·reductionist' theologies, of which he takes the treatments of Christianity
by Kant, Schleiermacher and Hegel as his principal examples (Bultmann's
rather different sort of 'reductionism' is dealt with in an Appendix).
~Ir Meynell treats these distinguished thinkers with proper respect, but
shows clearly that they are_using Christian language in quite different
ways from traditional Christians; ·they are Christians rather in the way
in which ancient Greek philosophers were pagans, that is, they use the
traditional religious ways of speaking freely in whatever sense they may
I require for their own P,hilosophical purposes. It is necessary to make
I this distinction as clear as possible. There is a great deal of 'reductionist'
Christianity about, and, especially for anyone engaged in a:cumenical
dialogue, it is important to have reliable criteria for distinguishing it
from traditional Christianity (neither Mr Meynell nor the present reviewer
thinks that all the opinions of the 'reductionists' about religion and
f morality are necessarily false and contemptible; but before evaluating
them one must be clear that one is dealing with something entirely different
from the traditional faith).
One general criticism of Mr Meynell's analysis which can be made is
that, in understandable reaction from some forms of 'reductionism',
he is inclined to play down very much the part of present experience in
traditional Christian belief, and to talk as it if consisted almost exclusively
in 'assent to statements of past (historical) and future (eschatological)
fact', present religious experience ·being only a 'by-product of the resulting
hope and thankfulness' (p. 136). We must agree with him on the necessity
of assent to historical (in principle now verifiable or falsifiable) and I
eschatological (only verifiable or falsifiable in the future) statements
for traditional Christians. But it would seem very odd for God to leave
th?se whom he calls to believe in him without any sufficient present
evidence of himself, and very odd for us to believe in a number of remarkable events.in the past; and hope for still more remarkable ones in the
future, without some sort of present awareness (admittedly very difficult
lo state satisfactorily) of God revealing them.
On p. 161, when considering the meanings of the word 'God', Mr
Meyn~ll says that it is proximate to nonsense to deny the existence of
God 10 the sense of 'first cause'. This at least requires a good deal of
argument to support it, and cannot just be asserted as it is here, since
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most unbelievers nowadays would flatly deny that it was necessary to
assume any single 'first cause' of events in any sense. On p. 225, in the
summary of Bultmann's views, a 'not' seems to have dropped out of the
sentence 'God must be regarded as an object for metaphysical sp~culation,
as he is by Catholic theology, and his action must not be conceived as
expressing itself in physical events'.
A. H. A:RMSTRONG

events· if one did not show that the Christian phenomenon of which they
form a part gives the answer to the question of our existence' (p. 26).
The second section consists of articles and conferences on "Kierkegaard,
'dialectical theology' and Bultmann's 'demythisation' (to use P. Bouillard's
term). It contains a resume of the first of his two volumes on Karl Barth,
which alone would be enough to recommend it. But it is also an account
of 'existential' theology which many might find the first fully intelligible
account which they have read. It is a genuine 'dialogue'. The true insights
of these thinkers are recognized, and their affinities with Catholic theology
are clearly shown. The apparent irrationality of Kierkegaard is discussed in a way which seems most admirably balanced. Barth's rejection
of a natural knowledge of God is treated in a really convincing way
because P. Bouillard's account of this knowledge is not subject to the
objections which can be rightly urged against conventional accounts of
it. Bultmann's intentions receive a sympathetic treatment which gives
added force to the conclusion that it is, fundamentally, Bultmann's
Lutheran approach which leads him to attach so little importance to the
historical personage, Jesus Christ (p. 144). The last section consists of
an article on Gabriel Marcel and the magisterial discourse for the centenary of Blondel's birth delivered at Aix in 1961. Marcel's work is here
considered in all its bearings; it is astonishing that so much ground could
be covered with such apparent ease in so short a space. P. Bouillard is
generous in his praise of Marcel, and the true value of his work emerges the criticism is made that his attitude to our time is a rather negative one
('it is in our present world and from our historical situation that we must
rejoin the eternal', p. 165). The discourse on Blonde} is undoubtedly
the best introduction to his work and should gain more readers for P.
Bouillard's great book B/011del el le Christia11isme.
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Logique de la Foi by H. Bouillard, s.J. Pp. 197 (Aubier) n.p.
P. BoUJLLARD tells us in his Preface that he was hesitant about acceptino
the suggestion of collecting these apparently disparate pieces into ~
single volume. They were also, he says, 'command performances' in each
case and require to ~ seen in a context. But he need have had no anxiety.
The fact that they are all animated, as he puts it, by the same intention:
'to bring out the secret correspondence between the logic of human
existence and the appeal of the Christian mystery' is of itself sufficient
justification. But there is another consideration. The reader of this short
book will be given a bird's-eye view of the ground covered by P. Bouillard
in his longer works and will thus be encouraged to read them.
The first part of the book consists of two papers on apologetics and an
address on Christian liberty. Since the sort of apologetics which P.
Bouillard advocates is Blondelian, the topic of liberty is quite naturally
connected with it. 'I think', he writes, 'that no one has defined better
than Blonde! what apologetics ought to be in the modem world. It is
true that his work contains obscurities and is out of date in several
respects. But it has touched the crucial point so precisely that it is s~ill
illuminating for us today' (p. 30). P. Bouillard writes with great clarity
and conciseness, and it would be necessary to quote at inordinate length
in an attempt to bring out the importance of his conclusions in this (or
in any) part of ·his new book. It is possible only to make a few refere?ces
to certain passages of peculiar interest. On the certainty of faith ~e wnt~s:
'God reveals himself to each of us, at the heart of the act of faith which
he himself determines. Our awareness of this revelation has the character
of a direct and personal apprehension, of an intimate experience, of a
supernatural perception analogous to mystical knowledge. Many t~co·
logians admit today that it is this experience of God on which the certatnty
of our faith is founded.' 'But', he continues, 'it must be emphasized no
less strongly that God always reveals himself in a mediate way, under
the sign and the veil of objects distinct from himself, and that we always
know him in this mediate way, through the signs . .. The sign is the
human reality of Jesus Christ' (pp. 19-20). On this background, P.
Bouillard presents the Blondelian thesis: 'To show the duty of believing.
one must first show that the Christian faith conditions the achievement of
our human destiny. No apologetic is of use unless, in some fashion, it
takes that course. It would be fruitless to establish miracles and great

L'Eglise et /es fates by Jean_Guitt<,m. Pp. 198 (Desclee de Brouwer)
120 F.B.
.
As the first layman to be invited to attend the Council, first as an observer
and then as an auditor, M. Guitton would seem to be well qualified to
write on the subject of the role of the laity in the Church. He bases his
~eflections on Newman's Rambler article 'On Consulting the Faithful
tn matters of Doctrine' (July, 1859) which he reprints in a French translation; as a result, out of 189 pp. of text 131 pp. are taken up with the
article, an introduction to it and some extracts from Newman's note to
The Arians where these are relevant. So we are left with only some sixty
pages of M. Guitton's own reflections on the subject of his book. In
~Iity the pages of the book actually devoted to the subject and contami?g fresh matter amount to exactly forty-six, since the last section
consists of an appendix, first published in the Revue Apologetique as long
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Tl,e My//, of Simplicity. By MARIO BUNGE. Pp. xii, 240, London, Prentice-Hall
International, 1963, 48s.
· The 'myth' which Bunge attacks in this book is the idea that the function of
science is to simplify-to show that the apparent complexity of the world can be
reduced to simple terms. While not denying that the search for simplicity has a
place in science, he maintains that its importance has been overrated. The result
has been thafmuch contemporary philosophy of science is guilty of oversimplification: it fails to appreciate the true complexity of the physical world . .Among
those modern trends which arc open to criticism on this score are reductionist
theories which would reduce physical objects to colfections of sense-data; linguistic analysis in so far as it seeks to make ordinary linguistic usage the general
philosophical norm, ignoring the depth and subtlety of scientific language; and
linguistic formalism which seeks to, impose a logically precise, purely formal
language which, again, only achieves its end by means of a systematic impoverishment of scientific discourse.
In a painstaking series of studies, Bunge examines a number of aspects of the
general notion of simplicity, distinguishing between simplicity as a characteristic of the physical world and as a characteristic of our descriptions of it and,
within the latter field, between simplicity of terms, propositions, laws and theories.
Some of the analysis may strike the reader as over-elaborate. For instance, more
than seven dozen different types of ' law-like statement' arc distinguished (not all,
admittedly, mutually exclusive) and it is by no means clear at the end that such
a minute system of classification was really worth undertaking. Perhaps, though,
it is as well that every possible distinction should be made at least once; in order
to be sure that no significant differences have been overlooked.
In the main, the author establishes his point that the world, and scientific discourse about it, have a depth and richness to which writers on the philosophy of
science have frequently failed to do justice. His argument woul<l, however, have
been greatly strengthened if his criticisms of false principles of simplicity had been
counterbalanced by a more positive recognition of the genuine concepts of
simplicity which science requires. In a true and important sens·~ it can be said that
the scientist discovers an underlying simplicity in the structure of the world whenever he finds that a set of apparently unrelated phenomena can be described by a
single law, or that several apparently distinct laws are particular instances of a
more general one. A universe in which relatively brief and simple law-like statements can convey large amounts of information about natural phenomena is, by
any reasonable criterion, structurally simpler than one in which this is not the
case. Bunge rig_htly stresses the difficulties which arise when we try to give precise
definition to phrases such as 'simple statement• or 'structural simplicity'; nevertheless it seems impossible to doubt that they do have some significance. Modern
developments in Information Theory could probably help to elucidate this
question.
The author docs not claim, however, to have given any final solution to his
problems and it would perhaps be unfair to ask for a more comprehensive
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treatment of the theme than he intended to give. The book, as ii stands, can be
read with profit by all who arc interested in the logical structure of science.
JOHN

L. RUSSl:LL

Sense, Nonsense and Clzristianity. By H. MEYNELL. Pp. 281 (Stagbooks), London,
Sheed & Ward, 1964, 12s. 6d.
The book is perhaps the first attempt by a philosopher of Catholic background
to subject the statements of traditional Christianity to a kind of linguistic
analysis. His task is not primarily to determine whether these statements are true
or false, but rather to find the means by which they ca n be verified or falsified.
The first chapter gives a very clear summary description of statements in general.
A statement in order to signify facts has to fulftl certain conditions. By distinguishing between the necessary, the central and the peripheral conditions of
meaningful propositions, the author explains the basic categories according to
which he intends to analyse religious statements. Any statement that docs not
fulfil its necessary condition ,vould "be nonsensical, whereas the non-fulfilment
of central conditions r~nders our propositions logically odd. It is noteworthy
that, when discussing this basic distinction of the conditions of meaningfulness,
the author relinquishes one of the original tenets of Wittgenstein and Ay-:.r.
According to him the necessary conditions of a statement, though strictly implied in it, are not affirmed analytically of the same. The di!Tcrcncc between
analytic and synthetic propositions is not one of kind but of degree.
In the second chapter the treatment of religious statements is a pproached by a
discussion of value-statements. Braithwaitc·s reduction of these latter to moral
commitment falsifies the nature of religious statement!.. To be religious impli.:s
not the use of a different set of criteria for valuation from that used by those who
are not religious : it is rather to hold that there obtains a different slate of affai rs
with an eye to which these criteria have to be employed. In other words religious
statements are value-statements which necessarily depend on so,nc factual truthconditions and only secondarily on religious behaviour and moral a ttitm.lcs.
The statements of tradition:.il Christian bdicf arc classified .1,: 11~,':::g to tl:c.:ir
factual enta ilments. The propositions of our Creed refer to histori~1I r.,cts oi the
past (e.g. 'suffered under Pontius Pilate') to facts of present experience (' I believe
in the Holy Catholic Church'), and to future facts ('who cometh to judge the
living and the dead'). For traditional Christianity the factual content of relisious
statements is kept in this threefold division and they are thus mutually irreducible.
Modern theological thousht on the other hand strives to reduce past and future
factual references to present Christian experience. Thus Kant, for example, b:;.
translating its statements reduces traditional Christianity into moral imperatives;
Schleiermacher's reductionism is founded on an acsthetical basis, where facts,
past and future, arc resolved in the present feeling-experience of the religious
individual. Hegel's attitude to Christian belief is characterized as a ' metaphysical
re.ductionism': religion is absorbed in the philosophy of self-realizing Mind, the
subject par exce/le11ce which can never become the factual object of our·religious
statcmc1?,ts. It is only in the appendix that the author discusses the existentialist
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reductionism of Bultmann, and analyses the idea of demythologization. Briefly,
'reductionist' theologies invert the proportion among the truth-conditions of
traditional Christianity where past and future facts were the necessary conditions
and present experiential facts only the central conditions.
Chapter V proceeds to discuss the ontological implications of traditional
religious statements. The common-sense ontology, which seems to be at the basis
·of traditional belief, presupposes three irreducible types of beings: persons,
sensations, material objects. Now just as a 'reductionist' theologian tries to
eliminate past and future.facts as necessary truth-conditions of his statements, so
analytic philosophy endeavours to reduce these three types of existence to one.
The author argues that this reduction is not permissible. For instance, religious
statements about the existence of God cannot be reduced to the affinnation of a
certain pattern of natural phenomena, as Ayer suggested, and the 'God language'
of the Bible naturally presupposes and affirms the personal element in God when
it acknowledges his manifestation in nature. ' God is angry' is not reducible to the
statement 'It thunders'. The truth conditions of religious statements are of wider
range than the verifiable propositions of the analyst, already on the level of
ontological implications. The ca!ie of this 'personal element' presupposed by
traditional religious statements is well argued both against Professor Ayer and
Professor Ryle. There are private facts about persons which are not equivalent
to the public facts about them, by virtue of which persons may thus be said in a
sense to transcend the public world. If this can be said meaningfully of any person, all the more can the same be affirmed of the traditional idea of God in
Christian belief. The Christian acknowledges God not only as the First Cause or
the object of man's worship or the sanction of man's works, but as a free personal
agent who brought about striking events in past history. This view and its implications can be denied by atheists or deists, but whether one believes it or not,
the traditional Christian's affirmation can claim the support of facts which are at
least in principle verifiable. Thus the statements of traditional Christianity arc
allegations, whether true or false, of public or private facts. Chapter VI gives us
some examples of how the principles previously stated can be used in the analysis
of religious mysteries. For mysteries, too, are religious statements in so
as some of their truth-conditions within the system of a religious doctrine can
be pointed out. Thus the truth conditions, necessary central and peripheral,
of the Inspiration of Sacred Scripture, of Miracles and"Visions, of Christo logy, of
the Real Presence arc discussed in turn. The author's presentation of these latter,
though rather sweeping, cannot fail to arouse the interest of Christian apologists
and systematic theologians.
Some reflections may be added to this interesting attempt by Mr Meyncll. The
first is concerned rather with the structure of the whole book than with its contents. In his introduction the author forecasts the general trend of his argument:
•of the logical positivist's criteria of meaningfulness some arc fulfilled by the doctrines of traditional Christianity, while the others are themselves invalid'. To tell
the truth, after re:1ding carefully the ensuing discl!ssions, I am still unable to say
wlzic/z criteria of meaning arc fulfilled by Christianity and whid1 arc in themselves

far

invalid. Secondly, without sharing the somewhat sanguine views of Professor
I. Ramsey, who seems to expect from an analytic approach to theology a
revolutionary renewal of this disciP.line, I had_anticipated a more positive c,•aluation oflinguistic analysis as applied toChristinn doctrine. To use the language of
certain philosophical method means a commitment to the basic intuitions of the
same, whether in their original sense or in their reasonably revised perspectives.
For either, one accepts the basic tenets of logical positivism along with its jargon
and admits that they arc inapplicable to Christian mysteries, or else one enters
into~ dialogue with the an~lyst in order to grasp in his very method those basically
true intuitions which, correctly understood, not only do not prove our religious
statements to be meaningless, but rather throw a new light on them. I believe that
this latter alternative is possible without altogether sacrificing the basic tenets of
linguistic analysis. There is no half-way house between these alternatives, where
we could pick and choose among the ideas of a philosophical method at our
pleasure. (Perhap.; the author's attitude to the strict division of statements into
analytical and synthetic, is an example of this point. It is true, some analysts have
already abandoned Aycr's and Wittgenstein's strict division, but to me none of
their arguments are altogether convincing.) Thirdly, the most·valuablc result of
the author's investigation is the clear distinction between the 'traditionalist'
and 'reductionist' versions of Christian religious statements, and this corresponds
with what has happened in the so-called 'reductionist' tendencies in thc field of
ontology. From a philosophical point of view I found the author's arguments
more or less convincing. I am not convinced, however, about their straightfonmrd
application to the truth-conditions of traditional Christianity. Mr Mcyncll '
affirms on the one hand that the necessary truth-conditions of traditional ~
Christianity are those referring to historical facts of p:1st and futurc, wherc:is "'
present Christian experience is only a central condition of the same. But, on the
other hand he seems to maintain that the relationship of the latter to the former
conditions is a necessary one (cf. p. :!4S). But is the necessity of this relationship
reciprocal? fn other words: do th:: factual conditions of p:ist and fucurc strictly
imply some present Christian expcriencc? And vice vcrs:i t C:111 we not ask
whether this present Christian experience docs not turn statements about past
and future events into meaningfully religious statements? Whatever this'Christian
experience is, and however one sets about its 'thematization', is it not our task
also to explain? The attempts of 'reductionist' theologians have the merit of
emphasizing (even if unduly) the importance of the 'experience' in question. Any
Christian religious statement that did not refer to the event of Christ would bt
admittedly nonsensical. But equally, any Christian statement that did not strictly
imply a present Christian experience of the individual who professes it, would be
not only odd, but irrelevant from the point of view of traditional Christianity.
Not even Catholic apologists can dismiss summarily Paul Tillich's statc1111:nt:
'Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably, ultimately. . • ·. Without t{1e
element of Ultimate concern no assertion is a thcologic.11 one' (The Piotcsta111
Era [London 1951), p. 9S).
GEORGE VASS

_.._..._._

___________
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